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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
A few years ago, Norway's Ambassador to the United States 
declared to the Washington Diplomat that his country's 
"tradition of good deeds" reflected its "enlightened self-
interest." Approvingly, the paper's writer commented that 
Norway "has been widely regarded as one of a handful of 
countries that consistently acts with generosity and 
broadmindedness in international affairs." Indeed, if the 
international community were to award a "good citizenship 
award" each year, then Norway would rake in the medals.' 
Historians and other commentators have also spoken of 
Norway's "ethical foreign policy" or "missionary impulse" 
which is seen to lie behind an altruistic desire to be of 
assistance and do the right thing in the world. However, it has 
been pointed out at as well that self-centred concerns have 
influenced Norwegian policy more than most of the country's 
statesmen would like to admit.' In other words, the self-
interest may have been just as egocentric as enlightened. 
The history of Norway's actions and attitudes during the 
Cod Wars - Iceland's fishing disputes with Britain after the 
Second World War - will be examined here in light of these 
I John Shaw, "Norway~ the International Citizen," The \Vashingto1t 
Diplomat, [http://www.washdiplomat.com/Ol~08/a4_08~Ol.html]. acccssed 
January 3, 2005. 
2- For a summary, see Olav Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations - A Histo1)' 
(Oslo, 2001), 254-73. 
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two possible determinants of sympathy and self-interest. At 
first sight, sympathy and compassion would seem more likely 
to have guided Norway's policy on Iceland than the selfish 
protection of purely Norwegian interests. After all, a close 
bond is often said to exist between the [Wo countries. In the 
summer of 1970, for instance, Iceland's President, Kristjan 
Eldjaru, wrote in his diary that the Icelanders and the 
Norwegians were so close and so similar in nature that it was 
impossible to distinguish between them:; Countless 
declarations on the friendship between the two nations could 
also be quoted and both commonly refer to each other as "our 
cousins. " 
Nonetheless, the relationship between Iceland and Norway 
has also, at times and in certain areas, seemed somewhat 
touchy and sensitive. The cousins have then become 
competitors, or even antagonists, and the smaller Icelanders 
have appeared resentful or suspicious towards the much 
bigger Norwegians. Common origins have even accentuated 
such tension. In 1965 - to name one piece of anecdotal 
evidence - an Icelandic university student openly charged 
Norwegian academics and politicians with systematic and 
blatant "theft" by claiming that famous Icelandic men from 
the age of the Vikings and the Sagas were in fact Norwegian. 
In this way, the charge went, the ruthless Norwegians tried to 
deprive the Icelanders of their glorious past and make it their 
own. In Reykjavik, Norwegian diplomats were amused for a 
while but had almost forgotten the accusations when the 
Icelandic Foreign Ministry firmly asked for Norway's official 
position in the case.' 
Admittedly, on closer inspection the Icelandic authorities 
decided to let the matter rest. Yet, the underlying distrust 
,1 The National Library of Iceland, !vfanllscripr Department. Papers of 
Krisrjan Eldjarn, diary for July 1, 1970. 
, See Archives of the Foreign Ministry (Oslo) [UD], 34.4/60/IlI, Nonvegian 
Embassy (Reykjavik), to Foreign Ministry, October 29, 1965, and January 
28, 1966. 
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remained and a decade later the Icelanders made a formal 
complaint again. This time the United States was accused of 
co-conspiracy with Norway, as it were. Since 1964, October 9 
has been celebrated in the U.S. as "Leif Erikson Day," to 
commemorate the European discovery of the land which was 
later known as America. On the eve of this day in 1975, the 
Icelandic Ambassador in Washington noticed that the U.S. 
administration described "Erikson" as a "Norwegian". He 
swiftly lodged a formal protest against this hurtful 
interpretation. On the contrary, he insisted, the explorer was 
indispntably an Icelander and while the Ambassador realised 
that the damage had already been done, he asked "that 
measures be taken immediately to see to it that any 
proclamations being made by state governments this year 
avoid the same error." The innocent officials in the State 
Department could only assure the Ambassador that "although 
it could give no guarantees, it would do what was possible to 
h' ,,5 meet IS request. 
Twenty years later, the Icelanders had seemingly won 
custody over the Nordic hero in the United States: proclaiming 
"Leif Erikson Day" in his tenure, President George W. Bush 
has habitually - and diplomatically - spoken of "the 
courageous son of Iceland and grandson of Norway. ,,6 
Presumably, the rulers in Reykjavik will next campaign for the 
Icelandic spelling of his name, Leifur (or Leifr) Eiriksson, 
instead of the Scan din avian version. On the one hand, debates 
or disputes over the nationality of the Nordic voyager seem 
petty and misguided, especially since the Norse settlers of 
Iceland did not consider themselves as "Icelanders" in contrast 
5 Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA IGRFLL National 
Security Adviser. NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs Staff: Files. Box 
11. Iceland, 1975 (1), George S. Springsreen 1vlemorandum for Brem 
Scowcroft, September 23,1975. 
6 Sce for instance "Leif Erikson Day, 2004," Proclamation by the President 
of the United States, Ihttp://\V\\'w.whitehousc.gov/ncws/releasesI2004 
1l0/prinr/2004/1 O/pril1t!20041 007-7.htmlJ, accessed January 3, 2005. 
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to "Norwegians".' On the other hand, concrete tourist and 
promotional interests have been at stake. And there have 
certainly been other cases where more fundamental national 
interests of Iceland and Norway have clashed and no love has 
been lost between these two neighbours in the North Atlantic. 
Usually, the ocean itself and its riches have been to blame. 
In the late 19" century, Norwegian herring fishermen and 
whale hunters began to operate in the waters off Iceland. 
Although they introduced new skills and at least indirect 
wealth to the poor island, the locals tended to dislike the 
foreign exploitation. In the interwar years, the Icelanders also 
felt that Norway always drove a hard bargain when it came to 
tariffs on Icelandic products and the continuation of 
Norwegian fishing privileges in Iceland. During the Second 
World War, the Icelanders wholeheartedly sympathised with 
the Norwegians in their struggle against Nazi Germany but in 
the post-war period, Norway and Iceland were keen 
competitors on the world's fish markets, especially in the 
United States.' And in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the two 
countries even managed to embroil themselves in a "border 
dispute" as disagreements rose over the delimitation of 
exclusive economic and fishery zones between Iceland and Jan 
Mayen, the small Norwegian island far north off Iceland.' 
Finally, since the 1990s the Icelanders and the Norwegians 
have almost constantly quarrelled over fishing rights around 
Svalbard and elsewhere in the northernmost parts of the 
North Atlantic. Icelandic statesmen and fishermen have 
7 See for instance Sverrir Jakobsson, "Defining a Nation: Popular and Public 
Identity in the Middle Ages," Scandill{111ian journal of Hist01)" Vo!. 24, No. 
1,1999,91-1Ol. 
~ See for instance Olafur Hannibalsson and J6n Hjaltason, Si)/umidstod 
hrad(rystilisalllla IT. Saga 51-11942-1996 [HistOry of the Icelandic Seafood 
Company] (Reykjavik, 1997), 151-61-
~ For a summary, see Rolf Tamnes, "Military Buildup and Nordic Stability 
in the 19705," unpublished paper presented to the conference, "The Nordic 
States and the Cold \Var," of C\VIHP, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, and University of Iceland, Reykjavik, June 24--27, 1998. 
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complained bitterly over Norwegian "ocean imperialism" and 
compared it to the drive to lay claim to Arctic regions in the 
first decades of the 20,h century. Conversely, Norwegian 
commentators have remarked that when fish is involved, the 
Icelanders are certainly tough and unscrupulous customers. \0 
Some cousins, it could be said! 
Like the conflict between sympathy and self-interest, this 
friction must be kept in mind when examining Norwegian 
policy towards Iceland during its fishing disputes with Britain. 
Moreover, the strategic importance of Iceland in the Cold War 
must be taken into acconnt. Cod War and Cold War were 
intrinsically linked and that connection could not but affect 
considerations on Iceland in Oslo. It will be seen here how 
Norwegian policymakers nervously criticised the Icelanders 
for their repeated threats to expel o.s. forces from Iceland and 
leave NATO, thus upsetting the whole "Nordic balance." At 
least some Icelanders were apt to counter that they did not 
want to serve as an outpost for the defence of Norway. "Why 
don't they offer to take the [O.S.] base and put it up near 
Oslo"? a leading Socialist in Iceland asked in the mid 1970s." 
Similarly, a veteran Icelandic diplomat later spoke of the 
Norwegians during the Cold Wars (off the record, it should be 
noted) as "you ... wimps. You don't want O.S. bases but then 
you try to tell us that we must have the Yankees here for our 
own security when in fact you are just thinking about 
I "p yourse ves. -
11) For a summary, see Tony Samstag, "Cod \Vars: Showdown Between 
Iceland and Norway", Scalldinavian Relliew, spring/summer 1995, 37-40. 
See also Yngvc Kristensen, "Nabokrangel om fisk. Striden mellom Norge og 
Island om fetten ril .1 fiske i Fiskevernsonen vcd Svalbard i perioden 1993-
2003." [Neighbours' fight over fish. The conflict between Iceland and 
Norway over the right to fish in the Fishery Prorection Zone off Svalbard, 
1993-2203) MA-thesis in history, University of Bergen, 2004. 
11 Magnus Kjartansson, Elds er tbarf. Rivdur og greillar (d 1947 til1979. 
[Fire is needed. Speecbes and articles, 1947-79] (Reykjavik, 1979),232-37. 
II Author's interview with an anonymous Icelandic diplomat, June 22, 2004. 
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The work is divided into seven main chapters. After a brief 
historical introdnction, chapter two discnsses the period from 
1944 to 1952 when Norway and Iceland made moves to 
increase their jurisdiction on the oceans, encouraged by the 
development of the law of the sea in favour of coastal states. 
Norway declared its determination to enforce fully its long-
standing fonr mile limit of territorial waters off North 
Norway, inclnding fjords and waters inside the Norwegian 
skjcerglird. Britain protested but in 1951, the International 
Court of Justice gave its verdict in the dispute, completely in 
Norway's favour. Almost at once, the Icelanders decided to 
follow suit. In doing so, however, they not only enraged the 
British trawling industry but they also closed good herring 
grounds to Norwegian fishermen who had worked there since 
the late 19,h century. This created a dilemma for the 
authorities in Oslo: should they sympathise with Iceland, 
which after all was only following the same course as the 
Norwegians, or should they defend the interests of Norway's 
herring fishermen? 
Chapter three covers the years from 1952 to 1956. It is 
mainly concerned with Britain's harsh reaction to Iceland's 
four mile limit extension. On the one hand, the Icelanders 
were astonished that the rulers in London did not accept the 
Icelandic action, based as it was on the ruling at The Hague. 
On the other hand, they clearly expected Norway to side with 
them in the ensuing conflict, as Britain imposed a ban on the 
landings of iced fish from Iceland, thus closing its most 
important market. Norwegian sympathies clearly lay with the 
Icelanders but would that translate into unqnalified support? 
Chapter four then discusses the Norwegian response to the 
crisis in Iceland's relationship with its NATO partners in 
1956-57, when it looked as if a new left-wing government in 
Reykjavik might expel the V.S. forces in Iceland, stationed 
there since 1951. Iceland, a fonnding member of NATO, was 
a vital strategic link in Western defences in the North Atlantic 
10 FORSV.'RSSTUDIER 1/2005 
and the defence interests of Norway would be seriously hit if 
the alliance did not have adequate installations on the island. 
Thus, the Norwegians had to be concerned and, furthermore, 
were they not most likely to be able to influence the 
Icelanders? 
Chapter five focuses on the eventful years from 1958 to 
1961. In these years, the United Nations convened two 
conferences to discuss the law of the sea and the width of 
fishing limits and territorial waters. Most significantly, 
however, the first Cod War broke out at the beginning of the 
period when the left-wing government in Iceland extended the 
country's fishing limits to 12 miles. Again, Iceland's allegiance 
within NATO came under threat, causing considerable 
anxiety in Oslo and long deliberations on how best to secure 
the most satisfactory solution for Norway, yet without giving 
the appearance of hard-nosed selfishness. Before the Cod War 
came to an end, the Norwegians had extended their own 
limits to 12 miles, which gave rise to some complaints in 
Iceland that the Nordic neighbours had decided to let the 
Icelanders fight at the Cod War front and then sail leisurely in 
their wake when Britain had all but surrendered. 
Unusually, the 1960s passed peacefully in the waters off 
Iceland. Then, however, trouble erupted once more. Chapter 
six describes the Norwegian reaction to the events of 1971-73 
in Iceland which were in many ways a repetition of the 
tumultuous years of the late 1950s. As before, a left-wing 
government in Reykjavik declared its intention to expel the 
U.S. forces from the island. Moreover, it extended the fishing 
limits from 12 to 50 miles in 1972, a move which infuriated 
the British authorities and the trawling industry (although the 
Royal Navy was initially kept at bay). A fresh concern for 
Norway was the effect which decisions and developments in 
Iceland would have on the question of Norwegian 
membership of the European Economic Communities. Yet, the 
strategic ramifications were uppermost in the minds of 
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decision makers in Oslo, especially after May 1973 when 
British warships intervened and the second Cod War began in 
earnest, with collisions at sea and threats in Reykjavik about 
the rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain. Chapter seven 
describes the discussions in Oslo about the possible 
consequences of such action and the ways in which Norway 
could mediate or work towards a solution of the conflict. 
Chapter eight is about the last Cod War in 1975-76, when 
Iceland extended its fishing limits to 200 miles. This time, 
Britain almost immediately sent in the navy and serious 
clashes occurred in the disputed waters, with considerable 
damage to both warships and coast guard vessels. Although a 
left-wing government was not in power in Reykjavik during 
this dispute, the U.S. presence and Iceland's membership in 
NATO came under threat and the Icelandic authorities even 
contemplated charging Britain with violent aggression before 
the United Nations Security Council. In Oslo, all this led to 
the same concerns and the same search for solutions which 
had been apparent in the earlier Cod War of the 1970s. 
Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund took more interest in 
Icelandic affairs than his predecessors had done and 
continnally offered Norway's good offices. Nonetheless, 
Iceland took an unprecedented step in relations between two 
NATO states and broke diplomatic relations with Britain. At 
cl,at stage, in February 1976, no obvious end to the dispute 
seemed in sight. 
Lastly, chapter nine deals with the tense final months of the 
third Cod War when Frydenlund continued his mediating 
efforts. In May, after a series of serious collisions at sea which 
almost miraculously did not lead to cl,e loss of life, the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister facilitated meetings between 
British and Icelandic ministers in Oslo which then led to an 
agreement to end hostilities, signed in the Norwegian capital 
on June 1, 1976. The last Cod War was over but was it really 
12 FORSV.4RSSTUDIEH 1/2005 
true, which some claimed afterwards, that "Frydenlund solved 
. ";J It . 
The work is primarily based on archival research in Iceland, 
Norway, Britain and the United States. Thanks are dne to the 
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies for assistance during 
research in Oslo, and also to the Gerald R. Ford Foundation 
for support in connection with research at the Ford 
Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
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Chapter 2 
"We are in the same boat" 
Historical Background and Four-Mile 
Fishing Limits off Iceland and Norway, 
1944-52 
The Cod Wars broke out because Iceland and Britain 
disagreed about the right to fish in the waters off Iceland. 
Obviously, the disputes involved the law of the sea, an ancient 
and fluctuating concept. \J In the 13'h and 14'" centuties, the 
Norwegian Kingdom claimed the waters north of the British 
Isles all the way to Greenland as the "King's Seas." When 
Iceland and Norway came under Danish rule, the rulers in 
Copenhagen continued to uphold this claim. However, they 
had to retreat as other states refused to accept their 
sovereignty on the oceans. By the 17''' century, the Danish 
King instead proclaimed a wide limit of territorial waters off 
his dependencies in the North Atlantic. In the Icelandic case, 
the limit initially equalled 32 nautical miles (one nautical mile 
is 1852 metres) but in the 19'h century the Danish authorities 
only laid claim to a four-mile limit, measured from baselines 
between the outermost headlands and skerries. So did the 
authorities in Stockholm on behalf of their Norwegian 
]} For an overview, sec Sayre Swarztrauber, The Three-Mile Limit of 
Territorial Seas (Annapolis, 1972), and R.R. Churchill and A.V. lowe, Tbe 
Lato of the Sea (Manchester:, 2"' ed., 1988),59-68. 
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subjects. By this stage, however, Great Britain championed the 
doctrine of the freedom of the high seas and the three-mile 
limit of territorial waters (measured from the low-water mark 
and only allowing for the inclusion of fjords less than ten 
miles wide). In 1882, all states but one lying on the North Sea 
agreed on this narrow limit in those waters. Only the 
Kingdom of Sweden and Norway refused and continued to 
maintain the historic Nordic claim to the baseline-measured 
four mile limit. Furthermore the agreement did not apply to 
Greenland, Iceland or the Faroe Islands, all under Danish 
rule. H 
Around 1890, British trawlers began to fish in the rich 
waters off Iceland and in the first decade of the 20,h century 
they also discovered the fishing grounds off North Norway. In 
both countries, the coastal fishermen still used small boats 
with line and nets, and strongly resented the competition, for 
when the trawl was drawn along the sea bed, other gear could 
be wrecked and the increased fishing effort led to depletion in 
some old and well-established fishing grounds. IS In Iceland, 
the local parliament, the Althing, tried to ban trawling close 
the island's shores but it almost goes without saying that, at 
the height of Pax Brita1l1zica, Great Britain would have none 
of that. In 1901, Britain and Denmark signed a treaty on the 
three-mile limit around the Danish dependencies of Iceland 
14 For a summary, see for instance Hannes ]6nsson, Friends ill Conflict. The 
Allglo·Icelalldic Cod Wars and the Law of the Sea (London, 1982), 31-37. 
See also Gudni ]6hannesson, "En frelles konflikt? Kampen om 
fiskerigrrenser i Nordatlanten fra middelalder tit nutid. >1 [A common 
conflict? Fishery limits disputes in the North Atlantic from the Middle Ages 
to the present day]. Daniel Thorleifsen (cd.), De vestl10rdiske landes 
{refleshistorie. Udvalg af il1dledellde betragllinger Oller dele a( dell 
vestllordiske fll!/leshistorie (Nuuk, 2003), 63-72. 
15 For the origins of British trawling off Iceland, see J6n Th. Thar, "The 
Beginnings ofBritish~Steam Trawling in Icelandic Waters," Mariner's 
Mirror, Vol. 74, No. 3, 1988,267-72. For Norway, see Brit Floistad, 
"Hovedlinjene i utformingen av norsk sjogrensepolitikk etter 1945" {Main 
developments in Norwegian policy on fishing limits and territorial waters 
after 1945], CMA thesis, University of Oslo, 1982),42-45. 
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and the Faroe Islands. At first, the Icelanders were fairly 
content with this development since they hoped that the 
waters inside the line would at least be protected. The British 
proved to be incessant "poachers", however, and resentment 
over the narrow jurisdiction grew steadily."; Meanwhile, 
having gained independence from Sweden in 1905, the 
Norwegians continued to maintain the wider four-mile limit 
and in 1911 they even arrested a British trawler for illegal 
fishing inside that line, but outside a three-mile line from the 
low-water mark. The British authorities were enraged. As 
Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey told the Norwegian 
Ambassador in London, the three-mile rule had become a vital 
national interest, "a principle on which we might be prepared 
to go to war with the strongest power in the world."" 
Afterwards, the Norwegians did not enforce assiduously the 
four-mile limit. Still, they never renounced their legal claim to 
it and in 1935 they issued a new Royal Decree on that line, a 
move which Britain protested so strongly that they backed 
down, while reserving their legal rights. A temporary 
compromise limit came into being but the matter was 
unresolved when war broke out in 1939.'" In many ways, 
therefore, the Icelanders and the Norwegians were in the same 
boat after the Second World War, when they began to secure 
their jurisdiction over the fishing grounds off their coasts. In 
theory and law, both could refer to old claims of wide 
territorial waters and both had to fight a British side, 
apparently determined to defend the principle of narrow 
limits. Apparently, the "cousins" had every reason to stick 
together. 
Iti SceJ6n Th. Th6r, British Trawlers ami leeland 1919-1976 (Esbjerg, 
1995),45-50. 
"The National Archives, London, [TNA], PRO MAF411674, Sir Edward 
Grey to Findlay, June 26, 1911. 
16 For the Anglo-Norwegian conflict over territorial waters in the first half of 
the twentieth century, see Floistad, '"Hovedlinjene''' 42-53. See also Olav 
Riste, Norway's Foreig11 Relation, 124-26. 
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On June 17, 1944, Iceland became an independent republic. 
The country had amassed relatively great wealth during the 
war, both by selling fish to Britain and through services to the 
British troops who occupied Iceland in 1940 and to the U.S. 
forces that took over the protection of the island the following 
year. In late 1944, a coalition of the conservative 
Independence Party (the largest party in Iceland throughout 
the post-war period), the Social Democratic Party and the pro-
Moscow Socialist Unity Party came to power in Reykjavik. It 
aimed to extend the fishing limits and considered the three-
mile treaty from 1901 to be a relic from the days of Danish 
rule. No immediate change took place but right after the end 
of the Second World War, a watershed occurred in Iceland's 
favour. In September 1945, President Harry S. Truman issued 
two Declarations on U.S. rights in its adjoining waters. Firstly, 
the United States claimed jurisdiction over all resources on its 
continental shelf, which in some areas stretched hundreds of 
miles from shore. Secondly, the United States reserved the 
right to regulate fisheries in the waters above the shelf. Yet, it 
did not intend to discriminate against foreign fishermen, for 
the United States was still a convinced "three miler". Even so, 
some Latin-American states were quick to interpret the 
declarations as they wished, proclaiming territorial waters or 
exclusive fishery jurisdiction of up to 200 miles.!' 
The U.S. move was of course also noticed in Norway and 
Iceland." In particular, the Icelanders seemed interested in this 
possible precedent for an extension of their fishing limits. 
Furthermore, they were keen to know if and when Norway 
was going to reopen the dispute with Britain over the four-
mile limit.'! The Icelanders clearly wanted to follow suit, 
1'1 Swarztrauber, Three mile Limit, 155-69. 
~ll See RA, 11000, 3] .6.3/1, Per Prebensen to Department of Commerce 
(Oslo), December 29,1945, and Papers of David 61afsson [DOP], Aki 
Jakobsson to Foreign Ministry (Reykjavik), February 11, 1946. 
11 RA, 11000, 31.6.3II, Rolf Andersen to Norwegian Legation (Stockholm), 
November 6, 1946. 
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should the Norwegians be successful on that front. At a 
fisheries conference in Reykjavik in early 1947, Icelandic 
officials suggested that Iceland and Norway recognise each 
other's right to a four-mile limit. The Norwegian 
representatives had no mandate to make such pledges and the 
authorities in Oslo did not seem to be in a hurry to confirm its 
four-mile claim off North-Norway." In the winter of 1947-
48, however, British trawlers reappeared in those waters. The 
locals immediately condemned the "trawler plague" and their 
MPs protested in Oslo.23 Something had to be done. In a 
closed session on June 26, 1948, the Storting resolved that the 
1935 Royal Decree of a baseline-measured four-mile limit 
would be fully enforced." In mid-September, when the winter 
fishing season was nearer, Foreign Minister Halvard Lange 
informed the British Ambassador to Norway, Laurence 
Collier, that the coast guard service was to prevent all 
trawling inside the Norwegian line.25 Britain condemned the 
move and suggested fresh negotiations or referral to the 
International Court of Justice at The Hague.'" Conflict lay 
ahead. 
In 1948, Iceland acted as well. The year before, a new 
government had come into power (a coalition of the 
Independence Party, the Social Democrats and the centre-left 
Progressive Party). It was intent to make a move on the issue 
of fishing limits and on April 5 the Althing unanimously 
passed a law, strongly influenced by the Truman Declarations, 
which gave Iceland the right to have all fisheries above its 
1.'. RA, 11002,31.6.3/1, .Minute On Icelandic territorial waters, May 2, 1947. 
See also UD, 31. 11/60III, Erik Dons Minute, !viay 26, 1950. 
"Stortingstidende 1948 (Oslo, 1949), debates May, 29,1948,1258-65 . 
• 'A Parliamelltary Archives, Oslo ISA): closed parliamentary session, June 26, 
1948. 
H TNA, PRO F0371171488!N100651128!30, Laurence Collier, British 
Embassy (Oslo), to Foreign Office, September 16, 1948. 
", TNA, PRO F0371171488!N10569!128130, interdepartmental meeting, 
September 24,1948, and F0371!71488!N10065!128!30, Foreign Office ro 
British Embassy (Oslo), September 25, 1948. 
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continental shelf "subject to Icelandic rules and control."" 
Needless to say, Britain did not like this potential 
encroachment on the high seas. And Norway also had cause 
for concern. Were Iceland to extend its fishing limits, the 
Norwegian herring fishery off the country's north coast might 
be seriously hit. Thus, both the herring fishermen and some 
legal experts urged the Oslo government to oppose the law. It 
was unacceptable, as one of the jurists put it, that a state 
could "unilaterally extend its fishing limits to cover waters 
which previously belonged to the high seas."lS In Stockholm, 
officials also indicated that Sweden was prepared to take part 
in a joint Scandinavian protest against the Icelandic move." 
On the other hand, Norway had ample reason to stay pnt, 
at least for the time being. To begin with, when Foreign 
Minister Bjarni Benediktsson notified the Norwegian Minister 
in Reykjavik, Torgeir Anderssen-Rysst, about the law on the 
continental shelf, he underlined that its aim was primarily to 
prevent new nations from entering the fisheries off Iceland. He 
added as well that an extension was not imminent and that 
the Icelanders would proceed with the "utmost caution.,,30 
Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities had to view the 
Icelandic law in relation to the situation off North-Norway. 
The legal objections sounded uncomfortably like the British 
protests to Norway's baseline-measured limit and if the 
Anglo-Norwegian dispute was to be referred to the 
International Court, Norway would probably damage its case 
27 Sce Fisheries Jurisdiction in Iceland (Reykjavik, 1972), 25. 
" RA, 11002, 31.6.3/1, Erik Colban Minute, October 22,1948. 
" RA, 11002, 31.6.311, R.B. Skylstad to Ministry of Fisheries (Oslo), 
October 30, 1948. See also Archives of the Foreign Ministry, National 
Archives, Copenhagen [RAD], 55.NORGE.I/N, Sch6n, Danish Embassy 
(Oslo), to CaBin, Foreign Ministry (Copenhagen), October 21, 1948. 
;\(1 RA, 11002, 31.6.311, Torgeir Anderssen~Rysst. Norwegian Legation 
(Reykjavik), to Foreign Ministry (Oslo), April 3, 1948. 
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by lodging formal protests against the Icelanders who relied 
just as much on fisheries as the fishermen of North-Norway." 
In the following years, however, decisions needed to be 
made. In July 1949, the Stortillg rejected a compromise line 
which British and Norwegian officials had drawn up after a 
series of negotiations in Oslo and London. The British side 
replied by calling for a joint submission of the dispute to the 
International Court. When that failed as well, Britain did so 
unilaterally, requesting the Court to rule on the validity of 
Norway's baseline method (but not the four-mile limit which 
was considered a lost cause). Shortly thereafter, the Icelanders 
also began to act. In October 1949, they denounced the three-
mile treaty with Britain from 1901, with the stipulated two 
years' notice, and in April next year, Iceland extended the 
fishing limits off its north coast to four miles, drawn the 
"Norwegian way" from baselines across fjords and bays. All 
foreigners were banned from fishing inside the new limit, with 
the exception that the 1901 treaty would apply to British 
subjects until its expiry in October 1951." Now Norwegian 
interests were directly involved. In late March 1950, when 
news of the proposed extension reached Anderssen-Rysst, he 
was quick to point out that the herring industry would be 
hurt. In a conversation with Foreign Minister Benediktsson a 
few weeks later, the Norwegian envoy reiterated that 
Norway's fishermen had started the herring fishery off Iceland 
some 50-60 years before and should therefore be given special 
consideration.33 
Again, such arguments sounded much like the British claims 
which the Norwegians were trying to counter at The Hague. 
In Reykjavik, Benediktsson pointed out that Iceland was only 
claiming the same line as Norway, and in Oslo the Foreign 
" RAD, 55.NORGE.IIIV, Schon, Danish Embassy (Oslo), to Collin, Foreign 
Ministry (Copenhagen), October 21, 1948. 
n ]onsson, Friends, 54-58. 
,J.l UD, 31.11/60/II, Anderssen-Ryssr 1vlinures,1vlarch 27,1950 and April 24, 
1950. 
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Ministry told Anderssen-Rysst to wait with possible protests." 
Yet, in Haugesund, Alesund and other herring ports on the 
west-coast of Norway, the fishermen were angry and upset. 
Most of the best grounds lay inside the new limit and they 
urged the Norwegian government to defend with vigour their 
established interests on the high seas around Iceland.''\ 
Appeals of this kind demonstrated the differing aspects of the 
national interest in the sonthern and northern parts of 
Norway, between inshore and distant-water fishermen. For a 
while, the government in Oslo tried to satisfy both sides, to 
the chagrin of the Icelanders and possibly at the risk of 
undermining the Norwegian case at The Hague. 
On the whole, most Icelandic politicians were convinced 
that Norway would sympathise with Iceland and the declared 
need to prevent overfishing in its waters. In April 1950, when 
the four-mile extension was under discussion in Iceland, 
Stefan J6hann Stefansson, the leader of the Social Democrats 
and a true believer in Nordic cooperation, stated that the 
Norwegians were bound to support such a move since it 
would aid them in their own conflict with Britain." Thus, the 
disappointment was great when it became clear that they were 
in fact against the Icelandic action, because of their own 
interests in Icelandic waters. In June, a Nordic fisheries 
conference was held in Sweden and Klaus Sunnana, the 
Norwegian Director of Fisheries, used the occasion to 
condemn the extension off Iceland:" Even worse, as some 
" UD, 31.11/601II, Anderssen-Rysst Minutes, March 27,1950 and March 
28, 1950, and Foreign Ministry to Norwegian Legation (Reykjavik), April 
5, 1950. 
l,l See SWl1lmore Arbeideravis [Norwegian daily], April 28, 1950, 
Morgllllbladid [Icelandic dailyl, May 5,1950, and UD, 31.11/601II, 
Islandssildfiskernes Forening [Norwegian association of Iceland-herring 
fishermen} to Director of Fisheries (Bergen), l\.1ay 26, 1950 (copy), 
3b Parliamentary Archives, Reykjavik, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, 
April 13, 1950. 
J7 Archives of the Foreign Ministry, National Archives, Reykjavik [URN], 
1996, B/63-1, Hans G. Andersen lvlemorandum, June 21,1950. 
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Icelanders felt, the Norwegian daily Verdells Gang published a 
damning article on the country's fishing limits policy. It was 
"a malicious and hypocritical piece", wrote the socialist organ 
Thj6dviljill11 on its front page." Moreover, 61afur Thors, 
Minister of Fisheries and the leader of the Independence Party, 
condemned the Norwegian attitude, as it appeared to him. 
"We have decided to enforce a regulation on our territorial 
waters," Thors told Anderssen-Rysst "which is identical to 
that which the Norwegians are now defending at The Hague . 
... But when others follow suit the Norwegians want to 
protest. If this is Nordic cooperation then that cooperation 
has no value and no future." Thors was an avowed "friend of 
Norway," Anderssen-Rysst pointed out, so the displeasure 
• 39 
was qUite strong. 
The newly independent Icelanders were still insecure in the 
international arena, sometimes naive about the willingness of 
other nations to support their point of view and apt to 
exaggerate foreign criticism out of proportion. Near the end 
of June, the Icelandic Minister in Oslo, Gisli Sveinsson, 
reported home that although the "Iceland-fishermen" on the 
west-coast had voiced their displeasure in the local press, very 
little had been written on the new Icelandic fishing limits in 
the national newspapers, apart from that one article in 
Verdens Gang, and in any case the writer was considered 
"impetuous and silly. ,,<t, In public, renowned sympathisers 
with Iceland also came to the defence of the old "Saga-
island".41 Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities were still of 
the opinion that a formal protest was not helpful. Sunnana's 
utterances at the fisheries meeting in Sweden had not at all 
been intended to convey a policy of the Oslo government. 
JS Th;6dvil;i1l11 JIcelandic daily], June 21,1950. To make matters worse, the 
article appeared on June 17, Iceland's independence day. See also Verdcns 
Ga/lg [Norwegian daily], June 17, 1950. 
H UD, 31.11160/II, Anderssen-Rysst to Foreign lvlinistry, June 29,1950. 
·1Il URN, 1996, B/63-1, Gfsli Sveinsson to Foreign Ministry, June 29,1950. 
~l Vcrdens Gang, June 27,1950. 
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Then again, the official decision not to complain over the new 
Icelandic law was based on the rather cynical calculation that 
while Norwegians herring interests were hit - and should be 
defended under normal circumstances - the proceedings at 
The Hague over Norway's own baseline limit had to take 
precedence." In addition, although no protest was made the 
Norwegian Legation in Reykjavik did deliver a Memorandum 
to the Icelandic government which stated that there was no 
scientific evidence to suggest that the herring stocks were in 
danger of depletion, that the Norwegian fishermen had sailed 
to Iceland to catch herring for over three quarters of a century 
and that the new fishing limit was therefore somewhat 
unjust." This was as far as the authorities in Norway would 
go, held back as they were by their own case before the 
International Court. 
A selfish approach should not have surprised the Icelanders, 
no paragons of altruism in the opinion of others. In the 
preceding years, Iceland, as a pro-Western nation and a 
founding member of NATO, had greatly benefited from 
Marshall Aid and other economic assistance which was based 
on the contention that richer states had to support their 
smallest ally. There were officials in Western capitals who 
complained bitterly that the Icelanders were only thinking 
about themselves and determined to make the most of their 
strategic importance. They were "living in an unreal world 
and enjoying a standard of living far beyond their means," 
Anderssen-Rysst asserted in mid-1948." "They are wholly 
unreliable as friends and there is no end to their greed," one 
~, UD, 31.11/60/11, Erik Col ban Minute, May 8, 1950, and Director of 
Fisheries w Foreign Ministry, !vIa)' 26, 1950. 
" URN, 1996, B/63·1, and UD, 31.11/60/11, Norwegian Legation 
Memorandum, Jnly 11, 1950. 
44 National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, 
USA [NA], RG59 Records of the Office of British Commonwealth and 
Northern European Affairs, 1941-1953. Subject Files, 1941-53. Box 15, Lot 
54D224 "Iceland. Mr. Butrick (US Mioister) 1948-49," Richard Butrick to 
H. Francis Cunningham, Jr, August 16, 1948. 
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British official later maintained." The Icelanders, however, 
simply felt that they had to fend for themselves. Iceland was 
small but Realpolitik - "foreign policy based on calculations 
of power and tbe national interest," to use Henty Kissinger's 
definition - was the underlying tenet of the country's foreign 
affairs." The same was essentially the case for Norway. "We 
are in the same boat," Gisli Sveinsson had tried to argue in a 
discussion about fishing limits with Erik Colban at the 
Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs in late June 1950." 
But that was only true as far as it went. When national 
interests coincided, Iceland and Norway had a common cause 
and could live up to the ideals of Nordic unity and friendship. 
When they clashed, however, it was everyone for themselves.'" 
Naturally, Britain showed the same self-interest. Although 
the British trawling industry was concerned that valuable 
grounds off Norway might be lost after a decision at The 
Hague, they were nowhere near as important as the waters off 
Iceland. "Up Iceland way," as the trawlermen put it, few 
traditional trawling grounds had been affected by the partial 
extension off Iceland's north coast in 1950, but the true fight 
would commence when the three-mile treaty with Britain was 
gone and a baseline-measured four-mile limit would take 
effect around the whole of Iceland. In October 1951, when the 
treaty had expired, the Icelandic government (now a new 
coalition of the Progressives and the Independence Party) 
decided to wait with further steps on the limit issue until the 
International Court of Justice had delivered its ruling in the 
" TNA, PRO MAF2091230, P.D.H. Dunn Minute, January 7, 1950. 
46 See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), 137. On Iceland's 
foreign policy, see for instance Th6r Whitehead, The Ally \Y!ho Came il1 
(ro11l the Cold. A Survey o( Icelandic Foreign Policy, 1946-1956 
(Reykjavik, 1998), 85-87. 
47 URN, 1996, B/63~1, Gisli Sveinsson to Foreign Ministry, June 29,1950. 
4. On the complexities of the "national interest," scc Joseph Frankel, The 
National Interest (London, 1970), 15. For a recent summary, see H.W. 
Brands, "The Idea of the National Interest," Diplomatic History, Vol. 23, 
}lo.2,1999,239-61. 
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Anglo-Norwegian case. That verdict came in December and it 
was completely in Norway's favour. The Court sanctioned the 
use of baselines and stated that the coastal population's 
dependency on fisheries was one of the factors which 
determined their decision." Unsurprisingly, the Icelanders 
celebrated this outcome, not only because they sympathised 
with Nordic friends but because they could now sail in their 
wake. Foreign Minister Bjarni Benediktsson immediately 
suggested to John Dee Greenway, the British Minister in 
Reykjavik, that conversations be held "to dispose of our 
differences. ,,50 As for Britain, officials and legal experts 
lamented that the ruling at The Hague was the worst possible 
outcome, fraught with adverse consequences." Sir Eric 
Beckett, the Legal Adviser in the British Foreign Office, had 
already confirmed to Hans G. Andersen, his counterpart in 
the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that if the result 
were in Norway's favour the Icelanders could certainly use the 
same method to delimit their fishing limit:" Furthermore, the 
judges had emphasised the geographical and socio-economic 
situation in North Norway. That applied just as well to 
Iceland where fish and fish products made up more than 90 
per cent of the nations exports. "I think we all realise how 
poor a legal case we have," S.]. Whitwell confirmed in the 
Foreign Office in January 1952:" 
4~ For n detailed discussion on the ruling, sce C.H.M. Waldock, "The Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case," British Yearbook of International Law, Vcl. 28, 
1951, 114-71, and Jens Evcnsen, "The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 
and its Legal Consequences," American J01lrnal of International Law, Vol. 
46, No. 4, 1952, 609-30. 
;" TNA, PRO F0371194658/NL1351/61,John Dee Greenway to Foreign 
Office, December 19, 1951. 
n TNA, PRO F0371194694/NN13511128, Sir P. Nicholls to Foreign Office, 
December 18, 1951. See also F03711100628/NL135114, Minutes from 
interdepartmental meeting, ],llluary 3, 1952. 
n TNA, I'RO F0371/94683INN1351124, Sir Eric Beckett Minute, June 5, 
1951. 
I] TNA, PRO F0371/100628/NL1351110, S.]. Whitwell Minute, January 
21,1952. 
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That month, Anglo-Icelandic talks took place in London. 
The Icelanders, led by Fisheries Minister Thors, admitted that 
they intended to follow the Norwegians and widen the fishing 
limit to four miles. But despite recent developments, the 
British side maintained that Norway had enjoyed a stronger 
legal claim to the use of baselines than Iceland did. Moreover, 
the Icelanders were led to understand that the British 
trawlermen simply would not tolerate an extension in the 
Norwegian manner. They would ban all imports of fish from 
Iceland and the authorities in London could do nothing about 
it. The trawling industry was concentrated in Grimsby, Hull, 
Fleetwood and Aberdeen and controlled all landing gear there. 
In the years after the war, the Icelanders had sold around a 
quarter of their iced fish catches to these ports so a ban of this 
kind seemed bound to hurt. Yet, the threat of economic 
coercion only hardened the resolve of the Icelandic 
representatives. On the one hand, they did not believe that the 
British authorities would actually allow the trawling industry 
to wield its muscle against an important ally in NATO, and 
on the other they remained convinced about the legal strength 
of their case. After the unsuccessful discussions in London, the 
legal expert Hans G. Andersen conferred with Norway's 
principal advocates at The Hague, Sven Arntzen of the 
Norwegian Bar and Professor Maurice Bourquin of the 
University of Geneva. The Icelandic government also hired 
.lens Evensen, one of the Norwegian counsels at The Hague, 
as its temporary adviser on fishing limits. These three jurists 
all endorsed that Iceland was fully in the right against Britain 
although they warned that some of the baselines, which the 
Icelanders were contemplating, were far longer than the 
longest ones off North-Norway." 
54 DOP, Petur Sigurdsson Memorandum (undated), URN, 1996 B/63-2, 
Hans G. Andersen co 1vlaurice Bourquin, l\1arch 26, 1952, and 1996-£/63-
3, Icelandic legation (\Vashington) to Foreign Ministry, April 30, 1952. 
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Thus, Iceland went ahead. On March 19, 1952, the 
Icelandic government announced a four-mile fishing limit 
around the whole island, measured by the use of 
"Norwegian" baselines. This new line would come into force 
on May 15. As expected, Britain lodged a formal protest, in 
particular against the extension from three miles to four and 
the longest baseline across the rich Faxa-Bay in the 
southwest. ss Three other states, France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, protested the new limit and despite the recent 
dispute before the International Court, British officials vaguely 
suggested that Norway join in as well. Soon after the ruling at 
The Hague, Foreign Minister Lange had remarked to Sir 
Michael Wright, Britain's Ambassador in Oslo, that 
unfortunately it could have adverse effects for Norway off 
Iceland, and Legal Adviser Beckett could not but comment 
that in this sense the Norwegians had won more than they 
wished for." Norwegian officials did indeed confirm that they 
would like to see the new Icelandic limit withdrawn or 
modified. Still, they realised that if they made such a request 
in public, they would open themselves to accusations of 
hypocrisy and selfishness, not to mention the obvious damage 
they would do to relations with Iceland." Thus, the interest in 
a "good name" on the international scene and a good rapport 
with a Nordic ally was stronger than the interest of defending 
localised fishing rights. Furthermore, this evaluation of 
national interests was slightly influenced by the near total 
collapse of the herring fishery in the early 1950s, both inside 
and outside the new limit. Fortunately for Icelandic-
H See TNA, PRO F037111006291NL1351131, A.]. Whitwell Minute, March 
19,1952, and F037111006291NL1351134, Harry Hohler Minute, March 
26, 1952. See also .J6nssoll, Friends ill C0l1f1ict, 60-64. 
;0, TNA, PRO F03711100664/NN135111, Sir Michael Wright to Anthony 
Eden, January 2,1952, and VD, 31.6/10/XII, Finn Seyersted Minute, March 
3,1952. 
'i7 UD, 31.11/601I1I, Erick Col ban Minute, May 27,1952, and handwritten 
nore, May 30, 1952, and TNA, PRO F0371!1006321NL13511101, British 
Embassy (Oslo), to Foreign Office, June 3, 1952. 
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Norwegian relations, there simply was no herring to worry 
about anyway. 
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Chapter 3 
The An.glo-kelan.dic Four-Mile 
Dispute 
Appeals for Norwegian Support, 1952-56 
In the early 1950s, the government in Oslo could not 
determine whether Norway's national interest ultimatelv lay 
in the advancement of wider fishing limits or the protection of 
narrow territorial waters. Since 1949, the International Law 
Commission of the United Nations had been discussing the 
law of the sea and in 1952, states were asked to comment on 
draft articles on the matter. At that time, the balance seemed 
to lie with the interests of Norwegian inshore fishermen and 
the authorities in Oslo did not object to the recommendation 
that coastal states should be entitled to impose restrictions on 
fishing as far as 200 miles outwards. "Unfortunately", wrote 
a legal officer in the Foreign Office in London, "the 
Norwegian government still seem obsessed by a negative, 
parochial outlook on this question. ,,5H For the next few years, 
no decisions were taken on limits at an international level, bur 
the current was flowing in favour of those who advocated an 
extension of exclusive national jurisdiction. Hence, in Norway 
the advocates of narrow limits reiterated that they expected 
the rulers in Oslo to defend their interests. Whaling was a big 
" TNA, PRO F03711998211GW15, D.H.N. Johnson Minute, March 29, 
1952. 
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industry in the country, for instance, and its representatives 
made their views clear. Likewise, the merchant marine fleet, 
another big interest, feared that wider limits would infringe on 
the principle of free passage on the oceans." In 1954, Norway 
formally protested the claims of Peru, Ecuador and Chile to a 
200-mile limit and in the privacy of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, the Conservative Carl Joachim Hambro 
condemned them as "piracy". (It may perhaps be added that 
he felt that the South-American attitude was perfectly 
comparable to the days of only some hundred years ago when 
villains from the "underdeveloped but now well-respected 
barbarian states of Morocco and Tunisia" captured 
Norwegian sailors on the high seas and sold them into 
I ) 6<, S avery . 
This conflict of inshore and distant Water interests 
continued to confuse Norwegian policy towards fishing limits 
off Iceland. In late 1952, British displeasure with the new 
four-mile limit there led to action against the Icelanders. The 
British trawling industry, with tacit blessing in London, 
imposed its ban on the landings of all iced fish from Iceland. 
Britain was not going to lose another fishing dispute at The 
Hague; instead the battle would be waged on the docks on 
Humberside, Fleetwood and Aberdeen. All knowledgeable 
officials in Whitehall continued to admit that the law was 
essentially on Iceland's side. The British government also 
accepted that the coercion could have adverse political effects: 
in 1951, D.S. troops had returned to Iceland after a break 
since 1946, but the Icelanders were at best lukewarm over 
their presence. Iceland was a reluctant member of western 
defence cooperation, with a deep-rooted inclination towards 
H See UD, 26.11123/JI, Norwegian Whaling Association to ,Ministry of 
Industry, .March 8, 1955, and UD, 26.11/23/1V, Norwegian Whaling 
Association, February 10, 1956. See also Floistad, "Hovedlinjene i 
mfofI11ingen av norsk sjogrensepolitikk etter 1945," 57-64. 
611 Storting Archives, Oslo [SA], Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, 
September 6, 1954. 
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neutrality and a strong socialist party which regularly polled 
up to a fifth of the vote in parliamentary elections. Yet, in 
London the ability to use economic force in order to protect 
an established definition of the national interest proved 
stronger than respect for these realities. Political and strategic 
considerations were overruled, as was respect for international 
law and the result at The Hague. Power mattered most; a 
banker, who handled Icelandic affairs at the Bank of England, 
would later write how "disagreeable" it was to think that 
Britain's unwillingness "to take up the case, as they did with 
Norway, is due to Iceland's being so small and so very 
vulnerable. ,,61 
As expected, the Icelanders condemned the imposition of 
the landing ban. Foreign Minister Benediktsson claimed that 
"short of a declaration of war by Great Britain he could 
conceive no more unfriendly act than that Her Majesty's 
Government should stand by while such a ban was 
imposed. ,,62 While neither he nor other Icelandic spokesmen 
would show British officials any signs of weakness, the ban 
looked to have the desired effect of hurting the Icelanders. 
From London, Norwegian Ambassador Hersleb Vogt 
conveyed the common perception that it would soon force 
them to negotiate and in Reykjavik, Hans G. Andersen 
confessed to Anderssen-Rysst that the government was deeply 
pessimistic about the whole situation.'" After all, in the first 
nine months of 1952, over 80 per cent of iced fish exports 
from Iceland went to Britain." Iceland needed help from 
friends in this struggle against the might of Great Britain. And 
help came. In 1953, the Soviet Union offered to buy the lion's 
,,' Bank of England Archives, London [BEAI: OV3519, H.A. Siepmann 
Minute, January 22, 1953. 
,.; TNA, PRO F03711100635/NL13511195, John Dee Greenway, British 
Legation (Reykjavik), to Foreign Office, November 6, 1952. 
(,3 UD, 31.11/60/III, Hersleb Vogt to Foreign Ministry, November 18, 1952, 
and Anderssen-Rysst to Foreign l\1inistry, November 24, 1952. 
,'4 BEA: OV3519, H.A. Siepmann ~1inute, January 22, 1953. 
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share of d1e country's catches in return for oil and other 
commodities. The authorities in Reykjavik were only too glad 
to accept this break from the British blockade and no longer 
worried too much about it, especially since other markets 
were found as well, including the United States where the 
purchase of Icelandic fish products increased in the mid-
1950s, against the will of its own fishing industry. At one 
stage, President Dwight Eisenhower even suggested that the 
United States acquire all of Iceland's fish production and thus 
end the country's disturbing trade with the Soviet Union." In 
Washington, the landing ban was much disliked (although the 
aversion was not strong enough to attempt to force the British 
authorities to have it lifted) and as has been observed, the U.S. 
National Security Council spent a "remarkable" amount of 
time searching for alternative markets for Icelandic fish in 
non-Communist countries.66 
Despite those efforts, the landing ban was a nuisance for 
Iceland and the dispute with Britain over the four-mile limit 
remained unsolved. The Icelanders looked for moral support 
where they felt it was most forthcoming - among their Nordic 
friends. During a meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers and the 
presidium of the Nordic Council in early 1954, they asked the 
Council to declare its solidarity with Iceland in the fisheries 
conflict. "If we can help each other ... we should do so," said 
Sigurdur Bjarnason of the Icelandic delegation. Foreign 
Minister Lange, a man who was held in high esteem in 
Iceland, was the first to describe the Scandinavian response." 
Although he underlined that the Norwegians empathised with 
the Icelanders, they felt that the Council ought not to take 
sides in a dispute between a Nordic state and another country. 
65 Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas [DDE], Ann 
Whitrnan File, NSC Series Box 5, 207h meeting, July 22,1954. See also 
Gudni]6hannesson, "Troubled Waters," 81-97. 
~'6 Berdal, The United States, Norway and the Cold War, 144. 
,,7 On opinions of Lange in Iceland, see Berdal, The United States, Norway 
alld the Cold IVar, 143. 
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For Denmark and Sweden, Foreign Ministers H.C. Hansen 
and 0sten Unden spoke in a similar vein." 
The Icelanders were undeterred, and also realised that a 
good publicity campaign could be made. In August 1954, the 
Nordic Council held its main session in Oslo. Olafur Thors 
(now Prime Minister in a new coalition of the Independence 
and Progressive Parties) arrived in good form, as Ambassador 
Wright wrote to London: 
M. Thars, who with his mane af hair and high-winged collar 
resembles in appearance a pianist of the old school rather 
than a Scandinavian politician, became a public figure at 
once, and the newspapers published long illustrated reports of 
interviews in which he expounded the justice of the Icelandic 
case and urged the Scandinavian Council to restore M. Thors' 
faith in cooperation between the northern countries.&~ 
During the Council session, the Icelanders proposed again that 
the Nordic Council side with them against Britain. In public, 
other delegates were full of sympathy but in closed sittings 
Prime Minister Thors and other Icelandic representatives faced 
the stubhorn resistance of a Scandinavian bloc. As before, 
their proposal was said to be outside the Council's 
competence which led to a heated and emotional response by 
Thors: "if a small nation with right on its side cannot get 
support in the Nordic region, we can't even expect justice in 
heaven."'" The Scandinavians concluded that Iceland could 
not be snubbed altogether. After a tense discussion, a 
compromise resolution was accepted: 
"I; RAD, 55.lSLAND.lIIII, Memorandum on meeting of Nordic Foreign 
Ministers and presidium of the Nordic Council, Copenhagen, .May 4,1954. 
,,' TNA, PRO F0371/1113481N1352/10, Sir Michael Wright to Anthony 
Eden, August 27, 1954. 
,,1) Sce Erik Seidenfaden, "Island giver Nordisk IUd hovedpine" [Iceland 
gives the Nordic Council headache], Iuformatiol1 [Danish daily], August 11, 
1954. 
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The Nordic Council recognises that it is of interest to all 
countries engaged in fishing outside the Icelandic coast and of 
vital interest to Iceland that precautions be taken to protect 
the fish population in these waters. 
To the extent that the legality of precautions already 
adopted is the object of dispute between Iceland and another 
country the Nordic Council is not qualified to make any 
statement. The right forum for an intentional law 
interpretation of the dispute is The Hague Court, not the 
Nordic Council or the Council of Europe." 
Although the Icelanders would have wished for more, they 
came to realise that this was all they could hope for. They 
accepted that outcome but it did not endear them to the ideals 
of Nordic cooperation or Nordic unity on the international 
scene. A few weeks later, a member of the British Legation in 
Reykjavik mentioned to Foreign Minister Kristinn 
Gudmundsson that Iceland was more antagonistic on the issue 
of Cyprus than the other Nordic states. Gudmundsson replied, 
or "almost snorted": "the other Scandinavian countries do 
not always support us in matters that we think important, and 
there is no reason why we should support them.,,72 For the 
Icelanders, their Nordic allies were failing the litmus test. 
The Scandinavian reluctance to offer unequivocal support 
was of course understandable. The Nordic Council was not a 
political forum. Furthermore, Norwegian representatives did 
work on Iceland's behalf in other venues. The Icelanders had 
sought support wherever they could at the international level, 
for instance within NATO and at the OEEC, the Organisation 
for European Economic Co-operation (established in 
connection with the Marshall Plan in 1948). On the whole, its 
members thought the British landing ban unfair and probably 
71 This translation of the original resolution in Swedish was made by the 
D.S. Embassy in Oslo. See NARA: RG59 840B.245/8-2454, D.S. Embassy 
(Oslo) to State Department, August 24,1954. 
"TNA, PRO F03711111533/NL13511114, D.W. Hough, British Legarion 
(Iceland), to Harry Hohler, Foreign Office, October 14, 1954. 
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illegal. All realised the complexities of the dispute, however, as 
well as Britain's reluctance to give in completely. Negotiations 
were needed to break the standstill and in November 1954, 
Arne Skaug, Norway's representative at the OEEC, Sllggested 
on his own initiative that a group of five members be formed 
to discuss the conflict and suggest a possible solution. Skaug 
was considered impartial in both camps and the offer was 
accepted." From now on, British officials clearly hoped that 
the Norwegians would be able to have some bearing on the 
obstinate Icelanders. From Oslo, the British Ambassador, Sir 
Peter Scarlett, wrote in December 1955: "I understand that 
the Icelanders probably listen to the Norwegians more than 
they do to others, partly because they are conscious of a 
common origin and outlook and partly because they do not 
suspect the Norwegians of wishing to bully them." 74 In 
London, Harry Hohler at the Foreign Office's Northern 
Department agreed: "the Norwegians are the only people who 
have any influence at all with the Icelanders, and it is just 
possible that a word from them would tip the balance."" And 
similarly, D.S. officials commented that "[i]n the past we had 
taken the line that Out best approach to Iceland was through 
Norway. ,,76 In other words, the hope was that the Norwegians 
would offer brotherly (or motherly) advice to the Icelanders, 
their immature neighbours in the North Atlantic. 
Apart from Skaug, the OEEC group was comprised of W. 
Harpham, the British delegate, Petur Benediktsson from 
Iceland (the brother of Foreign Minister Benediktsson), the 
Belgian Roger Ockrent, and the chairman, Gerard Bauer from 
"TNA, PRO F03711111534INLl351/154, W. Harpham, UK delegation to 
OEEC, to A.J. Edden, Foreign Office, November 11, 1954. 
" TNA, PRO F0371/122540INLl993/1, Sir Peter Scarlett, British Embassy 
(Oslo), [Q Harry Hohler, Foreign Office, December 31,1955. 
's TNA, PRO F03711122516/NL135117, Harry Hohler Minute, January 11, 
1956. 
,. TNA, PRO F0371/122490INLlOI5/16, R.F. Stretton Minute, April 4, 
1956. See also Berdal, The United States, Norway il1ld the Cold 'Var, 143. 
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Switzerland." The group immediately set to work. Initially, 
little progress was made and Bauer could not but remark that 
he felt "as if he were up against a brick wall. He was in the 
presence of two parties who would not meet each other."" 
British hopes about Norway's moderating influence were also 
unfounded. In Skaug's mind, it was simply up to Britain to 
back down. He felt that the law was on Iceland's side and, 
besides, the British coercion was not working. But most 
importantly, Skaug and other Norwegian officials emphasised 
the political effects of the landing ban." Through the trade 
agreement with Iceland, the Soviet leadership aimed to 
increase support for the Icelandic Socialists and drive a wedge 
between Iceland and the Atlantic Alliance.'" The "peaceful 
Soviets," as Thyne Henderson, the British Minister in 
Reykjavik, told Harry Hohler in November 1953, had rescued 
the Icelanders from British clutches and accumulated a large 
share of Iceland's foreign trade.81 At the same time in 
Reykjavik, the Soviet envoy Igor Sysoev wrote to Moscow 
that the trade agreement "should increase both the popularity 
77 For an overview of the group's work, see Einar Benediktsson, Icela11d and 
European Development: A Historical Review from a Personal Perspective 
(Reykjavik, 2003), and Ketill Sigurj6nsson, "Skjolin i Fl6rens't [The 
documents in Florence}. Einat Bencdiktsson (cd.), Upphaf Eur6pusamvi1l11U 
islands [The origins of Iceland's integration in Europe] (Reykjavik, 1994), 
61-102 (esp. 82-87). 
" TNA, PRO F0371/116441/NLJ351190, Minute on OEEC Iceland group 
meeting, March 10-11, 1955. 
79 UD, 31.11/60N, Gustav Heiberg Minute, January 3,1955. 
'" See Jon 6lalsson, Ka!ru fe/agar [Dear comrades] (Reykjavik, 1999), 165-
172. Olafsson researched Soviet documents in Moscow and his conclusions 
are undoubtedly sounder than those of Icelandic officials who were involved 
in the Soviet negotiations. They have downplayed the political aspect and 
argued that business reasons mattered most in Moscow. See Thorsteinsson, 
Utmtrikisthj61lltsta I, 490, and Davi'd 6lafsson, Saga landhelgismdlsills 
[History of the fishing limits caseI (Reykjavik, 1999), 87. Also Johannesson, 
"Troubled Waters," 91-97. 
" TNA, PRO F03711106341/NLl 1338/8, Thyne Henderson, British 
Legation (Reykjavik) to Harry Hohler, Foreign Office, November 27, 1953. 
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of the Soviet Union and negative feelings over the American 
. "S2 
occupation. 
By early 1956, the talks within the OEEC had almost led to 
the lifting of the landing ban and British officials got the 
impression that it was mainly due to the persistence of the 
OEEC team and "Norwegian intervention" with the Icelandic 
authorities.83 While Arne Skang's efforts should not be 
underestimated, the influence of Norway was not decisive. 
The apparent solution involved a de facto acceptance of the 
four-mile limit in return for a qnota on Icelandic landings in 
Britain; an outcome which was heavily balanced in Iceland's 
favour. Ultimately, therefore, the British trawling industry 
stalled. It could not be persuaded to remove an embargo 
which gave it some clear advantages on the British fish 
market. At this stage, the anthorities in London were not 
willing to put pressure on the industry and risk political 
trouble On Humberside or the other fishing ports. 
Meanwhile, the Icelanders remained as firm as ever and 
Western unease grew. In March 1956, the Progressive Party 
announced that it was going to leave the governing coalition 
with the Independence Party and work with the Social 
Democrats in parliamentary elections which would be held in 
the summer. Moreover, the two parties joined hands with the 
pro-Moscow Socialists and passed a resolution in the Althing 
calling for an end to the U.S. presence, with Iceland assuming 
responsibility on behalf of NATO for the maintenance of 
defence installations at Keflavik and elsewhere on the island. 84 
~t Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi Federatsii. Foreign Policy Archive of 
the Russian Federation, Moscow [AVPRF]: 96110/29~ Igor Sysoev, Soviet 
Legation (Reykjavik), to Foreign Ministry, December 16, 1953. 
"' TNA, PRO F0371/1225181NL1351/54, Jack Ward Minute, January 30, 
1956. 
B4 On the crisis in Iceland's relations with its Western allies in 1956, see 
Ingimundarson, The Struggle for V?estem Integratioll, 46-55, Valur 
Ingimundarson, "Buttressing the West in the North: The Atlantic Alliance, 
Economic Warfare, and the Soviet Challenge in Iceland, 1956-1959," 
International HistOl}' Review, Vol. 21, No. 1,1999,80-103, \Vhitehead, 
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In general, foreign affairs would obviously have much 
significance in the electoral campaign. Although the dispute 
with Britain was not directly connected with the larger issue 
of the U.S. presence in Iceland, the opponents of the military 
base could use the embargo to claim that in reality the "allies" 
in NATO thought first of themselves and were unwilling to 
respect the country's vital interests. Thus, the American dislike 
of the landing ban naturally intensified."' The United States 
aimed to influence the outcome at the polls and a significant 
part of that strategy involved a demonstration of the economic 
benefits of Western cooperation." In Washington, President 
Eisenhower reportedly came back to the idea of a wholesale 
purchase of Iceland's annual fish catches and in early June, 
when the Icelandic elections were only a few weeks away, the 
U.S. Embassy in London made an "urgent plea" to have the 
ban immediately removed. British officials fended off sudden 
action by pointing out-accurately-that it would only arouse 
suspicions so late in the day and that the ban was not the 
main reason behind the developments in Iceland."' Yet, it had 
to be acknowledged, as the British Fisheries Secretary, Roland 
Wall, readily admitted, that "the future of the American base 
at KefIavik is getting mixed up with the fisheries dispute. "ss 
The Ally \Vlm Came in from the Cold, 67-83, and Berdal, The United 
States, Norwa)' and the Cold W'ar, 144-47. 
", DDE, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948·61. OCB Central File 
Series, Box 36, OCB 091. Iceland (File#4) (4), Memorandum, June 26, 
1956, and NARA, RG59 840B.245/4-2556,.Iohnj. Muecio, V.S. Embassy 
(Reykjavik), to Seererary of State, April 25, 1956. 
", DDE: White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61. OCE Central File 
Series, Box 36, OCB 091. Iceland (File#3) (10), Memorandum, April 4, 
1956. See also BerdaI, The United States, Norway dnd the Cold War, 144-
45~ Ingimundarson~ Tbe Struggle for \Vestem Integration, 46-47, 
Inginllmdarson, "Buttressing [he West in the North," 90-92, and 
Whitehead, Tbe Ally 'V"o Came ill from tbe Cold, 71-76. 
P For Eisenhower, see The New York Times, June 25,1956. For rhe U.S. 
plea in London, see NARA, RG59 840B.24515·2556, Herbert Hoover to 
V.S. Embassy (London), May 25, 1956, and TNA, PRO 
F0371/122491/NLlOI5/37, Jack Ward Minute, June 11, 1956. 
"1NA PRO: MAF209/1492, Roland Wall Minute, June 14 1956. 
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Predictably, Norwegian officials also began to emphasise 
with more force than before that the damaging landing ban 
simply had to be lifted. Within the OEEC, Skaug was 
"particularly insistent on the importance for NATO of an 
early settlement ... "a. At the NATO headquarters in Paris, 
Norway's permanent representative, Jens Boyesen, suggested 
in similar manner that a removal of the landing ban would 
"help the situation in Iceland. ,,90 Put simply, the relatively 
moderate concerns of the Norwegians about events in Iceland 
were developing into a full-fledged fright about their own 
interests. 
"" TNA, PRO F037111225201NLl351/124, E.R. Warner, British delegation 
to OEEC (Paris), to Foreign Office, April 9, 1956. 
", TNA, PRO F03711122490INLl015113, Sir Christopher Sreel, British 
delegation to NATO, to Foreign Office, Aprill1} 1956. 
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Chapter 4 
Conflicting Concerns 
The National Interests of Security in the 
North Atlantic, No Foreign Bases in 
Norway and Fish Markets in the West, 
1956-57 
The Norwegian efforts within the OEEC had mostly been 
based on a sincere wish to seek a solution to a dispute which 
was not of direct concern to the country. But as Foreign 
Minister Lange observed in May 1956, if the U.S. had to close 
down its facilities in Iceland, no NATO state would be hit as 
hard as Norway, and as the British Minister Henderson 
predicted in Reykjavik, if the U.S. left Iceland, "Norway 
would be faced with insistent requests for bases from 
NATO."" The fundamental principle of no foreign bases on 
Norwegian soil was based on the premise of Western 
assistance in case of Soviet aggression. That precondition, in 
turn, was highly dependent on adequate facilities in the North 
Atlantic, primarily in Iceland. After the Althillg resolution in 
March 1956, Norwegian representatives within NATO thus 
asked whether the military consequences of U.S. withdrawal 
'1 SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, May 25, 1956, and TNA, PRO 
F037111224901NLl015/26, Thyne Henderson, British Legation (Reykjavik) 
to Harry Hohler, Foreign Office, !v!ay 1, 1956. For sources on the crisis in 
U.S.-Icelandic relations in 1956, see footnOte 84. 
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were as severe as they thought. After all, the Icelanders were 
not going to leave NATO, they wanted to keep the Keflavik 
base and other installations in working order, and they argued 
that the world was now much safer than at the height of the 
Korean War in 1951 when the U.S. forces had returned to 
Iceland. That reasoning cut little ice with U.S. and NATO 
strategists, however, who insisted that the consequences of a 
U.S. retreat from the country would indeed be "serious"." 
Thus, the Norwegian authorities could possibly find 
themselves in the disingenuous position of pressing the 
Icelanders to act in a way which Norway would not. At a 
meeting of the Storting's Foreign Affairs Committee on April 
16, its chairman, the Social Democrat Finn Moe, summarised 
the problem: 
I am quite certain about what can be said, that is, that if the 
Americans leave Iceland then Iceland will have no forces to 
defend its important strategic position. But I think we must be 
absolutely clear that this is exactly the same argument which 
our allies llse when it comes to Norway. We have our own 
forces, to be sure, but our allies maintain that they are quite 
incapable of providing a credible defence of Norway. And 
that is why they claim within NATO that we should accept 
foreign bases here. In that sense there is only a slight 
difference - and no fundamental difference - between our 
position and Iceland's position, and should we really maintain 
with great emphasis that Iceland must have a U.S. base then I 
~2 NARA, RG59, Bureau of European Affairs. Office of European Regional 
Affairs. Political-Military Numeric Files, 1953-62, Box 10, LeonJohnson 
Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 
"Meeting of the [NATO] Standing Group with the Norwegian Military 
Representative [Rear Admiral Skule Storheil1J," undated but early April 
1956. See also NATO Archives, Brussels [NATO], AC/lOO-VR/6, IS-AC-
0370,'''The Strategic consequences of the withdrawal of United Stares forces 
from Iceland". Report by the .Military Committee to the North Atlantic 
Council, June 28,1956, and C-R(56)38, North Atlantic Council Meeting, 
July 11, 1956. 
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do not think it would be that easy for us to defend OUr own 
base policy." 
Although another committee member (Erling Wikborg of the 
Christian People's Party) objected that the difference between 
the two countries was greater than Moe maintained, the 
underlying logic in the argument was fair. Furthermore, as 
Moe and others pointed our, the Norwegians could be 
accused of interference in Iceland's own affairs if they voiced 
their opinions with great force."' That could have the opposite 
effect of what was intended. Still, Norway was 
unquestionably an interested party and right from the start of 
the crisis in March, American officials hoped that the 
Norwegians would use their "special relationship" with the 
Icelanders to urge them to reconsider their position." Such a 
plea was not really needed, for Foreign Minister Lange and 
Norwegian diplomats had immediately sounded out their 
Icelandic colleagues. The response was reasonably 
encouraging. From Reykjavik, Anderssen-Rysst reported that 
he was "continually beiug reassured off the record." Lange 
sensed this as well and told the British Ambassador in Oslo 
that although he was concerned about the situation in Iceland, 
he thought that the Althillg resolution "should not be taken 
too tragically." Lange was also convinced that apart from the 
pro-Moscow Socialists, Icelandic politicians would in the end 
accept that a V.S. departure was "a strategic impossibility. ,,% 
This was a fairly safe assumption. The Progressives and the 
Social Democrats were far from determined to "kick our" the 
Americans and the parliamentary resolution was more for use 
9) Starting Archives, Oslo [SA), Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, April 
16,1956. 
94 SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, April 16, 1956, and TNA, PRO 
F0371/1224901NLl018119, Stewa" Crawford, British Embassy (Oslo), to 
Harry Hohler, Foreign Office, April 10, 1956. 
?5 Berdal, The United States, Norway and the Cold \\'lar, 145. 
"TNA, PRO F0371/122490INLl018119, Stewart Crawford, British 
Embassy (Oslo), to Harry Hohler, Foreign Office, April 10, 1956. 
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in domestic politics. For instance, Stefan J6hann Stefansson, 
former leader of the Social Democratic Party, told a 
Norwegian colleagne, Torstein Selvik, that it had been put 
forward so that the "communists" would not monopolise the 
base question and things would quieten down after the 
elections." 
It was a risky business, however. Initially, the 
administration in Washington responded harshly to the 
envisaged departure of U.S. forces and some officials even 
suggested that Iceland might have to be expelled from 
NATO." And all construction at the base in Keflavik was 
halted, a move which would inevitably hurt the Icelandic 
authorities since revenues from the base made up almost 10 
per cent of the national income and 20 per cent of foreign 
currency receipts. Understandably, as has been pointed out, 
"this type of economic warfare did not sit well with the 
Progressives and Social Democrats. ,,99 The coercion might 
only make them more obstinate and aid the opponents of 
Western cooperation in Iceland. When it came to Norwegian 
influence, therefore, Halvard Lange and other Norwegians 
tried more to restrain the United States than win over the 
Icelanders. At a NATO ministerial meeting in May, Lange 
apparently urged John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of 
State, not to "overreact". Afterwards, Dulles declared that 
Lange had had a "very positive influence" on his assessment 
of the Icelandic problem. "'0 
But then the crisis seemed to deepen. On June 28, 1956, 
parliamentary elections were held in Iceland. Neither the 
~; SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, May 25, 1956 
~'''DDE, \V'hitc House Office, National Securiry Council Staff: Papers, 1948-
61. Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) Central File Series, Box 36, 
'OCE 091. Iceland (File#3) (Ill), Draft Memorandum, "Recommendations 
of OCB W'orking Group on Iceland Regarding U.S. Strategy and Courses of 
Action in Iceland," April 10, 1956. 
"" Ingimundarson, The Struggle for \Vestern Integration, 46-47. 
Ill{) Bcrdal, The United States, Norway and the Cold ,,"lar, 145. 
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Independence Party nor the electoral bloc of the Progressives 
and the Social Democrats achieved a majority in the A/thillg. 
The participation of the People's Alliance, a new nnion of the 
pro-Moscow Socialist Unity Party and a leftist splinter group 
from the Social Democrats, seemed likely in any new 
government. That possibility created a stir in Washington, to 
say the least. As before, direct intervention in Iceland's 
domestic politics was thought to be double-edged but D.S. 
officials urged other NATO states - Norway in particular - to 
convey, as the U.S. instructions had it, "to appropriate 
political leaders [in Iceland the) extreme undesirability from 
[the) NATO view point of Communist Front participation in 
[a) new government [in) Iceland."wl Nonetheless, on July 24 
the fear came true: the Progress ives, the Social Democrats and 
the People's Alliance formed a new coalition. 
This regime claimed to be committed to the departure of 
U .5. troops, as foreseen in the A/thing resolution from March. 
Each of the three parties had two ministers, so for the first 
time in the history of NATO, a member state had 
"communists" in power. The administration in \'Vashington 
responded with even more force to these developments than 
the Althillg resolution in March. As Norwegian officials 
learned, the United States had taken the position that no talks 
were possible with a "communist" coalition. Furthermore, all 
economic assistance or cooperation with Iceland would have 
to cease and the country's representatives in NATO would 
have to be excluded from confidential meetings and denied 
access to sensitive documents."" At the end of July, the D.S. 
Ambassador in Oslo, COffin Strong, went so far as to suggest 
that "in Washington the possibility of forcing through a 
w, UD, 33.6/IIIIlI, U.S. Embassy (Oslo) to Foreign Ministry, July 11, 1956. 
Ill! UD, 33.6/1l1III, J.G. R::eder, Norwegian delegation to NATO, to Foreign 
.Ministry, July 27, 1956~ and 33.6/11/IV, Frithjof Jacobsen .Memorandum, 
September 6,1956. 
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change of regime in Iceland was being considered." 10l Never 
before had the United States been so willing to interfere in 
Iceland's domestic affairs as in the spring and summer of 
1956. 
The Americans also wanted the Norwegians to plead with 
the Icelanders, because of the perceived relationship of trust 
and guidance between the two countries. Ill< Ambassador 
Strong asked, for instance, that Norway deliver to the 
Icelanders the message of no economic or military cooperation 
since there would then be more hope that they would 
reconsider their policy instead of expressing indignation over 
American "bullying". 105 U.S. officials also wanted the 
Norwegians to ilnpress upon the non-"communise' ministers 
in the Icelandic coalition that their imprecise ideas about 
Icelandic management of the Keflavik base and other 
installations in peacetime were utterly unrealistic. 10' Foreign 
Minister Lange was certain, as he emphasised at the time, that 
Norway could take no formal action in the matter "without 
risking accusation of interference in Iceland's internal 
problems." Still, he agreed that "influence through personal 
channels" could be useful. 107 During these tense weeks, Lange 
met with his new Icelandic colleague, the pro-Western Social 
Democrat, Gudmundur i. Gudmundsson. The Icelandic 
Minister indicated that personally he would wish to maintain 
an "active" base at Keflavik with a limited number of fighter 
jets but he was unsure whether other cabinet members would 
be able to accept such a high level of U.S. presence. Lange did 
not appear to press Gudmundsson on this or other points, 
'"; UD, 33.6/11IN, R.B. Skylstad Minute, August 1, 1956. See also 
Ingimundarson, The Struggle for \Vestem 1lltegratioll, 49-50. 
!(\~ For a summary, see Berdal, The Uuited States, Norway and the Cold 
W!ar, 145--46. 
IOS UD, 33.6/U/IV, R.B. Skylstad Minute, August 24, 1956. 
1(1<, VD, 33.61111IV, Frithjof Jacobsen Memorandum, September 6, 1956. 
HO' National Archives, Ottawa [NAC], RG25 6113/50373-1.1, Canadian 
Embassy (Oslo) to Department of External Affairs, July 23,1956. 
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aware as he was of the thin line between friendly guidance 
and undue intimidation. J{," And just as in the previous spring, 
Lange and other Norwegians were mostly anxious to restrain 
the United States. In Oslo, U.S. demands for no dealings with 
the new Icelandic regime, economic pressure and restrictions 
within NATO were deemed to be so drastic that they might 
easily "drive Iceland out of NATO.,,!09 That assessment made 
sense and was supported in other Western capitals. '1O In 
Reykjavik, moreover, Prime Minister Hermann J6nasson of 
the Progressive Party angrily declared that if Iceland was given 
inferior treatment within the Alliance, "we shall withdraw 
from NATO in one hour."11I Besides, top secret information 
had never been sent to Iceland and at the beginning of 
September, all classified NATO documents in Reykjavik were 
destroyed. m The fear of a strategic leak was unfounded but 
the political ramifications of the stringent 0.5. attitude were 
obvious. Norwegian diplomats expressed that view on various 
occasions and they also pointed out that pro-Moscow 
Socialists were in a clear minority in the new coalition in 
Iceland. This educated advice undoubtedly carried some 
weight in Washington."J 
lD~ UD, 33.6/111111, Foreign 1vlinistry to Norwegian Delegation to NATO, 
July 27,1956. 
l!1~ VD, 33.6111IIII, Foreign Ministry to Norwegian Delegation to NATO, 
August 13, 1956. 
B" Sec NAC, RG25 6113/50373-40·1.1, Lester Pearson to Canadian 
Delegation to NATO, July 24,1956, TNA, PRO 
F03711122522/NL13511164, E.G. Harman, British Embassy (Reykjavik), 
to J. Given, Foreign Office, August 2, 1956, and Politishces Archiv des 
Auswartiges Amts, Berlin [PAAA}, B23117, van Scherpenberg Minute, 
August 28, 1956. 
'" NAC, RG25 6113150373-1.1, Canadian Embassy (London) to 
Department of External Affairs, September 21,1956. 
'" NATO, AC/lOO-VR/6, IS-AC-0370, SGLO (Paris) to SGN (Washington), 
September 12, 1956. 
'B UD, 33.6/11!lV, Knut Aars Minute, August 9,1956, and R.B. Skylstad 
:Minute, August 16, 1956. 
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U.S. officials gradually realised that the situation in Iceland 
was not as dire as they had feared at first. The Progressives 
and the Social Democrats excluded the People's Alliance from 
discussions on defence policy and in October, U.S.-Icelandic 
negotiations began on the continued presence of U.S. troops 
on the island. In stark contrast to the thinly veiled threats 
from a few months before, the administration in Washington 
now seemed willing to offer Iceland favourable loans and 
economic assistance, but only if the base remained intact. 
Inflation was high in the country and the Icelandic 
government desperately needed Western goodwill. Hence, the 
talks were proceeding well when the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary ensured that the Progressives and Social Democrats 
sincerely agreed on Iceland's need for U.S. protection on a 
permanent basis. 1H The crisis was solved. 
Norway's soothing voice had done Iceland good at a time 
when the administration in Washington was angry and 
aggressive (referring to Norway's efforts within NATO, the 
Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, once told 
Icelandic representatives that "you had a good friend." fL' 
Still, the sympathy for Iceland's cause was not merely 
altruistic or based on sheer goodwill towards the small 
neighbouring nation. Norwegian attitudes towards events in 
Iceland in 1956 were marked by a clear self-interest in the 
continued operation of the U.S. base on the island. It may be 
recalled that although most Progressives and Social Democrats 
would probably have wished to see a marked curtailment of 
the U.S. presence in Iceland, they never wanted to leave the 
Western defence system altogether. In that sense, Norwegian 
114 Observers disagree slightly on the main reason behind the Icelandic 
decision. For the view that the offer of U.S. economic assistance had a 
relatively minor effect on the outcome, see Whitehead, The Ally \\7110 Came 
in (rom the Cold, 82-83. For the argument that it played a larger role, sce 
Ingimundarson, The Struggle for W/estem Integratio1l, 50-5l. 
IlS UD, 33.6/11/IV, W. Morgenstiernc, Norwegian Embassy (Washington), 
to Foreign Ministry, October 5, 1956. 
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and Icelandic interests coincided. In the following months, 
however, the clash between sympathy and self-interest 
reappeared as the United States and other NATO members 
began to debate how Iceland could be fully entrenched in the 
Western camp. 
In November 1956, the landing ban in Britain was lifted at 
last. It had long lost its economic value and become a political 
embarrassment in London. l16 Furthermore, when U.S. and 
Icelandic representatives were discussing the arrangements at 
Keflavfk and economic assistance to Iceland, the notion of 
loans to purchase fishing vessels emerged. But this would only 
be sensible, it was pointed out in Washington, if an increasing 
portion of the catches was sold "in Free World markets. ,,117 In 
other words, the world's non-communist popnlation had to 
buy more Icelandic fish. A transformation of that kind could 
be difficult to achieve, however. To begin with, the Icelanders 
were getting satisfactory prices for their fish products in the 
Soviet Union so the West would have to offer a better deal, 
probably above what was on offer on the world market. That, 
in turn, could impede the fight against inflation in Iceland. 
Before the 1956 elections, when American officials were 
thinking of means to satisfy the Icelanders rather than 
intimidate them, they had tentatively suggested that, in the last 
resort, the United States purchase enongh of Iceland's fish to 
put an end to the country's trade with the Soviet Union. The 
problems involved in such a program would be "particularly 
thorny," it was pointed out: 
Most difficult of all would be the problem of wbat to do with 
the fish. The V.S. fishing industry would strenuously object to 
importation of the fish products into the U.S. To destroy the 
11~ .J6hannesson, "Troubled Waters," 121-24, and.J6nsson, Friends il1 
Conflict, 60-68. 
BC DDE, White HOllse Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61. OCB Central 
File Series, Box 36, OCR 091. Iceland (File#5) (1), OCB Memorandum, 
November 9, 1956. 
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fish products would give the Communists a potent 
propaganda weapon against the U.S. in Asia and other areas 
having large numbers of undernourished people. To attempt 
to sell them would cause Canada, Norway and other fish-
exporting countries to protest strongly, To give them away 
would be feasible only to a limited extent ... [and] here again 
great care would have to be taken not to disrupt normal 
marketing of these products. lIij 
Overall, Iceland and Norway were competitors on the world 
market for fish. 1I9 Thus, in November 1956, when the United 
States seemed prepared to help the Icelanders to sell more fish 
in the West, the Foreign Ministry in Oslo immediately warned 
- as U .5. officials had indeed predicted earlier in the year -
that actions on Iceland's behalf must not "have discriminating 
effects on a third country (i.e. Norway). ,,120 Still, something 
had to be done to ease Iceland's economic troubles and the 
rulers in Moscow were clearly willing to pose again as a friend 
in need. In the summer of 1956, the Soviets had indicated 
their willingness to provide Iceland with a hnge loan and the 
following spring that offer was confirmed: a $25 million loan 
was on the table, with low interest rates and repayable in fish 
and fish products. m 
The Icelandic government was not eager to tie itself so 
substantially to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Iceland 
needed the money, as the country's representatives pointed out 
in Western capitals. In an unprecedented move, NATO 
therefore stepped in. In the summer of 1957, Secretary 
General Paul-Hemi Spaak called on the member states to offer 
lIB DDE, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 
1948-61. Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) Central File Series, Box 
36, 'OCB 091. Iceland (File#4) (4), OCB Memorandum, June 26,1956. 
1\9 See Hannibalsson and Hjalrason, S6iumidstod hradfrystibtlsallna II 
[History of the Icelandic Seafood Company] (Reykjavik, 1997), 151-61. 
llD UD, 33.6111N, Knut Svcrre Minute, November 30, 1956. The point was 
reiterated a short while later. See 33.6111N, Chr. Sommerfelt Minute, 
December 12, 1956. 
w IngimundarsoI1, The Struggle for W/estem Integrati011, 52-53. 
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Iceland a favourable $9 million loan. Britain was utterly 
against the idea and West Germany was at best lukewarm. 
Both states cited setting a risky precedent and the fact that, in 
economic terms, the Icelanders were living beyond their means 
and would simply have to put their own house in order. 122 In 
Washington, resentment also arose over the Icelandic 
negotiating tactics. "Is Iceland blackmailing us?" asked an 
exasperated National Security Council official in August 
1957.'" Although "blackmail" was too strong a word to 
describe Icelandic attitudes toward the base, the Icelanders 
were obviously using their strategic importance to secure help 
from their allies. m 
The Icelanders were out to care for themselves. The 
Norwegians also wanted to do so, but how? In early 
September, Arne Skaug revisited the "Icelandic problem" , this 
time as acting Foreign Minister at a meeting of the Storting's 
Foreign Affairs Committee. He was anxious because of the 
Soviet advances to the Icelanders, underlining that Iceland was 
of tremendous importance for Norwegian defences and that it 
was "easy to imagine how catastrophic the consequences 
would be for all of us if the Soviet Union ... simply bought 
Iceland, so to speak." In Skaug's mind there was no doubt, 
therefore, that NATO would have to step in with its financial 
offer. Having said that, he also acknowledged that the 
Icelanders would use a substantial part of the loan to 
modernise their fishing industry and that would hurt 
Norwegian export interests. This dilemma only deepened as 
other members of the committee voiced their opinions. 
'" Sce for instance TNA, PRO F0371/128755INLl0338115, Foreign Office 
to British Embassy (Washington), July 5, 1957, and Die Kabil1ettsprotokolle 
der Btmdesregiertll1g, Vol. 10 (Munich, 2000), 335. 
'" DDE, White House Office, NSC Staff, Papers, 1948-61, Special Staff File 
series, box 3, Iceland, George Weber Memorandum, August 20, 1957. 
l~A On this point, see Gudni ]6hannesson, "To the Edge of Nowhere? D.S.-
Icelandic Defense Relations during and after the Cold War", Naval \\7ar 
College Review, Vo!. 57, Nos. 3-4, 2004,115-37. 
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Chairman Finn Moe used the expression "no-win situation" 
while Erling Wikborg justified a possible Norwegian 
contribution to a NATO loan as "defence expenditure." The 
Conservative Ole Bergesen wondered, nonetheless, whether 
Norway should really have to aid a competitor on the 
international scene: 
The no-win situation is of course obvious and Wikberg's 
description ... has a lot to it. It must be added, though, that 
these defence expenditures will hit a certain part of our 
population. They will hit our fishing exports and the 
construction of a competitive fishing fleet. This is a drawback 
which we are not used to when we divide the defence costs 
here, and it is precisely this which makes me so concerned and 
makes this case so difficult. Clearly, the fishing interests will 
raise a number of questions. They will say, with some 
justification: well, this is a no-win situation and these are 
defence expenditures but should they be divided so unfairly? 
Should they just fall on us?'" 
Near the end of the discussion, Arne Skaug admitted that he 
could agree with Bergesen's doubts and other words of 
caution. Then again, the NATO loan would almost certainly 
be offered, with or without Norwegian participation. Hence, 
the government concluded that Norway would have to chip 
in, but it would be a modest amount which could not make 
much difference either way. A maximum of around $500,000 
was suggested. '26 As it happened, the Icelanders became 
concerned that if too many nations participated in the loan 
they would be perceived as the beggars of NATO. 127 Only the 
United States and West Germany provided funding, altogether 
$7 million.'" (Canada was to join in as well but the 
I!S SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting~ September 6, 1957. 
126 SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, September 6, 1957. 
117 Foreign Minister Gudrnundsson raised this point in discussions with 
Secretary General Spaak. See UD, 33.6/11N, Jens Boyescn, Norwegian 
Delegation to NATO, to Foreign !vlinistry, September 17, 1957. 
m Ingimundarson, The Struggle for Western Integration, 54-55. 
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government in Ottawa complained that the Icelandic request 
for money "was a form of blackmail" and only offered 
$500,000, for the specific purchase of Canadian wheat, flour, 
dry milk, and cheese. Iceland needed none of these products 
and the offer was not accepted).'" But although the Icelanders 
had not got what they had originally set out for, they were 
reasonably satisfied. Also, the Norwegians received more or 
less what they wanted: financial assistance to Iceland which 
staved off the threat to Norway of increased Soviet influence 
in the North Atlantic, yet without the irritation of directly 
assisting a rival on the world's fish markets. 
'" NAC, RG2/A·5·a/1893, Privy Council Office Minutes, October 29,1957. 
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Chapter 5 
Intensification 
Cod War, Law of the Sea Conferences and 
the Norwegian Extension of Fishing 
Limits, 1958-61 
While one problem had been solved, another loomed. The 
leftist coalition, which took power in Iceland, had not only 
declared its intention to drive out the U.S. troops but was also 
determined to extend the country's fishing limits, probably to 
12 miles. In late 1956, the Socialists had most grudgingly 
given in on the U.S. withdrawal but they vowed never to 
accept a retreat when it came to the limits issue. Moreover, 
the Progressives and the Social Democrats agreed that action 
was necessary. As in 1952, the Icelandic authorities felt that 
right was on their side. In May 1956, Britain and the Soviet 
Union had signed a five-year agreement which permitted 
British trawlers to fish up to three miles in certain pockets off 
the Soviet coastline in the Barents Sea. In general, however, 
the trawlers would stay outside the 12 mile limit of territorial 
waters which Moscow maintained. In private, the Foreign 
Office in London could not but admit that, despite a clause on 
non-prejudice with regard to the general view on territorial 
waters, Britain had "gone a long way towards accepting the 
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Soviet jurisdiction over a 12-mile limit. "IJO The Icelanders 
could - and would - of course point to that concession when 
they followed the Soviet precedent. JJl 
The development of the law of the sea aided the Icelanders 
as well. In the summer of 1956, the International Law 
Commission delivered a final report on this complicated 
matter. It noted that "international law" did not permit an 
extension of territorial waters beyond 12 miles and in 
Icelandic eyes this conclusion meant that from now on all 
extensions up to that line were permissible. 1J2 Still, the 
Commission acknowledged that many states only recognised 
three miles as the maximum limit and it recommended that an 
international conference be held to seek an agreement on the 
law of the sea. In 1957, the United Nations decided to hold 
the conference in Geneva early next year. In Iceland, the 
Progressives and the Social Democrats therefore decided to 
wait with all action on the fishing limits and the Socialists 
accepted the delay, but only on condition that moves were 
made right after the international conference. m 
Trouble lay ahead in the North Atlantic and the 
Norwegians would be involved once more; either as a selfish 
party out to guard its own interests, as a Nordic sympathiser, 
or as the perceived neutral intermediary. To begin with, 
Norway's position was made more difficult by the still 
unsolved conflict over its national interests. Should Norway 
support wide national jurisdiction or side with maritime 
powers like Britain and the United States?l34 The distant water 
herring fishermen in the south were still at odds with the local 
'''' TNA, PRO F03711122902/NS13S1I38, Jack Ward Minute, May 3, 
1956. See also .J6hannesson, "Troubled Waters," 104-07. 
1.)1 See British Aggressioll in Icelandic 'Vaters (Reykjavik, 1959),22. 
m TNA, PRO F03711121209/GW1/163, British Delegation to the United 
Nations to Foreign Office, December 17, 1956. 
UJ For a summary, see 1.1orris Davis, Iceland Extends its Fisheries Limits 
(Oslo, 19631. 
!.J4 See Carl August Fleischer, "Norway's Policy on Fisheries) 1958-1964." 
Deue!of!111ellts ill tbe Law of the Sea 1958-1964 (London, 1965). 
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fishermen in North Norway and the shipping and whaling 
industries continued to make their views known. In addition, 
the Norwegian Navy did not relish a 12-mile fishing limit 
since it would be much harder to patrol and its resources were 
strained enough as things stood. 115 In the summer of 1957, the 
Fisheries Ministry in Oslo observed - tongue-in-cheek - that 
the best solution would be a 12-mile line off Norway but 
narrower limits elsewhere. l16 At the Geneva Conference, 
Canada was going to put forward a proposal for three-mile 
territorial waters and a 12-mile fishing limit. In late January 
1958, Fisheries Minister Nils Lyso argued that, all things 
considered, such a solution was acceptable and that if 
Denmark and Iceland supported the Canadian initiative, then 
so must Norway.m A decision in favour of either the status 
quo or wider fishing limits would always be condemned in 
some circles, however, so the Norwegian government decided 
to follow a passive policy to begin with and see how the winds 
would blow at Geneva."" 
Similarly, the Norwegians did not want to get involved in a 
campaign of sorts to urge restraint on the Icelanders. On the 
eve of the conference, Bredo Stabell, head of the legal 
department at the Foreign Ministry, concurred with the 
British view that nnilateral action off Iceland was most 
unwelcome and that the Icelanders were "in a very obstinate 
mood." Bnt as in the past, there was nothing which Norway 
could do and pressure would in fact only be detrimental. Like 
Norway, Britain could only hope that a settlement would be 
reached at Geneva and that the Icelanders would feel 
'" NARA, RG59 399.731/12-2057, W. Stratton Anderson, le, U.S. 
Embassy (Oslo)~ to State Department, December 20,1957. 
lh UD, 26.11/23MI, Ministry of Fisheries Memorandum, June 4,1957. Sce 
also 26.11123/V1JI, Bredo Stabell Minutes, January 10 and 13, 1958. 
IT" VD, 26.11/23IIX, Nils Lys6 to Foreign 1vlinistry, January 21, 1958. See 
also RA, Cabinet Iviinutcs, February 18, 1958. 
lJiI SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, February 19, 1958. For a 
derailed examination of Norway's position at rhe conference, see Sondena, 
'Bakgrunnen',65-85. 
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themselves bound by it. l39 In late February, the conference 
began and it quickly became clear that the old three-mile 
principle would not be confirmed. Canada's "3+9" 
proposition gathered considerable support, much to the 
pleasure of the Icelanders. This solution would never get tbe 
required two-thirds majority, however, and in mid-April the 
United States intervened by proposing six-mile territorial 
waters and an additional six-mile fishing limit, but with the 
provision that states which enjoyed "historical rights" could 
still fish in the outer zone. 
Norway and Denmark were among those that had been 
prepared to support the "3+9" proposal but now decided to 
back the American initiative. Conversely, Iceland was still for 
the Canadian proposal. If accepted, the U.S. "6+6" solution 
would allow fishing vessels from Britain, Norway and other 
nations with a history of fishing in Icelandic waters to 
continue their efforts up to six miles from shore. Thus, the 
Icelanders roundly condemned the U.S. proposal as a "stab in 
the back. ,,140 American diplomats in Reykjavik immediately 
worried about the adverse effects on attitudes towards NATO 
and the U .S. base and Foreign Minister Gudmundsson was 
indeed quick to warn Western representatives that such a 
hostile policy at Geneva could have "the most serious 
consequences for Iceland's foreign policy.,,141 Although the 
anger was mostly aimed at the Americans, the Icelanders were 
'" TNA, PRO F0371/1349561NL1351/25, Sir Peter Scarlett, British 
Embassy (Oslo), to Foreign Office, January 28, 1958. Also see 
F037111349551NL1351/9, Sir William Hayter, Foreign Office, to Sir 
Roderick Barday, British Embassy (Copenhagen), January 20, 1958, and 
UD, 26.11/23/IX, Bredo Stabell Minute, January 28, 1958. 
'" NARA, RG59 399.73114-1658, Theodore Olson, U.S. Embassy 
(Reykjavik), to Secretary of State, April 16, 1958. 
141 VD, 26.11123/XIU, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik) to Foreign !\.1inistry, 
April 18, 1958, PAAA, B80/244, Hans·Richard Hirschfeld, West German 
Embassy (Reykjavik) to Bonn, April I?, 1958, TNA, PRO: 
F037111349581NL1351174, Andrew Gilchrist to Foreign Office, April 17, 
1958, and NARA, RG59 399.73114-1858, Theodore Olson, U.S. Embassy 
(Reykjavik), to Secretary of State, April 18, 1958. 
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also deeply disappointed with the Danish and Norwegian 
position. In a leading article called "Friends who betray," the 
organ of the Progressive Party asked what conld possibly have 
brought these Nordic friends to stab the Icelanders in the 
back, as the United States had done. Hl True to tradition, the 
authorities in Iceland seemed to expect almost unconditional 
support for their policies in Norway and elsewhere in the 
Nordic region. 
In the final vote at the United Nations Conference on April 
25, no proposal received a two-thirds majority (the American 
proposal came closest, with 45 states in favour, 33 against 
and seven abstentions). In Iceland, the Socialist Fisheries 
Minister, Ludvik ]6sepsson, at once demanded an extension 
of the country's fishing limits, as the coalition partners had 
promised before the conference. It was now the turn of British 
officials to seek backing in Norway. They still clung to the old 
hope that, firstly, the Icelanders paid "more attention to the 
Norwegians than anyone else" and, secondly, that the 
Norwegians would be ready to speak on Britain's behalf in 
Reykjavik. Right after the inconclusive outcome at Geneva the 
British government therefore formally asked the authorities in 
Oslo "to make immediate representations to the Icelandic 
government ... ,,141 In Reykjavik, meanwhile, the British 
Ambassador, Andrew Gilchrist, warned that his government 
"would not tolerate unilateral measures by Iceland on what 
Britain regards as the high seas. ,,14< 
'" Timillll, April 23, 1958 (leading article). See also UD, 26.11123/XlII, 
Sven Knudsen, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), co Foreign Ministry, April 
23,1958. 
IH UD, 26.11/23IXIII, British Embassy (Oslo) Aide Memoire, April 26, 
1958. See also mA, PRO F03711134959/NL1351191, British Delegation 
ro Geneva Conference to Foreign Office, April 25, 1958. 
'" Times, May 1, 1958. See also TNA, PRO F0371/1349601NL13511112, 
Andrew Gilchrist to Gudmundur j Gudmundsson, April 29, 1958. In the 
mid 19505, Foreign Legations in Iceland and Iceland's Legations abroad 
were upgraded ro Embassies and the position of a Minister changed to that 
of an Ambassador. 
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At the end of April, the Icelanders eased the tension slightly 
by agreeing to postpone a decision beyond a scheduled 
meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in the first week of May. 
Both Britain and Iceland used that occasion to insist that they 
could not budge on an inch on this vital matter (let alone a 
mile) and conflict seemed inevitable. Again, Iceland promised 
to wait for a week or so but as Prime Minister Hermann 
J6nasson told Anderssen-Rysst, his government would then 
act. After that, Iceland would have to rely on Norway and 
other allies within NATO in the dispute with Britain, "and if 
we do not get support from NATO we must turn in that 
direction where we can find help in need. We only claim the 
right of our people to live on the land which fate granted 
ns. ""5 Fish still accounted for almost all of Iceland's exports 
so the emotional argument had its logic. The ill-disguised 
reference to the Soviet Union underlined the strategic 
connotations. 
Norway now had to decide how to react. At a meeting in 
the Foreign Ministry on May 14, Bredo Stabell argued that 
while the Norwegian authorities could not make a formal 
demarche in Reykjavik, they should try to urge caution on the 
Icelanders. On the other hand, O.c. Gundersen, the leader of 
the Norwegian delegation at Geneva, insisted that there was 
absolutely nothing which Norway could do to make the 
Icelanders abandon their intention to extend their fishing 
limits. Hoping against hope, it was still decided to ask the 
Icelandic government to postpone all action until a new 
international conference, which would probably convene in 
early 1959, had tried again to lay down the law of the sea.'" 
That was what the Norwegian government wanted to do. 
Iceland would not wait for so long, however. Later in May, 
w UD, 31.11/60N, Anderssen-Rysst to Foreign Ministry, May 8, 1958. 
14h VD, 31.2/811, Foreign .Ministry Minute, May 14, 1958. See also PAAA, 
B116/13193, Kurr Oppler, West German Embassy (Oslo), [() Foreign 
Ministry, May 14, 1958. 
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after tense talks at the NATO headquarters, the Progressives 
and the Social Democrats offered that in return for a 
recognition of Iceland's 12-mile limit, measured from new 
baselines, "historic rights" would be respected up to six miles 
for the next three years. Britain refused the offer and other 
states were not convinced either. Even in Oslo, the 
government warned that acquiescence in such an outcome, 
which would be detrimental to Norwegian fishing interests, 
required the Stortil1g's approval, by no means a foregone 
conclusion. l47 In Paris, Secretary General Spaak urged the 
Icelanders to reconsider and went so far as to threaten 
economic reprisals. Yet they would go no further and the 
pressure only caused resentment. I'" The coalition with the 
Socialists was on the verge of collapse and neither the 
Progressives nor the Social Democrats wanted to fight a 
parliamentary election where they would have to face 
accusations of subservience to Britain and NATO and a total 
disregard for Iceland's vital interests. As things had developed, 
no political party in the country could advocate moderation 
or respect for foreign wishes on fishing limits. On May 24, it 
was announced in Reykjavik that on June 30, new regulations 
on a 12-mile fishing limit would be issued, taking effect on 
September 1. The time until then would be used to "work for 
understanding and acceptance of the right and necessity for 
the extension. ,,149 
Despite a series of disappointments over the Norwegian 
attitude towards Iceland's fishing limits, the Icelanders felt 
that no nation seemed as likely to offer a sympathetic view as 
HT UD, 31.11/60/V, Foreign l'vlinistry Minute, undated bur from May 23-
26,1958. 
148 Foreign Ministry History Collection, National Archives, Reykjavfk ISO], 
1993~3-1, Icelandic Delegation co NATO to Foreign NIinistry, May 20, 
1958. In a letter to Prime .Minister Jonasson, Secretary General Spaak wrote 
that "unfortunate effects for Iceland would thus probably be produced at a 
time when OEEC partners show willingness to open up markets for 
Icelandic fish." 
14') See J6l1sson, Priellds in Conflict, 72. 
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Norway. Indeed, Foreign Minister Lange declared in the 
Storting that "we Norwegians, as close friends and cousins of 
the Icelandic people, have a great understanding for their 
troubles in this matter. "L'" During the summer, Norwegian 
officials did assist the government in Iceland. For a while, the 
Danish authorities recommended that the Icelanders should be 
persuaded to put the fishing limits issue for a regional 
conference; almost as a "family affair," as Ambassador 
Hansen put it in Oslo.15' The Norwegians were quick to point 
out that it simply was too late to expect Iceland to back away 
from its declared policy, and that the Icelandic authorities 
would hold strong suspicions about such a concerted front 
against them. "2 This could in fact be seen as news of the idea 
leaked in Reykjavik, and formal protests over Iceland's 
intentions by a number of states had no effect whatsoever. 153 
Moreover, as the Norwegians did not tire to mention, too 
much pressure would at best be useless, at worst counter-
productive. The British government asserted that it would 
prevent all attempts to interfere with trawlers "on the high 
seas," and behind the scenes, plans were made to send the 
Royal Navy to the disputed waters after the deadline of 
September 1.'5< Within NATO, other representatives urged 
I_I!) Stortingstidel1de 1958 (Oslo, 1959), debate on June 18, 1958, 2324-25. 
]51 UD, 31. 11/60/Vl, Bredo Stabell Minute, June 9,1958. See also RAD, 
55.lSLAND.I/IV, Foreign Ministry to Danish Embassy (Reykjavik), June 9, 
1958. 
I'~ UD, 26.11123/XIV, Halvard Lange Memorandum for Norwegian 
Government, June 17, 1958, RAD, 55.DAN.31NII, Foreign Ministry 
Minute, June 15, 1958, TNA, F0371/134970/NL1351/423, British 
Embassy (Oslo), to Foreign Office, June 11, 1958, and Federal Archives of 
Germany, Koblenz [BA], B!16/42636, Gerhard Meseck Minute, June 13, 
1958. 
HJ See for instance Tb;6duiljill11 (The Nation's \Vill, Socialist Parry organ), 
June 10, 1958. Apart from Britain, France, Belgium, West Germany, 
Sweden, Spain and the Netherlands protested the planned 12-mile limit. See 
]6nsson, Friends ill Conflict, 84. 
'" TNA, PRO F037111349681NL13511364, British Government 
Declaration, June 4,1958, PRO AD.M30617, Admiralty to Captain Fishery 
Protection Squadron, Iv1ay 22, 1958, and PRO ADM30616, "Operation 
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Britain to show restraint and some Norwegian officials 
complained that the use of force might "drive the Icelanders 
into the arms of the Communists." 155 Of course the self-
interested approach was apparent here. The Norwegians 
readily admitted that the U.S. facilities in Iceland remained 
"primordial to their security."l% Still, they never gave Iceland 
their full, unconditional support. For one thing, the 
government in Oslo was fundamentally opposed to unilateral 
extensions of fishing limits, especially as another conference 
on the law of the sea was being planned.15? The close relations 
with Britain also mattered. Norway had no desire to anger a 
traditional ally by siding completely with Iceland. Lange, in 
particular, had gained trust and goodwill in London. He was 
"extremely reasonable and saw our point of view," said 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd at one stage, and in early 
1958 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan described him as "an 
old friend + a very wise + reliable man.,,15" Halvard Lange was 
not going to fight Iceland's battles against his trusted 
associates in Britain. 
Domestic concerns continued to work against an alliance 
with Iceland as well. When the intentions of the Icelandic 
government were clear, the herring fishermen reiterated their 
opposition to a 12-mile limit off Iceland.15' Since the aim of 
the new line was primarily to restrict trawling for cod and 
other demersal fish, representatives of the herring interests in 
Whippet," Captain Fishery Protection Squadron "OP"Order 1-58," August 
1, 1958. 
'F PAAA, B801244, Meyer-Lindenherg Minute, July 8, 1958. See also SA, 
Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, June 18, 1958. 
'" NAC, RG25 8352/10600·F·40·1.1, R.A. MacKay, Canadian Embassy 
(Oslo), to Foreign Ministry, June 17, 1958. 
IF SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, May 28,1958. 
'" TNA, F03711111561INNI351115, Selwyn Lloyd Minute, March 19, 
1954, :md Department of Special Collections and \X/estern Manuscripts, 
Bodleian Library, University of Oxford [BOD], MSS. Macmillan, Harold 
!v1acmillan Diary, March 6, 1958. 
I,') UD, 31. 11/60N, DirectOr of Fisheries (Bergen) to Fisheries Ministry, 
May 29, 1958. 
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the Starting called on the government to work for a 
compromise with Iceland which would allow the Norwegians 
to continue their traditional herring fishery, especially since 
the herring stocks seemed to be recovering after a dearth at 
the start of the decade. However, complaints about 
Norwegian selfishness would probably have been loud in both 
Reykjavik and London if the suggestion had been made and 
the government never gave it serious thought. 100 Then the 
situation in North Norway had to be taken into account. 
Were Norway to side unreservedly with Iceland, the fishermen 
there would have every reason to maintain that the same limit 
should be imposed in their waters as well, not only because of 
the precedence off Iceland but because of the assumption that 
if British and West German trawlers were excluded from the 
Icelandic fishing grounds they might sail en masse to Norway. 
In public, the Norwegian government therefore acknowledged 
that if such fears came true it might unfortunately become 
necessary to follow the Icelandic lead. I" 
In August 1958, a ray of hope appeared as the Icelandic 
Progressives and the Social Democrats again agreed to hold 
secret talks in NATO on the looming extension. Although the 
discussions continued right up to the end of the month, no 
compromise was reached. Ultimately, the Icelanders would 
only offer the same as in May (a 12-mile limit but a three-year 
transition period in the outer six miles) and the British also 
stuck to their guns. Norway's various conflicting interests 
meant that the Norwegians tried little to influence either side 
and turned down late in the day U.S. appeals for one last 
friendly pressure on the Icelanders."" Yet, Norwegian officials 
did not detach themselves completely from the NATO talks. 
They always emphasised that Norway could never accept a 
lI,n SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meetings, June 18 and July 31,1958. 
I,,! Stort;ngstidel1de 1958, debate on June 18, 1958,2324-25. See also RA, 
Cabinet Minutes, June 24 and July 30, 1958. 
142 UD, 33.12/39I1I, Finn Seyersted Minute, August 29,1958. 
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solution which was based on Iceland's unique reliance on 
fisheries. Whatever the outcome, the fishermen of North 
Norway would have to be granted the same rights as the 
Icelanders.I" This emphasis on parity got so strong that Bredo 
Stabell warned that Norway must avoid appearing to be 
negative and insistent on its own rights at the NATO talks. I" 
According to the U.S. delegation in Paris, French officials who 
closely watched the developments within NATO even begun 
to fear that the Norwegians were trying to "sabotage" an 
agreement in order not to prejudice their own right to claim a 
12-mile limit. l65 That was an overstatement and as Lange 
underlined, if Britain and Iceland had been able to reach an 
agreement then Norway would never have tried to block it 
because of its own concerns. l66 Furthermore, the Norwegian 
regard for domestic issues was perfectly understandable. To 
compare, the Danes also took the same line with regard to the 
Faroe Islands, jnst as dependent on fisheries as the 
Icelanders.l67 Bnt while these Nordic reservations probably 
had little or no effect on the eventual failure of the talks they 
certainly did not make it easier for Britain to consider 
surrender in the struggle with Iceland; a defeat in those waters 
would be that worse to accept since it would reverberate 
through the whole North Atlantic. 
t't} UD, 33.12/39/II, Finn Seyerstcd Minute, August 3, 1958, Bredo Stabcll 
Minute, August 6, 1958, and Foreign Ministry to Norwegian Embassy 
(Oslo), August 8,1958. See also RA, Cabinet Minutes, August 7,1958. 
164 VD, 33. 12/39/lI, NHs Lyso to Foreign Ministry, August 20,1958. See 
also NARA, RG59 740B.022J8-2158, Nolting, U.S. Embassy (Paris), to 
Secretary of State, August 28, 1958. 
", NARA, RG59 740B.022/8-285S, Houghton, U.S. Embassy (Paris), to 
Secretary of State, August 28,1958. 
lid) SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, September 4,1958. 
". RAD, 55.1SLAND.1NI, Troels Oldenburg, Danish Delegation to NATO, 
to Foreign Ministry, August 11 and August 28, 1958, and TNA, PRO CAB 
129/94, C(58)174, "Icelandic Fishery Limits. Memorandum by the ,Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs," August 27,1958. 
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On September 1, the Cod War began (the term was coined 
by British journalists at the start of the dispute).I6R Iceland 
extended its fishing limits to 12 miles and the tiny coast guard 
fleet was determined to prevent foreign fishing inside the new 
line. All nations respected the change except Britain which 
sent Royal Navy frigates to protect its trawlers from 
harassment or arrest. Tempers ran high as the warring sides 
tested each others' strength and resolve. At sea, the coast 
guard vessels tried but failed to capture trawlers as they fished 
in small "boxes" under naval protection. On land, the 
Icelanders were enraged over the British "invasion". In 
Reykjavik, protesters gathered outside the British 
Ambassador's residence, shouting that "Vikings never give 
up," and at one of the largest meetings in the nation's history, 
the Socialist Magniis Kjartansson delivered the war cry which 
summed up the Icelanders' determination: "we don't deal with 
the Brits, we beat them. ,,1" 
After a while, the tension decreased but of course the 
standoff could not last forever. Britain and Iceland would 
have to negotiate and Norway seemed the obvious candidate 
for the role of a mediator. Indeed, Foreign Minister Lange had 
offered his services right after the outbreak of "hostilities" on 
September 1.17<, Some time had to pass, however, before a 
compromise solntion could be contemplated. The rulers in 
London were willing to talk but the Icelanders insisted on a 
withdrawal of the warships before they would even consider 
negotiations. And in this diplomatic and political struggle, 
they felt the strength of the "NATO-weapon" . Iceland's 
l<;~ For works in English on the Cod \Var, sec Andrew Gilchrist, Cod \Vars 
alld How to Lose Them (Edinburgh, 1978), Davis, Iceland Extends its 
Fisberies Limits, Gudni ]6hannesson, "How Cod War came: The origins of 
the Anglo-Icelandic fisheries dispute, 1958-61," Historical Research, Va!. 
77, No. 198 (2004), 543-74,./6115S011, Friends in Conflict, 69-108, al1d 
Thar, British Trawlers and Iceland, 170-94. 
16.9 See ]6hannesson, "How Cod War Came," 567-70. 
17,) RA, Cabinet Minutes, September 4, 1958, and SA, Foreign Affairs 
Committee meeting, September 4, 1958. 
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strategic importance was of course one of the strongest tools 
in its armoury. In early October 1958, for instance, Prime 
Minister J6nasson warned U.S. Ambassador Muccio that 
"[hJostile feelings towards the British might reach such 
intensity that we might have to break off diplomatic relations 
with Britain and even withdraw from the North Atlantic 
T 0 . . ,,171 reaty rgalllsatlOn. 
But would it have happened? Lange, for one, appeared 
unconvinced or willing to call Iceland's bluff. In an informal 
talk at the United Nations in mid-September, he insisted that 
"no matter what happens, Iceland will not ... leave NATO."172 
Lange knew perfectly well how much the Icelanders relied on 
economic goodwill and assistance from the West, and the 
crisis in 1956, when they looked ready to expel the American 
forces from Keflavik, had demonstrated how angrily the 
United States might respond to a charge against its perceived 
vital interests in the North Atlantic. Iceland could not wield 
the "NATO-weapon" unless the stakes were raised in the 
conflict, for instance if a fatal incident occurred at sea. 
However, the Royal Navy presence could always lead to a 
calamity of that kind and the Norwegian government thus felt 
it was more up to Britain than Iceland to give in. At a meeting 
of the NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1958, Lange 
complained about the British nse of warships against the 
smallest and only unarmed member of the Alliance. After all, 
Britain had not despatched a fleet of frigates to the Barents 
Sea to protest the Soviet 12-mile limit. Lange accurately 
pointed out that in Norway, the general public found it hard 
to accept this duplicity and was full of sympathy for their 
small Nordic friends in the uneven struggle against Great 
l7l Archives of the Prime Minister's Office, National Archives, Reykjavik 
[FRN], 1989·B/555, Hermann .J6nasson to John J. Muccio, October 3, 
1958. 
m NAC, RG25 8352/10600-F-40~1.1, Canadian Permanent Mission to the 
United Nations to Foreign Ministry, September 17, 1958. 
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Britain.m Yet, Lange did not feel that Britain would have to 
do all the giving; at the ministerial meeting he agreed with the 
British argument that Iceland would also have to show some 
good faith, for instance by patrolling only six miles out in 
return for a withdrawal of warships during the period of 
., 174 
negotIatIOns. 
In Reykjavik, new rulers would have to ponder that 
possibility. At the end of 1958, the left-wing coalition in 
Iceland collapsed after disputes over economic reforms. The 
Social Democrats formed a minority government with support 
from the conservative Independence Party. Gudmundur 1. 
Gudmundsson kept his post at the Foreign Ministry and Emil 
J6nsson became Prime Minister. J6nsson swiftly emphasised 
that no policy changes should be expected as it would be 
"suicidal for any government to give in. ,,175 If confirmation 
was needed it came on May 5, 1959, when the Althillg 
unanimously reaffirmed Iceland's right to the whole 
continental shelf and stated that "fishery limits of less than 12 
miles from baselines around the country are out of the 
question. ,,176 But neither would the authorities in London back 
down. A new conference on the law of the sea was now to be 
held at Geneva in early 1960 and Britain would not prejudice 
its position there by a retreat around Iceland. Apparently, the 
standoff would therefore continue up to the conference, at 
least. Meanwhile, the Icelanders tried to solicit formal support 
in the Cod War. In the summer of 1959, the Nordic Foreign 
Ministers met in Reykjavik and as had happened during the 
J7J UD, 33.12/39/111, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign Ministry, 
December 18, 1958, TNA, PRO F03 7l/1350051NL1351/1249, British 
Delegation to NATO to Foreign Office, December 18,1958, and NATO, C-
R(58)66, IS·0008, North Atlantic Council meeting, December 18, 1958. 
m TNA, PRO F03711135004/NL135111237, Selwyn L10yd to Foreign 
Office, December 17, 1958, and SO, 1993·3·1, Icelandic Embassy (Paris) to 
Foreign Ministry, December 19, 1958. 
175 NAC, 55.ISLAND.l/IX, Birger Kronmann, Danish Embassy (Reykjavik), 
to Troels Oldenburg,January 13, 1959. 
n See ]6nsson, Friends in Conflict, 106. 
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landing ban five years before, the Icelandic government called 
on Iceland's most reliable friends to condemn the British 
aggression. Predictably, however, the other Nordic 
representatives rejected those pleas and could only be 
persuaded to declare the hope that the international 
community would soon reach an agreement on the law of the 
sea and that until then no tragic incidents would take place in 
the waters off Iceland. "This we all agreed on," Lange 
reported home, "and the Icelanders felt it was slightly better 
than just sticking the tongue out at them, but not much. ,,177 
Despite the disappointment, Icelandic officials and 
statesmen saw in Lange a trusted friend and possibly a 
successful intermediary. At the end of 1959, weak hopes of an 
end to the dispute appeared at long last. It was generally 
accepted that if an international agreement on the width of 
territorial waters was to be reached, the second effort at 
Geneva must not fail. The Western powers, in particular 
Britain and the United States, feared that a breakdown would 
lead to "chaos" on the oceans and great damage to traditional 
naval and fishing interests. An end to hostilities off Iceland 
would naturally improve the atmosphere before and during 
the conference. Thus, Britain suggested that NATO should 
intervene to "find some modus vivendi which would avoid the 
danger of incidents.,,'78 With both British and Icelandic 
blessing, this took the form of secret mediation efforts by 
Secretary General Spaak and Halvard Lange. Spaak, who had 
been deeply disappointed by Icelandic "intransigence" in the 
spring and summer of 1958, doubted whether the Icelanders 
would be willing to accept any meaningful compromise. Lange 
was mostly responsible for the proposal which they produced 
on January 22, 1960: in return for a withdrawal of warships 
and the end to British fishing within the 12 mile limit, Iceland 
In SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, September 7, 1959. 
"" TNA, PRO F0371/1431141NL13511248, Sir Frank Roberts, British 
Delegation to NATO, to Selwyn Lloyd, December 23,1959. 
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would promise to cancel permanently all charges for 
poaching, and nothing in the agreement could be said to 
prejudice the views of the two parties at the forthcoming 
conference.!" Although the formula was heavily in favour of 
the Icelanders, the authorities in Reykjavik felt they conld not 
accept the idea of clemency for all "poaching" and thns risk 
charges of betrayal and weakness.!RI) In the words of legal 
expert Andersen, the 12-mile limit had assnmed an "almost 
religious importance" in Iceland. He admitted, moreover, that 
actually the Icelanders were not that keen to see the British 
warships leave since their menacing presence would give 
Iceland good propaganda material at Geneva.!S! So, if there 
were to be a "compromise", it would have to involve a 
complete British retreat without any Icelandic commitments. 
Undeterred, in mid-February Lange suggested that Britain 
and Iceland accept him and 5paak as arbitrators to determine 
"a reasonable and just modus vivendi" which wonld take 
immediate effect and last during the Geneva conference. While 
both the British and the Icelandic sides respected Lange's 
endeavours and completely accepted his impartiality, they 
dared not put the future of the dispute in the hands of 
outsiders, not even for the short-term. m Lange felt let down 
and probably found more fault with the Icelanders, especially 
when the British government decided on the eve of the 
179 SO, 1993-2-1, Hans G. Andersen, Icelandic Embassy (Paris) to Foreign 
Ministry, January 23,1960, and TNA, PRO F0371/151669INL1351114, 
Sir Frank Roberts, British Delegation to NATO, to Foreign Office, January 
23,1960. 
IIW Private papers of Gudmundur f. Gudmundsson, Reykjavik rGiG], 
Gudmundur i. Gudmundsson to Halvard Lange, January 26, 1960. 
'"' UD, 33.12139/IV, Bredo StabeII Minute, January 25,1960. Sce also TNA, 
PRO F0371/151669/NL1351/20, Charles Stewart, British Embassy 
(Reykjavik), to Christopher McAlpine, Foreign Office, February 5, 1960. 
Other diplomats also got the impression that the Icelanders did nor really 
desire an cnd to the naval presence. Sec NAC, RG25 8352110600·E·40-1.2, 
N.A. Robertson Memorandum, January 29, 1960. 
Hi! UD, 33.12139IIV, Halvard Lange to Paul-Hcnri Spaak, February 17, 
1960, and Bredo Stabell Minute, February 19, 1960. 
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conference that the advantages of leaving the disputed waters 
outweighed the disadvantages. Not only did the Royal Navy 
sail away but the trawler owners agreed to keep their vessels 
away from Iceland for the duration of the conference. IS) Lange 
could not take credit for that move which surprised almost all 
concerned. Nevertheless, his efforts had contributed to the 
feeling in Britain that the British side had to take the first step 
towards a solution, even if the Icelanders still stuck stubbornly 
to their ground. 
The second law of the sea conference at Geneva began. The 
United States and Canada joined hands there and tabled a 
proposal of six-mile territorial waters and an additional six-
mile fishing limit with a phase-out period of ten years for 
"historic rights" in the outer zone. Most grudgingly, Britain 
also supported this compromise since it looked as if it might 
just achieve the required two-thirds majority at the 
conference. Likewise, the government in Oslo backed this 
improved "6+6" solution, while underlining at the same time 
that if the conference was unsuccessful, Norway would be 
compelled to take unilateral action on its fishing limits. 1", 
Danish support was also secured, but only after Britain agreed 
to exercise its "historic rights" off the Farae Islands for five 
years, not ten. 185 Furthermore, the Danish authorities insisted 
that if the Icelanders were to be given a better deal then the 
Faroese would have to enjoy that solution as well, and the 
Norwegians pointed out that they could not accept a worse 
'"' TNA, PRO CAB128/34, CC(60)5, Cabinet Minutes, February 3, 1960, 
and CAB1291100, C(60)32, "Law of the Sea: Iceland. Memorandum by the 
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food," February 19, 1960. 
,", NARA, RG59 399.731/3-1660, WilIiamson Memorandum, March 16, 
1960, RA, Cabinet Minutes, February 25, 1960, and SA, Foreign Affairs 
Committee meeting, 1Vlarch 3, 1960. For an overview of Norway's position 
before and at the second conference, see Soudena, "Bakgrunnen", 105-26, 
and Fleischer, "Norway's Policy on Fisheries, 1958-1964," 94-96. 
m TNA, PRO F0371/1508211GWl1167, Sir Roderick Barcla)" British 
Embassy (Copenhagen) to Foreign Office, April 9 and April 12, 1960. 
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outcome for North Norway than the Faroe Islands. ". For 
Britain, the most substantive concessions - off Iceland - would 
by necessity determine the terms of retreat elsewhere. 
In London, once again, this defence of local interests in 
Oslo and Copenhagen made the thought of complete 
surrender to the Icelanders that much more distasteful. At 
Geneva, the British delegation therefore tried to get the 
Icelandic representatives to accept a five-year compromise 
solution on Faroese lines. In November 1959, the 
Independence Party and the Social Democrats had formed a 
centre-right coalition and its members, in particular Bjarni 
Benediktsson, the influential Minister of Justice from the 
Independence Party, would probably have liked to support 
such a solution. In the end, however, the governing parties 
calculated that the general public would condemn a deviation 
from the 12-miles limit.'"' That limit was, as one Icelandic 
diplomat put it, "holier than ever." No amount of pressure, 
even from friends in Norway, could change that. '" Hence, 
Iceland decided to oppose the "6+6" solution at Geneva and 
as it happened, it failed by only one vote to get the stipulated 
two-thirds majority. "Chaos" continued on the high seas. 
After the failed conference, the British trawlers returned to 
the fishing grounds off Iceland, yet without naval protection 
for the time being and supposedly outside the 12-mile limit (in 
fact, they often stayed inside the line). In Oslo, meanwhile, the 
government decided to act. On May 13, 1960, Foreign 
Minister Lange declared that Norway would extend its fishing 
limits to 12 miles. The herring fishermen still grumbled that 
their interests would not be served by such action, especially 
1% TNA, PRO MAF209/1665, Viggo Kampmann to John Hare, April 20, 
1960, and UD, 31.2/S/XIV, Hans Engen Minute, May 5,1960. 
'" TNA, PRO F03711150S25/GWllI121, British Delegation at Geneva, to 
Foreign Office, April 23, 1960. See also ]6hannesson, "Troubled Waters," 
199-20S. 
I~S UD, 31. 111601IX, Finn Sandbcrg, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign }..'Iinistry, May 24, 1960. 
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since the herring appeared to be swimming up to Iceland's 
shores again.'" Lange argued, however, that Iceland would 
never deviate from its 12-mile limit anyway and he also 
emphasised that the Norwegian authorities would naturally 
hold talks with interested parties (first and foremost Britain) 
about phase-out rights and other aspects of the extension. 19" 
This was not really "unilateral action" it la Iceland, much 
more an invitation to enter honest negotiations. British 
officials felt that they would then hold a few strong cards. At 
the end of the 1950s, Britain was still Norway's largest single 
trading partner and the two countries seemed set to work 
together in a free trade area, outside the recently formed 
Common Market on the continent.!9! Fish appeared to be the 
strongest sticking point in talks between Britain and Norway 
because the Norwegians wanted as many fish products as 
possible to come under a free trade agreement. As Harold 
MacmiIlan agonised in the summer of 1959, when the Danes 
had hammered through a "bacon" compromise, "[w]e seem to 
have settled the Danish question with pigs-at what political 
cost to ourselves I cannot tell. We have now a Norwegian 
problem on fish. I doubt if we can risk this as well."!" 
A compromise solution was found on the amount of toll-
free imports to Britain of frozen fish from Norway.!" In late 
September 1960, the two sides also reached agreement on 
fishing limits, as expected. Britain would not have jurisdiction 
in the outer six miles but neither would the Norwegian coast 
guard vessels have authority to arrest British trawlers. They 
I!;~ SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, May 11, 1960. 
I~\I Sondena, "BakgruIlnen", 127-29, and Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig, 363-
66. 
1~1 For the most detailed examination on Norway's accession to EFT A, see 
Svcio Olav Bansen, "Det norske EtlA-spofet i 1950-ara. En studie av 
Norges Europa-politikk, med s::crlig vekt pa perioden 1956-1960," (MA 
thesis, University of Oslo 1990). For a summar}', see Eriksen and Pharo, 
Kald krig, 312-18. 
," BOD, M55. MacmiIIan, Harold MacmiIIan Diary, .July 15, 1959. 
1~) Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig, 316. 
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could only report alleged infringements which would then be 
investigated in Britain. The phase-out clause for fishing in the 
outer zone would run for a decade, not five years as the 
Norwegians had wanted, but instead they got four trawler-
free areas there. The six-mile extension took effect in April 
1961, the extension to 12 miles in September that same 
year. 19' In Oslo and London, the negotiations and the 
agreement itself were hailed as the correct way to solve 
disagreements on the international scene. Unsutprisingly, 
British officials argued that the Cod War would end if only 
the Icelanders could be as accommodating as the Norwegians, 
and the Norwegian authorities readily acknowledged that 
Britain would try to use the agreement as leverage against 
Iceland.'4; 
In Reykjavik the Anglo-Norwegian agreement was not 
celebrated, therefore. For one thing, the complaint could 
always be heard that the Norwegians were using the 
Icelanders as "icebreakers" by having them do all the fighting 
on the Cod War front. Then the Norwegians would calmly 
sail in their wake and receive the same rewards.!% At best, as 
the conservative Morgullbladid wrote on May 17, 1960, the 
Icelanders accepted that the Norwegians were not in the same 
boat as they themselves since fishing interests were not as vital 
for Norway and other concerns had to be considered.197 On 
the other hand, many Icelanders were obviously disappointed 
with the "weak" Norwegians who were damaging Iceland's 
resistance against Britain.m In Oslo the Icelandic Ambassador, 
1'4 Sondcna, "Bakgrunnen", 139-45. 
1~,\ RAD, 55.NORGE.1/V, Birger Kronmann, Danish Embassy (London), to 
Janus Paludan.lune 15, 1960, TNA, PRO F03711151743INN1351137, 
Heath Mason Minute, August 18, 1960, and F03711151745/NN135 1/61, 
Christopher r..1cAlpine ro S.]. Rose, British Delegation CO NATO~ October 
18,1960. See also Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig, 364. 
1% See for instance UD, 31.2/8/VI, V. Ansteeensen Minute, November 11, 
1958. 
1')7 See Morgll1lbladid, ,May 17, 1960 (leading article). 
lOB Sce Visi,., May 14, 1960 (leading article). 
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Haraldur Gudmundsson, implied that his government had 
been surprised and hurt by this unfriendly act and he got the 
impression that at least some Norwegians were a bit ashamed 
to have signed the agreement with Britain when Iceland was 
still fighting the Cod War. 199 
While that may have been the case in some quarters, it was 
clearly in Norway's national interest to reach an agreement 
with Britain. As Arne Skaug stressed in the Starting when the 
charge was made that the government in Oslo had made life 
harder for the Icelanders, the two nations were not in the 
same boat. lOo The Icelandic discontent was another example of 
the tendency to expect near unconditional support in the 
Nordic area. And the weak hopes of Iceland being influenced 
by the Anglo-Norwegian precedent quickly vanished. Already 
during the Geneva conference, Foreign Minister 
Gudmundsson had told Halvard Lange that the Icelandic 
government could never accept a ten-year phase-our period for 
Britain off Iceland. Using the "NATO-weapon" once more, 
Gudmundsson argued that a retreat of that kind would "lead 
to such strengthening of communist support that Iceland's 
membership in NATO would be seriously jeopardised. ,,201 The 
Icelandic authorities stuck to this line in talks with Britain 
which began in October 1960. Failure seemed inescapable 
until the rulers in Reykjavik accepted that Britain would never 
back down from the demand for a short phase-out period. In 
March 1961, the first Cod War finally came to an end as 
Iceland agreed to respect Britain's "historic rights" up to six 
miles for another three years. Britain accepted new, wider 
baselines around Iceland but also obtained the assurance from 
the Icelandic government that disputes about limits extensions 
M GiG, Haraldur Gudmundsson, Icelandic Embassy (Oslo), to Gudmundur 
f. Gudmundsson, October 1, 1960. 
"'" Startingstidende 1960-61 (Oslo, 1961), debare on November 17,1960, 
2271-72. 
2(11 UD, 31.2/8/XrV, Norwegian Delegation at Geneva to Foreign lvlinistry, 
April 12, 1960. 
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in the future could be referred to the International COUrt of 
] 
. 11.P 
ustlCe.- -
Norway had very little to do with the final outcome but the 
end to the Cod War was of course welcomed in Oslo. The 
danger of U.S. expulsion from Iceland and even the country's 
resignation from NATO had subsided. The security of the 
Western world, including Norway, was enhanced and that 
was of course in line with Norway's national interest. Phase-
out rights in Icelandic waters had not been obtained, however, 
and the Norwegians felt that they, as a Nordic friend, should 
at least get the same privileges as the Cod War foe."" 
Moreover, West-Germany, which had considerable trawling 
interests off Iceland, was given the same three-year adaptation 
period as Britain so why not Norway as well, with its old 
tradition of herring fishing off Iceland? But the Icelandic 
authorities were uot impressed. They had only reluctantly 
given the West-Germans the same trawling rights as Britain, 
and the opposition had condemned both concessions most 
ferocionsly. One more retreat would add to the criticism and 
as the Norwegian Embassy in Reykjavik reported, the 
Icelandic ministers and officials did not expect such difficult 
requests from Hcousins" .204 Despite an obvious desire to test 
the Icelandic waters, the Norwegian authorities never made a 
formal appeal in this case."5 The 1960s then passed peacefully 
off Iceland. The country also enjoyed unprecedented political 
stability as the coalition of the Independence Party and the 
Social Democrats stayed in power until the parliamentary 
elections of 1971. Then, however, a crisis arose again. 
!I)! Thar, Britisb Trawlers al1d lee/and, 191-94, and J6hannesson, "Troubled 
Waters," 214-35. 
'"' UD, 3l.11/60IIX, Bredo Stabell Minute, May 10, 1961. 
204 UD, 31.11/601X, Bjarne Solheim, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
E.F. Ofstad, October 17, 1961. 
2!1S UD, 31.11/60/X, E.F. Ofstad to Jens Boyesen, Norwegian Delegation to 
NATO, December 15,1961, and UD, 31.11/601X1,Jen5 Boye5en, 
Norwegian Delegation to NATO, to Jens Evensen, January 12, 1962. 
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Chapter 6 
A Cold Chin Down the 
Backbone 
Norwegian Concerns in aNew Cod War 
and a Keflavik Crisis, 1971-73 
Throughout the 1960s, the Icelandic regime was on the whole 
content with the law of the sea and Iceland's fishing limits. A 
temporary boom in the herring fishery put off pressute for 
further extensions and for most of the decade the international 
community was against any fresh attempts to reach an 
agreement on the width of territorial waters, having already 
failed twice. Nonetheless, Icelandic officials pointed ant that 
Iceland still aimed to control its whole continental shelf and 
would at some stage make moves in that regard. In 1964, 
Hans G. Andersen (still the country's chief adviser on the law 
of the sea) suggested to Halvard Lange that action could be 
expected in five years or 50.206 Even so, nothing would be done 
unilaterally. Bjarni Benediktsson, who led the coalition from 
1963 until his tragic death in a house fire in 1970, emphasised 
that Iceland would of course honour the proviso in the Anglo-
Icelandic agreement from 1961 about a possible reference of 
disputes to the International Court of Justice. 207 His successor, 
~iM> SA, Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, January 7, 1964. 
N7 See Thar, British Trawlers and Ice/and, 194-97. 
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J6hann Hafstein, followed the same line and in talks with 
Nordic diplomats in early 1971, Emil J6nsson, the Social 
Democratic Foreign Minister, insisted that the government 
remained committed to the principle of negotiations and 
respect for international law."" By this stage, a new law of the 
sea conference was schednled for 1973 and the Icelandic 
authorities indicated that they would wait for the outcome 
there. 
Conversely, the opposition in Iceland was determined to 
extend the country's fishiug limits when they had the chance 
to do so. In 1961, the People's Alliance and the Progressive 
Party had harshly condemned the agreement with Britain, 
especially the terms about a reference to the International 
Court. Iu the Althil1g the Socialist Liidvik J6sepsson 
thundered that the "treachery" would only last as long as the 
government which committed it.'" In the summer of 1971, 
parliamentary elections were to be held and in the preceding 
campaign the opposition parties focused on the need to 
protect the fish stocks, Iceland's livelihood and vital interest. 
The election results indicated that most Icelanders agreed with 
them: the Independents and the Social Democrats lost their 
majority in the Althing and on July 14, the Progressive Party, 
the People's Alliance and a new centre-left Party, the Union of 
Leftists and Liberals, formed a coalition. The chairman of the 
Progressives, Olafur J6hannesson, became Prime Minister and 
Liidvik J6sepsson went back to the Ministry of Fisheries. This 
centre-left regime was determined to extend Iceland's fishing 
limits to 50 miles and it also declared its intention to expel 
u.s. forces from Iceland before the end of its four-year term.' 1<1 
MUD, 31.11/60/XII, Christian .Mohr, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign lvlinistry, January 30, 1971. 
:n" Althingistfdindi 1961 D [parliamentary debates] (Reykjavik, 1962), 
debates, March 9, 1961, col. 479. 
2111 For works in English on the defence and fisheries policies of the centrc~ 
left regime in Iceland in the early 1970s, see R.P. Barston and Hjalmar W. 
Hannesson, "The Anglo-Ice1andic Fisheries Dispute," International 
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Some Western officials must have had a sense of deja VII. It 
was the troubled 1950s all over again. 
Just like before, Norway's fishing and defence interests were 
inevitably linked with developments in Iceland. This time the 
sensitive relationship with the Common Market (or the 
European Economic Communities, EEC) would also be 
affected.m In 1970, a centre-right coalition in Norway had 
followed Britain's lead in aspiring for membership of the EEC. 
In March 1971, the Labour Party had come back to power 
and was determined to join. The EEC leadership in Brussels 
wanted to accept Norway, not only for economic reasons and 
for strengthening the union but even - as British officials 
noted in June 1971 - "because they are afraid that, if Norway 
did not accede to the Communities, it would cut loose from 
NATO.,,1l2 Paul Koht, the Norwegian Ambassador in 
London, ominously agreed that if Norway were unable to join 
the EEC, "there would be a danger that she might be drawn 
into some new orbit." The anxiety seemed excessive, to say 
the least. Moreover, the Norwegians appeared willing to risk 
this alleged upheaval for the sake of fish, as they insisted that 
they had to maintain a 12-mile limit off their shores with no 
rights for foreign fishing. Some officials even used the 
Relations, Val. 4., No. 6, 1974, 559-84, Jcffrey A. Harr, The Allglo-
Icelandic Cod \Var of 1972-73. A Case Study of a Fishery Dispute, Insritute 
of International Studies, Research Series, No. 29, University of California, 
Berkeley (Berkeley, 1976), ]onssol1, Friends in Conflict, 109-54, Stephen R. 
Karz, "Issues arising in the Icelandic Fisheries Case," International and 
Com{Joratiue Lazo Quarterly, Val. 22, pt. 1, January 1973, 83-108, Valur 
Ingimundarson, '''Fighting the Cod Wars in the Cold \Var: Iceland's 
Challenge to the \Y/estern Alliance in the 19705", The RUSI journal, Vol. 
148, No. 3, 2003, 88-94, and Th6r, British Trawlers and Iceland, 198-217. 
i1! On Norway's application to join the EEC and the strategic connotations, 
see Clive Archer and Ingrid Sogner, Norway, European integration and 
Atlantic Security (Oslo, 1998). The mOst detailed work on the fishing aspect 
of Norway' negotiations with the EEC is Bjnrn Dynna, "Fiskeriscktorcn i de 
norske utvidelsesforhandlingene med EF (1970-1972)" [The fisheries sector 
in the Norwegian negotiations on entry into the EEC, 1970-1972], (MA 
thesis, University of Oslo 1973). 
'" TNA, PRO PREM151356, K.C. Christofas Minute, June 28, 1971. 
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military-political argument that overfishing by foreigners 
within 12 miles would depopulate further the remote regions 
in North Norway, "with possible strategic consequences." 
Britain and the EEC were nndeterred, however, and called for 
fishing rights up to the six-mile limit off Norway. The British 
government was under pressnre to accept foreign fishing up to 
its six-mile limit and did not wish to agree on that and then be 
denied the same right elsewhere. "3 In Brussels, at the same 
time, the complaint could be heard that the Norwegians "did 
not appear to understand what the Community was about, 
and there was a limit to what the Commnnity should do for 
the sake of a few dispersed fishermen and peasants. ,,214 
The Icelandic 50-mile decision could only increase the 
divide between Norway on the one hand and Britain and the 
EEC on the other. In October 1971, Ambassador Koht 
warned Sir Geoffrey Rippon, Britain's chief negotiator in the 
membership talks, that the fishermen in Norway were now 
saying that Norway ought to follow Iceland and declare a 50-
mile limit instead of inviting foreign fishermen up to its 
shores.m At the beginning of 1972, after long and drawn-out 
negotiations with the EEC, the Norwegian government had 
managed to secure a promise on the preservation of the 
exclusive 12-mile limit for most of their coast for the next 
decade, and with a good chance of an eA1:ension thereafter.'" 
The Norwegian voters then had to decide whether to join the 
Community or not, and some of them at least would continue 
to have the Icelandic initiative in mind. 
While the Icelandic intention to extend fishing limits was 
bound to affect decision-making in Norway, the aim of the 
left-wing coalition in Reykjavik to expel D.S. forces posed a 
clear danger to Norwegian interests. As T6mas A. T6masson, 
.lU TNA, PRO PREM15/356, C.c. Tickell to Robert Annstrong, June 30, 
1971. 
'" TNA, PRO CAB170166, C.C. Tickell Minute, July 13, 1971. 
'" TNA, PRO CAB170166, C.C. Tickell Minute, October 21, 1971. 
1!~ Sce DYllna, "Fiskerisektoren", 152-83. 
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Iceland's Permanent Representative at NATO, once told his 
U.S. colleague, Donald Rumsfeld, if the withdrawal were to 
take place "[the] British would feel a cold chill on top of their 
head and [the] Norwegians would have [a] similar sensation 
along their backbone.,,217 In the 1960s, the Soviet Union had 
embarked on a huge expansion of its blue water fleet. In the 
early 1970s, the Soviet Northern Fleet was thought to consist 
of 60 major warships and 175 submarines. In 1968, and again 
in 1970, the Soviet Union had conducted major ocean 
exercises which demonstrated its vastly improved capabilities 
in Northern waters.m During an exercise in 1971, 
furthermore, ships from the Northern Fleet sailed there and 
practised - as was widely publicised in both Iceland and 
Norway - invasions of the two countries.'" 
What lay behind the naval build-up? At the time the 
Norwegian military leadership concluded that, in the event of 
war, the Soviet Union was mostly determined to secure 
operations of their SSBN's (strategic missile submarines) and 
to intercept NATO communications and supply lines. In 
peacetime, it was argued, the Soviets wanted to maintain a 
credible submarine nuclear deterrent and to "create and 
sustain an impression of Soviet power at sea, to reduce the 
efficacy of NATO reinforcement and support perceived within 
'" NARA, RG59 Box 1741 DEF 15 ICE· US, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. 
Delegation to NATO (Brussels), to Secretary of State, May 12, 1973. 
211; Major-General Tonne Huitfeldt, "The Maritime Environment in the 
North Atlantic," Power at Sea lII. Competition and Conflict. Adelphi Papcr 
No. 122, (London, 1976), 86-87. On the Soviet naval buildup in the 1960s 
and 19705, see also Christoph Bertrarn and Johan Jorgen Hoist (eds.), New 
Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic (Oslo, 1977), Clive Archer (cd.), Tbe 
Soviet Union and Nortbem lJ7aters (London, 1988), Bj6rn Bjarnason, f hita 
kalda stridsills [In the heat of the Cold Warl, (Reykjavik, 2001), Bradford 
Dismukes and James McConnell (eds.), Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New 
York, 1979), RolfTamnes, The United States and the Cold War il1 the High 
North (Oslo, 1991), and "Military Buildup and Nordic Stability in the 
1970s." 
'" Morgtlllbladid, July 9, 1971. Sce also David Miller, The Cold War: A 
Military History (London, 1998), 178-79. 
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the alliance. ,,220 Obviously, the Western powers felt that they 
had to respond to this escalation in the North Atlantic and it 
was of course as clear that the threatened departure of D.S. 
forces from Iceland was therefore extremely disagreeable. As 
for the Norwegians, they would be put under increased 
pressure to accept the permanent presence of NATO forces 
and installations in Norway.Z21 In mid-July 1971, right after 
the formation of the centre-left coalition in Reykjavik, the 
organ of the Labour Party in Norway pointed out that the 
strategic importance of Iceland was greater than ever before.m 
On July 15, the day after the new regime took power, Lars 
Langaker, the Norwegian charge d'affaires in Reykjavik, 
called on the new Foreign Minister, Einar Agustsson, and 
conveyed the concerns of the Norwegian government. 
Agtistsson replied that the government was first going to focus 
on the fishing limits issue and in fact the Progressive Party 
would try its utmost to avoid the denunciation of the defence 
agreement with the United States although a clear reduction in 
the U.S. presence would probably be inevitable. But the gist of 
the message was that there was no need to panic.'" 
The Progressives had been determined to enter government 
after 12 years in opposition and they knew that the People's 
Alliance, a vital partner, would insist on a pledge to expel the 
"occupation" army. The leftist part of the Progressive Party 
was in favour but the right wing, and the majority of the 
party's MPs, viewed this commitment as a price which had to 
l!lI Huitfeldt, "The Maricime Environment in the North Atlantic," 87. 
111 Similar concerns in the 1950s could also be mentioned here. See also Nils 
Orvik, "Nonvegian Foreign Policy." Ronald Barston (cd.), The Other 
Powers (London, 1973), esp. 52-55. For a summary, sce Albert J6nsson, 
"Trunda thorskastrfdid" [The tenth Cod Warl, Saga, Vol. 19, 1976, 91. 
ill Arbeiderbladet [Norwegian daily], July 19,1971 (leading article). 
~:J VD, 31.11160IXIJ, Lars Langakcr, Nonvegian Embassy (ReykjavIk), to 
Foreign Ministry, July 15, 1971. 
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be paid to form the coalition.'" In reality, they were going to 
delay the matter and hope that later on the situation would 
somehow be "quite different," as Agustsson explained.'" Still, 
the rulers in Oslo remained worried after the initial talk with 
the new Foreign Minister. On July 27, Langaker spoke with 
him again and the following day, Ambassador Christian Mohr 
did so as well, having been recalled to his post during a 
summer vacation in Norway. Both of them reiterated the 
importance of V.S. facilities in Iceland to NATO, especially in 
light of increased Soviet activity in the North Atlantic."6 While 
Agustsson stated again that the V.S. presence would have to 
be greatly reduced, he confirmed that no decisions were to 
expected in the immediate future and that the Icelanders 
would never act without warning Norway first.'" Later in the 
year, the Norwegian defence minister, A.J. Fostervoll, 
confirmed with V.S. officials that "there is an understanding 
between the Prime Ministers of Iceland and Norway that 
Iceland will take no final action regarding the Keflavik base 
before consulting the Norwegian Prime Minister."m It is easy 
to imagine the uproar within the coalition and among the 
Icelandic public, had news of this assurance leaked at the time. 
On the one hand, the Norwegian authorities were relieved 
that a drastic change was not imminent in Iceland.'29 On the 
m See Valur Ingimundarson, "A Western Cold War: The Crisis in Iceland's 
Relations with Britain, the United States, and NATO, 1971-74," 
Diplomacy alld Statecraft, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2003), 94-136. 
,,; NARA, RG59 Box 1741 DEF 15 ICE-US, Crowe, U.S. Embassy (Oslo), 
to Secretary of State, July 28, 1971. 
'" UD, 31.11160IXII, Lars Langaker, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, July 27 and August 16,1971, and NARA, RG59 Box 
1741 DEF 15 ICE-US, Crowe, U.S. Embassy (Oslo), to Secretary of State, 
July 28,1971. 
227 UD, 31. 11/60IXII, Lars Langakcr, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, July 27,1971. 
m NARA, RG59 Box 1741 DEF 15 ICE-US, State Department to u.s. 
Embassy (Oslo), October 28, 1971. 
m TNA, PRO FC03311308, T.F. Brenchley, British Embassy (Oslo), to J.K. 
DrinkaIl, August 5, 1971. 
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other hand, they felt that Agustsson's arguments were not very 
convincing and that the Progressives were playing a dangerous 
game. After the round of talks with Agustsson in Reykjavik, 
Norway's Foreign Minister, Andreas Cappelen, could not but 
comment that "Icelandic domestic politics had no social 
democratic basis or tradition and ... that the position was 
difficult to understand." Cappelen underlined as well that 
Norway would feel "very isolated" if the V.S. forces left 
Iceland since Norway relied on the Keflavik base just as it 
relied on membership in NATO."" Norwegian self-interest in 
Iceland had reappeared. At the UN General Assembly in New 
York in late 1971, one of the left-wing Norwegian delegates 
even admitted off the record that although he would publicly 
support the policy of V.S. withdrawal in Iceland, in actual fact 
and "for very selfish reasons" he wished that the Americans 
would stay, for otherwise the calls for V.S. bases in Norway 
would greatly increase.m In Norway the military leadership 
felt it necessary to wonder whether the required installations 
could perhaps be set up on the Norwegian island of Jan 
Mayen. It is small, however, practically inhabitable and was 
no substitute for Iceland in strategic terms.'" 
And then there was the limits extension. Norwegian and 
other Western officials were relieved that the Icelanders were 
only going to focus on the base issue when they had 
successfully completed the other main goal of extending 
Iceland's fishing limits. Then again, the first Cod War had 
shown how fish and security concerns had got tangled 
together and in 1971, Britain was certainly not going to 
"" TNA, PRO FC041/825, R.G. Sheridan, British Embassy (Oslo), to A.C. 
Thorpe, July 30, 1971. 
!3! Morgunbladid, January 26, 1984. The news report was based on a leaked 
memorandum from the Foreign Ministry about a meeting bet\veen the 
representatives of the three coalition parties in Iceland and three Norwegian 
delegates (including Arne Treholt, then active member of the Norwegian 
Labour Party's youth assocation). 
~)! See Rolf Tamnes, "Military Buildup and Nordic Stability in the 1970s." 
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accept the impending extension without stiff resistance. A 
decade before, they had accepted the 12-mile limit and the 
new, rather excessive baselines in return for the assurance 
about a possible reference of further disputes to The Hague. 
This stance was unchanged when the new centre-left regime in 
Iceland declared that it would ignore the agreement and 
extend the limits unilaterally. Informal talks between London 
and Reykjavik had already begun in August 1971 but they 
solved nothing and once more, Iceland and Britain seemed 
destined to fight over fish. Although the Icelanders did not act 
immediately, they were determined not to back down and 
Prime Minister Edward Heath declared to his officials that "it 
should be emphasised, constantly and forcibly, to the 
Icelandic government that we have many cards in our hands 
and we will not hesitate to play them. "m Over the following 
months, British officials discussed the various means of 
retaliation: persuasion at the international level, economic 
coercion or naval protection - passive as in the first Cod War 
or even aggressive up to the point of immobilizing or sinking 
Icelandic coast guard vessels.'" 
For Britain, important fishing interests were clearly at stake, 
as was the principle of having a binding commitment 
honoured. Also, the British side did not accept that the fish 
stocks off Iceland were in serious danger and in any case an 
international solution should then be sought. Furthermore, a 
retreat against the Icelanders could have serious repercussions, 
m TNA, PRO PREMlS/955, Peter Moon to Nicholas Barrington, August 
25,1971. See also PRO FC03311312, "Record of Talks Between the 
1vlinister of Stare and the Icelandic Foreign 11inister, 18 August 1971." Sce 
also Edward Heath, The Course of My Life. My Autobiography {London, 
1998), 490-9J. 
m See for instance TNA, PRO CAB1481126, "Icelandic Fisheries Dispute: 
Naval Protection," Foreign and Commonwealth Office Memorandum, May 
10,1972, and FC0761538, "Fishery Protection off Iceland - Use of Military 
Force," Draft Memorandum by D.A.J. West, Ministry of Defence, August 
23, 1972. For a summary, see Gudni .J6hannesson, "Okkar bestu ovinir" 
[Our best enemies], Morg1l11blaoio, March 7, 2004. 
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for instance at the preparatory talks for the next law of the sea 
conference where Britain would again try to defend the 
principle of narrow limits, and of course in relation to 
Norway and the EEC negotiations.215 The Icelanders would 
have to be persuaded or forced to give in and the new set of 
policymakers in London was at least sometimes guilty of the 
same wishful thinking as their predecessors in the 1950s, 
namely that the Scandinavians could be expected to give 
Iceland a brotherly and effective counsel of moderation and 
d d·'36 un erstan Il1g.-
The previous disputes had demonstrated how conflicting 
Norway's national interests could be when it came to Iceland's 
actions in the field of fish and fishing limits. What should the 
Norwegian authorities do now? Should they defend or oppose 
the Icelanders? Arguments for the former could easily be 
found. The herring fishery off Iceland had completely 
collapsed, after incessant over fishing by Icelandic, Norwegian 
and Soviet fishermen, so Norway had no direct fishing interest 
there by this stage. In general, there were worrying signs of 
overfishing in the North Atlantic and near Iceland, foreign 
vessels took more than half of the total catch (in the 1960s 
and up to 1972, British vessels caught around a 20-25 per 
cent and West German ones around 15 per cent).2J7 In this 
sense Icelandic claims about the need for conservation 
measures were reasonable."" Furthermore, in a strategic 
context, objections to Iceland's intentions among the NATO 
'" TNA, PRO CAB148!126, DOPO(S)(72)1, "Icelandic Fisheries: Talks 
with Icelandic Delegation in Reykjavik on 13 and 14 January, 1972," and 
PRO CAB148!126, DOPO(S)(72)2, "Extension of Territorial Waters. 
Fishery Interests. Note by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food," 
January 18, 1972. 
':'J~ See for instance TNA, PRO FC0411825, Lord Bridges Minute, August 
13,1971. See also William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain 
(London, 1976),236. 
LP Thar, British Trawlers and leeland, 244-45. 
ih See VD, 31.11/60IXII, Knut Haem, 1.1inistry of Fisheries, to Foreign 
Ministry, September 1, 1971. 
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member states would probably lessen Icelandic support for the 
alliance and the U.S. base, at a very delicate moment in the 
country's relations with the West. American officials told 
Norwegian representatives that it was for this reason that the 
Washington administration did not state strong opinions on 
the fishing limits issue (and also because U.S. fishing interests 
were not directly involved)."" 
Moreover, Iceland anticipated Nordic support. In October 
1971, the European Fisheries Conference (a union of 
fishermen's associations) condemned the Icelandic 50-mile 
declaration and threatened a ban on the landings of Icelandic 
fish. During a meeting of Nordic fisheries officials a short 
while later, the Icelandic delegate harshly condemned Nordic 
acquiescence in the resolution: "if this is really the Nordic 
reaction, if Nordic representatives will in actual fact act 
together with others to burn us inside our own honse, then we 
Icelanders must obviously reconsider our attitudes towards 
Nordic cooperation. ,,'" In Iceland, as Lars Langaker wrote 
from Reykjavik in April 1972, "a negative position on the 
extension will be portrayed as a betrayal by brothers ... and a 
clear breach of Nordic cooperation. "Hl For most of the 
Icelandic population, as Langaker again reported three 
months later, full sovereignty over the fishing grounds was 
simply a continuation of the struggle for independence in the 
19'" and early 20,h centuries.'" Emotions and obstinacy 
strongly influenced Icelandic policies on fishing limits. The 
Icelanders had cast themselves in the role of David against 
Goliath and the international media usually adopted this view 
as well. In Norway, therefore, the general public was on the 
Z>'l UD, 31.11160/XIII, Knut Sverrc, Norwegian Embassy (Washington), to 
Foreign Ministry, March 8, 1972. 
l~O VD, 31.11/60IXII, Foreign Ministry l\1inutc, October 18, 1971. 
24\ UD, 31.11/60IXII, Lars Langaker, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), ro 
Foreign Ministry, April 7, 1972. 
24" VD, 31.11/60IXIV, Lars Langaker, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, August 11, 1972. 
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whole sympathetic towards Iceland, the distant and tiny 
"Saga-island" in the North Atlantic. Icelandic radical left-
wing students in Norway also played a role here. They 
regnlarly protested British "imperialism" on the oceans, 
distributed leaflets on the Icelandic case and were in fact so 
vociferous that the Norwegian security service labelled them 
for a while as a potentially dangerous element.w 
On the other hand, there were ample reasons to object to 
the intended extension. For instance, the herring could always 
recover and then the Norwegians might live to regret an 
acceptance of the Icelandic move."< Similarly, a 50-mile limit 
around Iceland would probably lead to intensified fishing off 
Norwegian shores and calls for Norwegian action would then 
grow louder, at a time when the government in Oslo was still 
opposed to an extension of the fishing limits."5 Furthermore, 
active support for Iceland would not be well received in 
London, Bonn or Brussels. In March 1972, when Britain 
decided to refer the dispute with Iceland to the International 
Court, Norwegian officials commented that "the Norwegian 
government would privately be quite glad ... since it would 
have been an embarrassment to the Norwegian Government 
in the EEC context if Iceland had been able to take a 50-mile 
fishery limit without any effective challenge. ,,2<6 Likewise, 
Norwegian legal experts, the knowledgeable officials and the 
cabinet ministers involved all felt that right was not on 
Iceland's side. In their mind, the 1961 agreement about 
w UD, 34.4/601IV, Kjeld Vibe to Agnar KI. ]onsson, Icelandic Embassy 
(Oslo), .March 11, 1974. On the student activists, see also Gudmundur ]. 
Gudmundsson, "Thorskar f k61du strfdi/' [Cod in a cold war], Ny saga, 
Vu!. 12,2000,67-81. 
1~4 UD, 31.11160IXIII, Foreign !vlinistry Memorandum, March 29,1972. 
:"t} UD, 31. 11160IXII, S. Rcmoy, Norwegian Embassy (London), to Foreign 
!vlinistry, June 15, 1971, Knut Hoem, Ministry of Fisheries, to Foreign 
Ministry, Septembet 1, 1971, and VD, 31.11/60IXIII, Kjell Eliassen Minute, 
Aptil 20, 1972. 
'" TNA, PRO FC0761515, Sit CUttis Keeble Minute, March 10, 1972. See 
also VD, 31. 11/60/XIV, Kjell Eliassen Minute, July 28,1972. 
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referral of disputes to The Hague was still in force and the 
Icelanders should also wait for the outcome of the 
forthcoming law of the sea conference.'" 
The pros and cons made a passive conrse seem inevitable. 
Notwithstanding Icelandic and British calls for snpport, np to 
the summer of 1972 the government in Oslo did not have to 
express a formal view on the planned 50-mile limit. On July 
14,1972, the government in Reykjavik issued a declaration 
on the extension of the fishing limits from 12 to 50 miles on 
September 1 the same year.'" Apparently, the point of no 
return had been reached and on August 3, Foreign Minister 
Cappelen issued a statement on the Norwegian position in the 
impending dispute. It emphasised Norway's "great 
understanding of Iceland's difficult position" and noted that, 
while Norway wished to have fishing disputes solved through 
international arrangements, the government in Oslo was not 
saying that Iceland should definitely follow that route.'" In 
short, the Norwegians did not want to take sides. If required, 
they would support the Icelanders, but with reservations. In 
Reykjavik, the position was accepted, but certainly not 
applauded.''" And on August 17, a more serious upset was 
received in Reykjavik. The International Court of Justice ruled 
that Iceland was not in the right to enforce the 50-mile limit 
against British and West-German vessels, and that as an 
interim measure, Britain should be allowed to catch 170,000 
tons of fish off Iceland, and West Germany another 119,000 
tons.m This verdict was deeply disappointing to the Icelandic 
government. Even so, it maintained that the Court did not 
have jurisdiction in the matter. Iceland would go ahead and 
247 UD, 31.11160/XIII, Foreign Ministry !vlinure, March 29,1972. 
2AIi See J6nsson, Friends in Conflict, 130. 
l4~ A!tcn!JOsten [Norwegian daily], August 3,1972. 
HO UD, 31.11/60/3\.'\11, Lars Langaker, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign 1o.1inistry, November 6, 1972. 
251 See Th6r, British Trawlers and Ice/and, 203-04, and Jonsson, Friends ill 
Conflict, 131-34. 
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last-ditch talks with Britain about a non-prejudicial and a 
lower provisional fishing quota for the British trawlers failed. 
On September 1, 1972, Icelandic coast guard vessels began 
to patrol the waters off Iceland up to the 50-mile limit. Britain 
was anxious not to escalate the dispute and initially refrained 
from sending in the Royal Navy. Still, the authorities in 
London strongly protested this "encroachment on the high 
seas" and encouraged Norway, as the most likely party to 
have any influence in Iceland, to advise restraint and 
accommodation. Once more, the Norwegians pointed out that 
their persuading the Icelanders would do no good at all.252 In 
addition, they were actually contemplating whether they 
ought to conclude a separate peace with Iceland. At the end of 
August, the F aroe Islanders had reached an agreement on 
regulated fishing within the 50-mile limit and in the first days 
of September, the Belgians recognised that line de facto, in 
return for limited fishing for their small and ageing trawler 
fleet. On reflection, Norwegian fishing interests off Iceland 
had become so insignificant that the government in Oslo did 
not consider such a trade-off advisable.'" Furthermore, while 
the rulers in London, Bonn and Brussels understood that the 
Danes could hardly have resisted the intense wishes in the 
Faroe Islands to reach an understanding with Iceland, they 
condemned the Belgian decision.'" The British and West 
German authorities felt that the EEC should stay united and, 
in fact, they had already secured a special clause in Iceland's 
trade agreement with the Community which stated that 
certain concessions on fish tariffs would not take effect if its 
member states were involved in a dispute with Iceland over its 
HO TNA, PRO FC0761526, M. Elliott Minute, September 26, 1972. 
'" TNA, PRO FC0761522, British Embassy (Oslo), to Foreign Office, 
August 16, 1972, UD, 31.10113/1, Foreign l\.1inisrry Minutes, September 1 
and 21,1972. 
'" TNA, PRO FC0761552, Alee Douglas·Home to British Embassy 
(Brussels), September 11, 1972, and UD, 31.1l/60/XV, Paul Koht, 
Norwegian Embassy (London), to Foreign .h1inisrry, September 12, 1972. 
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fishing limits."5 Norwegian "disloyalty" would have been 
criticised as forcefully as the Belgian "defection" and in the 
first phase of the Cod War, Norway still aspired to be a good 
European. 
On September 25, those hopes were dashed. In a 
referendum on EEC membership, a majority of Norwegians 
(53,5 per cent) said no. The opposition was strongest in North 
Norway and other rural regions. Concerns about fishing and 
fishing limits had undoubtedly influenced the outcome."6 In 
early August, the Centre Party, which was resolutely opposed 
to membership, had proclaimed that Norway should follow 
Iceland and impose a 50-mile limit instead of allowing the 
fishing vessels from the EEC to fish in Norwegian waters.257 
The Norwegian Socialists were also resolutely against 
membership and when the results of the referendum were 
clear, Finn Gustavsen, leader of the Socialist People's Party, 
stated that the Icelandic initiative had opened the eyes of the 
Norwegians: "we should thank the Icelanders for having 
waged this battle against the might of the EEC just when we 
were discussing membership."m Trygve Bratte!i's Labour 
government resigned and was succeeded on October 18 by 
Lars Korvald's centrist coalition (which included the Centre 
Party). Within the EEC and NATO, fears appeared 
immediately that the new regime would extend Norway's 
fishing limits before the law of the sea conference, and thus 
~5; Sce BencdiktssoD, Iceland al1d European Development. 
'" See TNA, PRO PREM/868, Ralph Selby, British Embassy (Oslo), to Alee 
Douglas-Home, October 4, 1972. Sclby also mentioned that the planned 
introduction of the Common Fisheries Policy before the accession of 
Norway and Britain was "bound to excite the suspicions of a naturally 
suspicious people." Moreover, Selby wrote on Kare \ViIloch, one of the 
leading politicians who advocated membership, that "the Norwegians do 
not really tcust the likes of Mr Willoch, who with his bald pate and pointed 
jaw looks as if he might almost have been the origin of the word egg-head." 
'" NARA, RG59 Box 2355, POl 33-4 ICE, Ausland, U.S. Embassy (Oslo), 
to Secretary of State, August 10, 1972. 
Z$~ Thj6dL'iljillll, September 27, 1972. 
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reduce the chances of an agreement. In Washington, the 
administration decided to urge its Western allies to impress on 
the Norwegians the "adverse consequences of unilateral 
extensions on Norwegian fishing, shipping, and security 
interests. ,,259 In the event, the worries were unfounded as the 
new coalition was determined to await the outcome of the 
conference."" Unilateralism was not the Norwegian way. 
By this stage, the fishing dispute had intensified. In the first 
conflict, the Icelanders could only hope to end British 
"poaching" by arresting trawlers and bringing them to port. 
In the 1970s, however, they used to good effect a new "secret 
weapon." This was a "cutter" which the coast guard vessels 
dragged over the trawl-wires and thus severed the trawl from 
the British trawlers. Arrests were no longer needed to stop 
British fishing but the trawlermen were of course furious over 
this intimidating tactic and threatened retaliation. By mid-
October, British officials were stressing (in conversations with 
Nordic diplomats in London, for example) that if the cuttings 
continued, lives would soon be lost in the disputed waters. 
While Britain respected Nordic sympathy for tiny Iceland, the 
officials stressed yet again that a complete surrender was out 
of the question and the Nordic states should try to use their 
moderating influence in Reykjavik."" Fortunately, fatal 
incidents were avoided but in mid-January 1973, the British 
trawlermen had got so frustrated over Icelandic harassment 
that they declared that they would all leave the Icelandic 
grounds unless they were offered naval protection. The 
authorities in London responded by sending ocean-going tugs 
to their assistance but they had only just arrived on the scene 
when Britain could enjoy a respite in the conflict. "The Devil 
,>' NARA, RG59 Box 2016, POl 33·8, State Department to D.S. Embassy 
(Oslo), October 26, 1972. 
'w NARA, RG59 Box 2016, POl 33-8, D.S. Embassy (Oslo) to Stare 
Department, November 3, 1972. 
'" NAC, 55.JSlAND.lIXVU, Kristiansen, Danish Embassy (london), ro 
Foreign Ministry, October 13, 1972. 
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rescued them," as an Icelandic coast guard captain later put it, 
for on January 23, 1973, a volcanic eruption began on the 
Westman Islands, south off the Icelandic mainland. Over the 
next couple of months, the coast guard vessels were 
preoccupied with salvage efforts there."" 
However, relative calm on the fishing grounds was 
accompanied with increased tension in the strategic arena. In 
early 1973, it looked increasingly likely that the government 
in Iceland would invoke the stipulation in the U.S.-Icelandic 
defence agreement from 1951 which called for consultation 
before the eventual withdrawal of American troops from 
Iceland. Foreign Minister Agustsson emphasised in private 
that the action was necessary to maintain peace within the 
coalition. Furthermore, even if and when the decision was 
made, the country's allies should not presume that the 
Icelandic authorities were determined to expel the 
Americans.'" In Western circles the complaint could be heard, 
still, that the Progressives were playing with fire. Norwegian 
officials were clearly concerned and although they hesitated to 
exert pressure they reiterated, whether in Washington or 
Reykjavik, the importance of U.S. facilities in Iceland for 
Norway and NATO.'" More surprisingly, in early March 
1973, the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme expressed his 
deep worries to Gylfi Gislason, leader of the Icelandic Social 
Democrats (then in position). Although Palme was harshly 
critical of U.S. foreign policy and espoused detente and 
disarmament, he insisted that it was "absolutely essential" for 
Scandinavian security to have the U.S. forces on guard in 
1ft! For the coast guard comment, see Sidasti valshm [The Last Waltz], 
(television documentary (part Il), Channel Two, Iceland, February 22, 
2000). 
S,) See Ingimundarson, "A Western Cold \\'ar," 107-1l. 
M NARA, RG59 Box 1741 DEF 4 ICE US, Frederick irving, U.S. Embassy 
(Reykjavik), to Secretary of State, February 22,1973, RG59 Box 1741 DEF 
15 ICE US, Frederick Irving, 0.5. Embassy (Reykjavik), to Secretary of 
State, April 16, 1973, and RG59 Box 1741 DEF 4 ICE US, Frederick Irving, 
U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), to Secretary of State, May 15, 1973. 
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Iceland.m When it came to Iceland in Scandinavia, self-interest 
was not merely a Norwegian phenomenon. 
In late April, it was more or less a foregone conclusion that 
the Icelandic government would soon initiate the formal 
process of consultations on U.S. withdrawal. Equally as 
worrying for Western interests, the situation in the disputed 
waters had seriously deteriorated. Duties in connection with 
the Westman Islands were no longer as pressing and the coast 
guard vessels had resumed warp-cuttings. The tugs could only 
offer limited protection and on April 23, lives could easily 
have been lost as a group of trawlers tried to ram a coast 
guard vessel and the crew responded by firing rifle shots at the 
trawlermen."" In Reykjavik, Norwegian Ambassador Olav 
Lydvo noticed how the incident had created "extreme 
touchiness" which would certainly affect attitudes towards 
NATO and the U.S. base.'" British officials underlined, 
however, that Britain had shown "extreme patience" but 
could not tolerate that shots were fired at British vessels on 
the high seas. They accepted that the Norwegians could not be 
asked to press the Icelanders but argued that they must use 
their influence to urge upon the authorities in Reykjavik the 
importance of creating the correct atmosphere for talks. '" Yet 
again, Norway was caught between Scylla and Charybdis. The 
",' NARA, RG59 Box 1741 POL ICE-NOR, Frederick lrving, US Embassy 
(Reykjavik), to Secretary of Statc, March 19, 1973. In mid-May, Leif 
LcifIand, the Swedish charge d'affaires in \Vashington reiterated these 
concerns. See NARA, RG59 Box 2355 DEF 4 ICE-US, State Department to 
U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), }'>lay 18, 1973. See also Leif Leifland, Froste"s 
/ir. Om USA:s diplomatiska lJt(rysning t1V SlIerige (Stockholm, 1997), 164-
65, and Valur Ingimundarson, Uppgjor uid tI111heimiml. Smnskipti islands, 
Bandarfkjmuu1 og NATO 1960-1974 [A settlcment with the outside world. 
Iceland's relations with NATO and the USA, 1960-74], (Reykjavik, 2001), 
207-08, 
"", SO, 1993-7-1, Icelandic Coast Guatd Report, April 27, 1973. 
,,,, NARA, RG59 Box 1741 DEF 4 ICE· US, Ftederick Irving, U,s. Embassy 
(Reykjavik), to Secretary of State, April 27, 1973. 
H,' VD, 31.11/60/XVIII, R.G, Britten, British Embassy (Oslo), to Kjeld Vibe, 
April 25, 1973, 
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government in Oslo had no newfound desire to support 
wholeheartedly one side or another but the Icelanders 
confounded the problem by formally asking for the purchase 
or lease of Norwegian naval vessels which could be used in 
the Cod War.'" Somewhat ironically, the authorities in 
London had earlier made very informal soundings about the 
lease of civilian tugs in Norway."o In Oslo, officials 
discouraged such cooperation and they also managed to reject 
the Icelandic request without causing anger in Reykjavik, 
where at least the government officials and more sympathetic 
ministers understood the Norwegian unwillingness to get 
directly involved in the dispute.27I 
Meanwhile, Icelandic harassment continued. At the 
beginning of May, the fiftieth trawl was cut from British 
trawlers since the Cod War began.'" In Reykjavik, British and 
Icelandic representatives failed once more to reach a 
temporary modus vivendi and by the middle of the month, the 
trawlermen were again determined to leave the Iceland 
grounds for good unless the Royal Navy came to the rescue. 
In London, the government was perfectly aware of the 
strategic implications of such a move. On the other hand, 
Prime Minister Edward Heath and most of his cabinet felt that 
Iceland's conduct had become absolutely intolerable.m On 
Saturday, May 19,1973, to the sound of "Rule Britannia" on 
the trawler radios, three British frigates sailed inside the 50-
", UD, 31.11160/XVIII, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, April 27, 1973. 
"" UD, 31.11160IXVI, Nicolai Sverre Minute, February 2, 1973. 
m URN, 1996 B/373-1, Icelandic Embassy (Oslo), to Foreign Ministry, June 
14,1973. The Icelanders made similar soundings in \X'ashington and got the 
same response. See URN, 1996 B/373·1, Icelandic Embassy (Washington), 
to Foreign Ministry, March 30,1973, and Ingimundarson, "A Western 
Cold War," 110. 
m TNA, PRO CAB1291170, CP(73)70, "Fisheries Dispure Between the 
United Kingdom and Iceland: Draft \Vhite Paper," June 18, 1973. Icelandic 
figures for the number of warp~cutting were slightly higher. See 
lngimundarson, "A Western Cold \X1ar," 111. 
m TNA, PRO CAB128/52, CM(73)29, Cabiner Minutes, May 17, 1973. 
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mile limit and began to fend off the Icelandic coast guard 
vessels. Armaments were not used, only manoeuvres to keep 
the coast guard vessels away from the trawlers. Still, the risk 
of collisions was always high. The Cod War had begun in 
earnest. 
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Chapter 7 
Norwegian Intervention at Land 
and Sea? 
Cod War Climax, 1973 
The rulers in Reykjavik met the British "invasion" with a 
vengeance. On the evening of May 19, Prime Minister 61afur 
J6hannesson declared on national television that Iceland 
would ask for help against the aggressor at the UN Security 
Council or within NATO. He also pointed out that according 
to the North Atlantic Treaty, "an attack on one was 
considered an attack on all." Likewise, the Socialists 
mentioned that the V.S. forces were supposedly based in 
Iceland to protect the country against an invasion, so now it 
was time for them to react. m Indeed, J 6hannesson carried a 
message on those lines to V.S. Ambassador Frederick Irving, 
requesting that the fighter jets at Keflavik fly out and "bomb" 
the British warships!275 Naturally, the Prime Minister did not 
expect to be taken at his word but he was demonstrating how 
the base issue and the fishing dispute were intrinsically linked: 
the Icelanders wonld not wish to be in a defence alliance with 
an enemy on the fishing grounds. 
m Timimz and Th;6dviljinn, l\1ay 22,1973. 
275 Sfdasti lltllsillll IThe Last Waltz], (television documentary (parr Ill), 
Channel Two, Iceland, February 29, 2000). 
SYNPATHf AND SELP-INTEREST 95 
When news of the British interference reached Oslo in the 
afternoon of May 19, Norwegian officials alerted Prime 
Minister Korvald.'" The Norwegians immediately appreciated 
that these latest developments in the Cod War could easily 
escalate and create tremendous anger in Iceland towards 
Britain. Inevitably, the question of NATO membership and 
the V.S. presence would be drawn in as well. The possible 
consequences for Norway were in the mind of all concerned in 
Oslo and they also knew that the Norwegian public 
overwhelmingly backed the Icelanders. There were valid 
reasons for involvement, therefore, and on May 22, Norway 
formally offered its good offices to Britain and Iceland.'" In 
Oslo, Foreign Minister Dagfinn Varvik told the British 
Ambassador, Ralph Selby, that a modus vivendi wonld almost 
certainly have to contain the removal of the British warships. 
While Selby did not reject that out of hand he added that the 
government in London would then expect a commitment from 
Iceland to refrain from warp-cntting during the time of 
negotiations.'" And from Reykjavik, Ambassador Lydvo 
warned that the Icelanders would only expect a Nordic 
country to sympathise fully with them, even in the role of a 
mediator.279 Although the Icelandic government was happy 
with the emphasis on British withdrawal, ministers would 
only agree to negotiations before the warships were actually 
gone, and they would not tolerate unimpeded British fishing 
within the 50-mile limit for the duration of the talks. The 
veteran Hans G. Andersen also remarked that the Norwegians 
had been clumsy and panicky since they had "insulted" Prime 
,., UD, 31.111601XVIII, leif Edwardsen Minute, May 21, 1973. 
,~ UD, 31.11/601XVIII, Leif Edwardsen Minute, Mal' 21,1973, and 
NARA, RG59 Box 2355 POl 33-4 ICE-UK, Crowe, ·U.s. Embassy (Oslo), 
to Secretary of State, May 22, 1973. 
'" UD, 31.11/60/XVlIl, Foreign Ministry Minute, May 22,1973, and Paul 
Koht, Norwegian Embassy (London), to Foreign Ministry, May 24, 1973. 
n UD, 3 J.11160/XVIII, Olav lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, May 22, 1973. 
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Minister ]6hannesson by putting their proposal forward 
without consulting him first."" Icelandic sensitivities would 
always have to be acknowledged. 
On May 25, Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Donglas-Home 
reiterated the British stand on a linkage between withdrawal 
and warp_cutting.'" Iceland then promptly declined the 
Norwegian mediation offer and emphasised once more that no 
talks were possible unless the Royal Navy left the waters off 
Iceland.'" And as if to highlight the strategic environment, on 
the same day the chairman of NATO's Military Committee 
gave the North Atlantic Council an account of yet another 
Soviet naval exercise in the southern Norwegian Sea and the 
North Atlantic close to Iceland. Soviet Bear aircraft even flew 
less than 30 miles from Icelandic shores.'" The exercise served 
to demonstrate increased Soviet activity in Northern waters 
and the knowledge about the Bears confirmed the surveillance 
value of the Keflavik base. The Norwegians now turned their 
attention solely to the British side, knowing that the Icelanders 
would not budge from their warships-out demand. On May 
27, Ambassador Koht visited the Foreign Office and urged 
Britain to withdraw the Royal Navy, for otherwise the 
presence of V.S. forces in Iceland would be put in jeopardy, 
with serious consequences for NATO in general and Britain 
and Norway in particular. While the British agreed per se with 
that assessment, they were not, as Foreign Secretary Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home put it, willing to "sign a blank cheque": a 
withdrawal would have to be accompanied by a promise not 
"" NARA, RG59 Box 1741 DEF 4lCE-VS, Frederick lrving, V.S. Embassy 
Rcykjvik, to Secretary of State, June 7, 1973. 
19] URN. 1996 B/296-2, Icelandic Embassy (London), to Foreign l\1inistry, 
May 25,1973. 
2K2 VD, 31. 11/60/XVIII, Foreign Minstry to Norwegian Embassy (London), 
May 26, 1973. 
'" VD, 31.11160/XVIll, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign 
1.1inistry, May 25, 1973. 
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to cut warps.'"' On May 29, moreover, the British cabinet 
almost decided to capture with all possible means the flagship 
of the Icelandic coast guard which had opened fire on, and 
holed, a British trawler which had strayed from the protection 
fleet. The rulers in London were held back by the risk of fatal 
casualties, legal considerations - and of course the strategic 
ramifications.'"' But despite the hardened British attitude, the 
Norwegians raised the matter within NATO and appealed to 
Britain to leave Icelandic waters, for the sake of the Alliance 
and Western security.'" Genuine anxiety seemed to determine 
policy-making in Oslo. 
Within NATO, Secretary General Joseph Luns also put 
forward his good offices. Throughout the conflict, Luns felt 
that Britain simply had to sacrifice its own limited fishing 
interests for the sake of Western security; in private 
conversations with Icelanders in early June he complained as 
well that at least some of the British statesmen and diplomats 
were disillusioned by old "imperialistic" ideas.'" Luns' 
helpfulness did not make a difference, however, and Icelandic 
diplomats came to warn that, as things stood now, there 
probably was a majority in the Althing for both the expulsion 
of the V.S. troops and resignation from NATO.'" It was 
certainly true that the Icelanders were united in their loathing 
of British actions. Still, they were also consciously using the 
"NATO-weapon" to have their way in the Cod War. "We 
'"' UD, 31.11160IXVIII, Paul Koht, Norwegian Embassy (London) to 
Foreign Ministry, May 27,1973. 
m J6hannesson, "Okkar bestu ovinir" [Our best enemies}, Morgullblaoio, 
March 7, 2004. 
!% UD, 31.11J60IXIX, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign 
1.1inistry, May 30, 1973. 
l~" Private papers of Heimir Hannesson, Memorandum of conversation with 
Joseph Luns, June 6, 1973. 
~nH UD, 31.11160/XIX, Norwegian Delegation to the UN to Foreign 
Ministry, June 5,1973, and NARA, RG59 Box 1741 DEF 4 ICE·US, 
Frederick Irving, U.S. Embassy (Reykjvik), to Secretary of State, Junc 7, 
1973. 
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used NATO to death," Matthfas Johannessen, the co-editor of 
the influential right-wing Morgul1bladid, later recalled in 
connection with the Cod Wars.'" In the summer of 1973, 
British policymakers still acknowledged the strategic 
importance of Iceland."o Yet, they were not going to succumb 
to such Icelandic coercion and confirmed that position once 
more at a meeting of NATO defence ministers on June 7. That 
particular confirmation had come about after a renewed 
urging by Norway (and Denmark) that the British frigates be 
withdrawn without further conditions.'91 Although the 
authorities in Oslo knew enough about to Icelandic politics to 
be aware of the constant temptation to exploit the strategic 
importance of Iceland, they felt that risks should not be taken 
in this matter. The Icelanders might be unfair and obstinate, 
but they had to be accommodated. 
In Oslo, the desire to be of assistance also turned into 
desperation. On June 11, the British delegation at the NATO 
headquarters in Brussels reported that the Norwegian Chief of 
Defence Staff had snggested that a Norwegian warship be sent 
to keep peace on the fishing grounds. The naval leadership in 
Britain found the idea "interesting" but did not comment 
further on it.191 A week later, however, Tim Greve at the press 
department of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry prepared a 
detailed minute on Norwegian naval involvement for Foreign 
Minister Viirvik: 
2R'i Kalda strfdid [The Cold War], (television documentary, Iceland state 
television, May 15,2000). Also sec Ingimundarson, '" A Western Cold War", 
113-15. 
"" See for instance TNA, PRO DEFE5/196, COS30(73), "The Importance to 
United Kingdom Defence Interests of NATO Military Facilities in Iceland," 
Ministry of Defence Chiefs of Staff Committee Memorandum, July 5,1973. 
29l VD, 31.11160/XIX, Nonvegian delegation to NATO to Foreign Ministry, 
June 7, 1973. 
m TNA, PRO DEFE24/529, "Iceland. DOP Centre Sitreps," Situation 
Report, June 11, 1973. 
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In practice, this would take the form of unarmed Norwegian 
vessels replacing the [British] frigates. These Norwegian 
inspection vessels would not take over the functions of the 
frigates but they would patrol the grounds in order to a) 
prevent the British trawlers from fishing in areas where the 
Icelanders have imposed a total ban on fishing, and b) prevent 
the Icelandic coast guard vessels from harassing British 
trawlers (cut trawl-wires etc.)l~l 
Greve thought that Britain might be willing to consider the 
proposition but admitted that the Icelanders might find it 
difficult to accept. As it happened, nothing more was heard of 
this unrealistic idea. Instead, the Norwegian authorities 
continued to work for a solution. In late June, they suggested 
a de-escalation of the dispute whereby the British side would 
withdraw the warships and significantly curtail the fishing 
efforts, the Icelanders wonld "reduce harassment" and 
negotiations wonld immediately commence.'" Again, the 
notion was not realistic as the trawlermen wonld hardly 
tolerate reduced harassment and the Icelanders could not 
formally agree to only slightly impeded fishing by Britain 
inside the 50-mile limit. Still, the endeavour was landable and 
made both camps aware that their allies were concerned over 
the conflict. 
On July 4, furthermore, Norway signed an agreement with 
Iceland on limited line-fishing within the 50-mile limit. It was 
akin to the Belgian-Icelandic pact from September 1972 and 
strengthened the Icelandic case even if it contained a non-
prejudicial clause with regard to Norway's general position on 
fishing limits and territorial waters.m The Norwegians no 
longer needed to worry abour dissatisfaction in London, 
Brussels or Bonn; by calling for the unilateral withdrawal of 
'" VD, 31.11160/XIX, Tim Greve Minute, June 18, 1973. 
2q4 sO, 1993-5-3, Icelandic Embassy (Oslo), to Foreign Ministry, June 29, 
1973. 
29.\ UD, 31.11/60IXIX, Foreign Ministry Minute, June 28, 1973, and UD, 
31.1 0113/!, Olav Lydvo to Per Tresselt, July 4, 1973. 
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the Royal Navy they had sided so clearly with Iceland that the 
relatively trivial fishing agreement would not make much 
difference. Still, it increased Icelandic confidence and in late 
June, Foreign Minister Agustsson also told Ambassador 
Lydvo in Reykjavik how much the Icelanders appreciated 
Norway's efforts to persuade Britain to withdraw the Royal 
Navy. A short while later, however, Prime Minister 
J6hannesson dampened whatever feeling of satisfaction which 
the remark may have created in Norwegian minds by saying 
to Lydvo - with a sarcastic smile - that the Norwegians were 
primarily worried about the effects on the Keflavik base.'" 
For the following months, the burden of seeking a solution 
fell mostly on the shoulders of Secretary General Luns who 
was in regular contact with both the British and the Icelandic 
sides. The dispute only hardened, however. Collisions 
occurred between warships and coast guard vessels and on 
August 29, whilst welding a damaged bow after one such 
incident, an Icelandic mate was hit by a wave and died. 
Although Britain was not directly to blame for this only loss 
of life during the Cod Wars, the Icelanders' ire reached new 
heights. On the same day, before the tragic news from the 
fishing grounds reached Oslo, Kjeld Vi be at the Foreign 
Ministry thought that while there was still a majority in 
Iceland for the continued presence of D.S. forces and 
membership in NATO, support for both of these main planks 
in the country's defence policy was diminishing - mainly 
because of the Cod War. The Norwegians were therefore 
going to reiterate in Reykjavik the tremendous importance of 
the Keflavik base for the defence of Norway and the whole 
North Atlantic.'" The policymakers in Oslo must have known 
that such pleadings would do little but confirm in Iceland 
what was already known about Norwegian attitudes. In any 
Z% UD, 31.11160/XIX, Glav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign !vfinistry, June 22 and July 4, 1973. 
mUD, 31. 11/60/XIX, Foreign Ministry Minute, Augus[ 29, 1973. 
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event, the intensification of the fishing dispute at the end of 
August put an end to the planned approach. Instead, it looked 
as if the Icelandic government would take the dramatic step of 
breaking diplomatic relations with Britain. The Socialists had 
long called for such a step and the Progressive Party now 
appeared willing to support it. At the beginning of September, 
John McKenzie, the British Ambassador in Iceland, estimated 
that the risk of this step, never taken before in disputes 
between two NATO states, was about 50/50."" Over the next 
fortnight, further collisions took place in the disputed waters 
and McKenzie must have changed his odds for the worse. 
Still, the Icelanders did not act yet on the diplomatic front and 
during this time of tension Britain suggested that a neutral 
commission of enquiry be established to examine each 
incident."" Norway would almost be self-chosen for an 
authority of that kind. Here was another non-starter, 
however, and near the end of the month, the Icelandic 
government appeared to have made up its mind: Iceland 
would sever diplomatic relations with Britain. 
On September 21, the Foreign Ministry in Reykjavik 
formally enquired if Norway was prepared to look after 
Icelandic interests in Britain (France would take care of British 
interests in Iceland)."" It was a foregone conclusion that 
Norway would not reject the request but there were many 
practical issues to consider. Ambassador Lydvo foresaw added 
work in Reykjavik and felt that a second office clerk would be 
needed."} The Norwegian Embassy in London had to go over 
and clarify its proper function for Iceland with the British 
'" UD, 31.11/60/XX, Ola" Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, September 1 and 4, 1973. See also Tfmhm and Daily 
Telegraph, September 8, 1973. 
M SO, 1993-7-1, Hans G. Andersen Minute, September 9,1973. 
"" UD, 31.11/601XX, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, September 21, 1973. 
,1Cll VD, 3 L11/601XX, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, September 22, 1973. 
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authorities. In accordance with custom, the Icelandic Embassy 
would remain with its staff and would continue to run its 
communications with Reykjavik. However, the Norwegian 
Ambassador would be responsible for all conduct of the 
Icelandic mission and the Icelandic Embassy would have a 
new title on its correspondence, as well as a plaque at its 
entrance: "Royal Norwegian Embassy. Icelandic Interests 
Section." Ambassador Koht was not certain how much extra 
work these added responsibilities would entail but he felt that, 
at least to begin with, no extra manpower would be needed."" 
It goes without saying that the Icelandic threat to break 
diplomatic relations was meant to force Britain to give in. At 
first, however, the British appeared to be in the same fighting 
mood as the Icelanders. Early in September, they showed no 
sign of surrender and on September 24, when the practical 
aspects of the Icelandic action were under discussion, Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home told Foreign Minster Varvik (at the UN 
General Assembly in New York) that the British position 
remained unchanged: the British warships would only be 
withdrawn if the Icelanders promised not to harass the 
trawlers. Anything else would be a victory for the Icelandic 
hard-line "communists". Douglas-Home confirmed that 
Britain would be perfectly pleased wirh Norwegian care of 
Icelandic interests and he could not but comment, weary as he 
was of dealing with the Icelanders, that "Iceland would then 
for once be properly represented in Britain. "liB Three days 
later, the Icelandic government declared that if the Royal 
Navy had not sailed outside the 50-mile limit by October 3, 
diplomatic relations would promptly be broken."" 
JI11 UD, 31. 11160/XX, Paul Kohr, Norwegian Embassy (London), to Foreign 
Ministry, September 24, 1973. 
]1)). UD, 31.11/60/XX, Norwegian Delegation to the United Nations to 
Foreign lvlinistry, September 24,1973 . 
.1(14 SO, 1993RS-3) 61afur J6hannesson [Q John McKenzie, September 28, 
1973. See also Daily Telegraph, September 28,1973. 
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Dread now descended on the NATO headquarters in 
Brussels. On September 30, Secretary General Luns met with 
Prime Minister Heath and almost begged him to withdraw the 
warships. The following day, Foreign Secretary Douglas-
Home admitted to Ambassador Koht in London that the 
British side was naturally more concerned now, with a definite 
deadline hanging above their heads. Douglas-Home was no 
longer as defiant. He felt that the whole affair had been 
cleverly handled by the Icelandic "communists" and indicated 
that the Royal Navy would probably leave the waters off 
Iceland even if the Icelandic government did not pledge to stop 
interfering with British fishing.'" In Oslo, Ambassador Selby 
was as gloomy when Kjeld Vibe gave the well-rehearsed 
message that hopefully Britain would be as accommodating as 
possible with the Icelanders, for the sake of Western security. 
Selby felt that it was "high time" that Norway also asked the 
Icelanders to show accommodation and only the 
"communists" in Iceland would benefit from a British retreat. 
Vibe replied, as before during similar exchanges, that 
Norwegian pressure would merely be counterproductive. 
Moreover, he made the convincing point that a continuation 
of the conflict would benefit the left in Iceland more than an 
end to the conflict, however unfavourable to Britain."" 
On October 2, Edward Heath notified 61afur .J6hannesson 
that the Royal Navy would leave Icelandic waters the 
following day. They would return, however, if the coast guard 
vessels continued to harass the British trawlers, and Heath 
emphasised that the opportunity be used now to negotiate an 
interim settlement of the dispute."17 In the last days of 
September, Joseph Luns had also contacted Prime Minister 
J6hannesson and stated his "assumption" that if Britain were 
.Jp5 UD, 31.11160/XX, Paul Koht, Norwegian Embassy (London), to Foreign 
1vlinistry, October 1, 1973. 
"" UD, 31.11/60/XX, Kjeld Vi be Minute, 2 October 1973. 
",. TNA, PRO CAB 128/53, CM(73)43, Cabinet Minutes, Ocrober 2,1973. 
104 FOR5VARSSTUDIER 1/2005 
to take out its warships, "your side will desist from taking 
measures within the 50-mile zone. "JOS Whereas J6hannesson 
would not give a concrete and public guarantee to that effect, 
he did declare behind the scenes that "he would do all he 
could to ensure that there was no harassment. ,,309 The Prime 
Minister did not want his brinkmanship to lead to Iceland 
taking a decisive step towards an escalation of the dispute, 
with unforeseen consequences for the future of the V.S. base 
and even Iceland's membership in NATO. Thus, J6hannesson 
accepted Heath's invitation for talks. They took place in 
London on October 15-16 and produced a two-year 
agreement on fishing inside the 50-mile limit. Most 
importantly, Britain accepted an annual quota of 130,000 
tons. JI<) In Iceland, the People's Alliance condemned this 
settlement and threatened to break up the coalition. But Prime 
Minister J6hannesson seemed to have jndged the general 
mood in Iceland correctly; on the whole, the Icelanders agreed 
with his argument that a continuation of the conflict would 
not serve the country's interests and the "peace terms" were 
considered fair."! Also, the People's Alliance decided that, 
despite its anger and resentment over the "capitulation" in the 
Cod War, it was worth staying on to fight the other big battle 
on the international scene, over the future of the V.S. presence 
in Iceland. 
In:, sO, 1993~5-3, Icelandic Delegation to NATO to Foreign Ministry, 
September 29, 1973. 
;c. TNA, PRO CAB 128/53, CM(73)42, Cabinet Minutes, September 27, 
1973. 
JjO FRN, DAl8-3, Memorandum on Hearh-16hannesson meetings in London, 
October 15-16, 1973, and TNA, PRO CAB 128/53, CM(73)46, Cabinet 
Minutes, October 16, 1973. 
Jll See Hart, The Anglo-Icelandic Cod War, 45-46, Ingimundarson, "A 
Western Cold \Var," 119-120, and 16nsson, Friends in Conflict, 147-52. 
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Chapter 8 
Once More Unto the Breach 
The Beginnings of the Final Cod War, 
1975-76 
Although the end of the Cod War was celebrated in Norway, 
the anxiety over the planned expulsion of U.S. forces from 
Iceland was still in place. U.S.-Icelandic talks on the future of 
the defence agreement continued and the government in Oslo 
watched developments as well as it could. In late December 
1973, Prime Minister J6hannesson warned that although the 
Icelanders would "take into account" the views of their 
Nordic neighbours, they would never accept being an 
"outpost" for Scandinavia. He argued, furthermore, that the 
Cod War had demonstrated how Iceland could not rely on 
help from NATO. While that was true in the purely military 
sense, the British side had been held back thronghout the 
conflict by the strategic importance of Iceland and the danger 
of upsetting a vital ally. A neutral Iceland might not have 
achieved as good an outcome and U.S. Ambassador lrving 
used the occasion of the talk with J6hannesson to warn him in 
return that, despite the strategic factor, in the long run Iceland 
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needed the goodwill of the United States more than the United 
States needed Iceland.Jl2 
The authorities in Reykjavik and Washington had not 
finished their defence discussions when the Icelandic coalition 
collapsed in the spring of 1974, after fierce disagreements over 
economic policy. In the ensuing elections in the summer, the 
conservative and pro-Western Independence Party received 
over 40 per cent of the vote and appeared to be in a key 
position to form and lead the next coalition. This result 
caused joy in Oslo. In December 1973, the party's leader, Geir 
Hallgrimsson, and a few other key members had gone to 
Norway for talks on the strategic situation in the North 
Atlantic and confirmed the long-held view of the 
Independence Party that the U.S. facilities in Iceland were vital 
to the security of the Western powers. Also, they gladly 
acknowledged that Norway had an understandable and 
rightful interest in Icelandic defence policy.·l1J Calm waters 
finally seemed to lie ahead, therefore, when the Independence 
Party formed a coalition with the Progressive Party in August 
1974, with Hallgrimsson as Prime Minister. Although the 
middle-of-the-road Progressives remained in power, Iceland's 
defence policy would of course be radically different from that 
of the previous coalition. In October, the U.S.-Icelandic 
defence negotiations were formally brought to a close by an 
agreement on the continued presence of the U.S. forces in 
Iceland.JH 
This was Iceland, however, and fishing issues had to 
intervene. The new regime stated its intention to extend the 
couutry's fishing limits to 200 miles. Within the United 
Nations, ongoing talks on the law of the sea were leading to a 
Jll NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials Project [NLNS], Box 693, NSC 
Files. Country Files. Europe. Iceland Val. 1, Frederick Irving, U.S. Embassy 
(Reykjavfk), to Secretary of State, December 24, 1973. 
)0 UD, 31.11/60/XX, Foreign Ministry Memorandum, December 6, 1973 . 
.114 On the U.S.~1celandic defence talks in 1973-74, see Ingimundarson, "A 
Western Cold \'7ar," 120-27. 
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broad consensus on the concept of a 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone. An international agreement was not in sight, 
still, and nations with traditional fishing interests off distant 
shores insisted that a phase-out period must follow such a 
radical change on the high seas. Prime Minister Hallgrfmsson 
was aware of this but, as before in Iceland, domestic pressure 
for action on the fishing limits was stronger than concern for 
internationalopinion.m 
The Icelandic 200-mile policy could affect Norway's 
position on the law of the sea. The inshore fishermen had 
never liked the government's reluctance to declare a 50-mile 
limit and in the early summer of 1974, the Socialists proposed 
in the Storting that Norway this step be taken. T rygve 
Bratte/i's Labour Party had returned to power and the motion 
was roundly defeated. The Norwegian authorities remained 
opposed to unilateralism and Jens Evensen, expert on the law 
of the sea, was playing a prominent role at the international 
level which would be harmed by such action. Apart from this, 
Icelandic diplomats suspected that the Norwegian government 
feared the wrath of Britain and West Germany, as well as the 
position of the International Court (in August 1974, it had 
belatedly - and with little effect on official or public opinion 
in Iceland - declared the country's 50-mile limit contrary to 
internationallaw).m Nevertheless, the Norwegians made clear 
that they foresaw an extension of national jurisdiction on the 
oceans; they just wanted it to happen in an orderly manner 
through multinational or global settlements. But if that proved 
impossible, then Norway might have to consider going it 
alone and the Icelandic tendency to do so may have 
strengthened this caveat in Oslo: the inshore fishermen and 
'" See UD, 3J.11160IXXII, Ame Treholt to Kour Frydeolund, June 17, 
1975 . 
. 116 SO, 1993-4-3, Agnar Kl. J6nsson, Icelandic Embassy (Oslo), ro Foreign 
Ministry, September 17, 1974. 
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the Socialists who wanted action were apt to compare 
Norwegian "weakness" with Icelandic firmness.m 
The two coalition parties in Reykjavik agreed to wait with 
the 200-mile extension until 1975. On July 15 that year, a 
regulation on that move was issned. The new limit was to take 
effect on October 15 but it would only be enforced against 
Britain from November 14, the expiry date of the two-year 
agreement which ended the second Cod War in 1973. During 
the summer of 1975, however, Icelandic representatives made 
clear to their Norwegian colleagues that the decision would 
definitely not be reversed and only the most minimal 
concessions on phase-out rights might be considered.'" 
Naturally, this course was bound to cause renewed friction 
with Britain. It would also make a settlement with West 
Germany less likely. (The authorities in Bonn, while refraining 
from sending warships to the North Atlantic for 
understand a ble reasons, had not recognised the 50-mile 
extension and a solution was not in sight when the new 
coalition took over in Iceland.)319 
And although the Norwegians did not have significant 
fishing interests to worry about, the Icelandic claim to a 200-
mile zone would directly hit Norway. Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands both lie less than 400 miles from Iceland. Most 
likely, both of these countries would lay claim to a 200-mile 
limit in the near future and the Icelandic authorities therefore 
decided to draw a median line between them and Iceland. On 
the other hand, the Icelanders were going to enforce the full 
317 See for instance Morgul1bladid, June 1, 1974. See also Johan Jorgen HoIst 
(ed.), Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Arbok 1974 [Yearbook of Norwegian foreign 
policy] (Oslo), 224-246, and Anders C. Sjaastad (cd.) Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk Arbok 1975 [Yearbook of Norwegian foreign policy] 
(Oslo), 256-292. 
mUD, 31.11/60/XXII, Arne Treholt to Knud Frydenlund, June 17, 1975. 
m See lugo Heidbrink, "Continue trawling and continue negotiations: The 
50-mile conflict." Ingo Heidbrink and Erik Hoops (cds), German-Icelandic 
Fisheries History. Aspects o{the Development since 1945 (Bremerhaven, 
2003), 300-07. 
SYNPATH':r: AND SELF-INTEREST 109 
200-mile limit to the north, even though the Norwegian island 
of Jan Mayen is less than 400 miles away in that direction. In 
Reykjavik, the conclusion was reached that the tiny, 
uninhabited island could not enjoy the same right to fisheries 
jurisdiction as the peoples of Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands. The legal expert Hans G. Andersen was against this 
policy and foresaw sensitive and complicated talks with 
Norway, hitherto a friendly influence for Iceland. The 
politicians, however, dared not invite accusations of leniency 
against Norway and asked for understanding in Oslo. At the 
outset, the Norwegians were noncommittal. Although 
Norway had no existing interests to defend to the south of Jan 
Mayen, rich fishing might develop there and resources on the 
ocean floor would have to be considered. Jens Evensen 
pointed out as well that Norway had to view the matter in 
connection with the ongoing negotiations with the Soviet 
Union about national jurisdiction in the Barents Sea.'20 In 
general, Norway also wanted to prolong the fishing rights it 
had secured inside Iceland's fishing limits with the agreement 
in the summer of 1973.321 Thus, some tension between Iceland 
and Norway seemed inevitable. With every extension of 
national jurisdiction in the North Atlantic, a clash of interests 
grew more likely. 
Even so, Norwegian worries about Icelandic actions paled 
in comparison with British anxiety and resentment. In early 
October, the Labour MP for Grimsby, Anthony Crosland, 
declared that Britain must have continued fishing rights within 
the present 50-mile limit off Iceland. From Reykjavik, 
Ambassador Lydvo reported that Crosland's stern comments 
had caused great indignation and low-key talks at the start of 
"" UD, 31.11160IXXII, Ame Treholt to Knut Frydenlund, June 17, 1975, 
and Olav Lydvo, Nonvegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to Foreign Ministry, July 
10,1975. 
3;1 UD, 31.10/13/II, Knut Frydenlund Memorandum to Norwegian 
Government, October 14, 1975. 
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November did not lead to a solution.m On November 14, the 
third Cod War broke out. The Icelandic coast guard vessels 
sailed among the British trawlers off Iceland, demanding that 
they haul their gear. All obeyed for the first day but the 
following morning, a Hull trawler refused to stop fishing on 
the "high seas." The gunboat Th6r promptly cut both its 
trawl-wires. Right from the start, the Icelanders would hold 
no prisoners. Weak hopes in Britain about a period of 
standstill vanished as the trawlennen demanded naval 
protection or they would simply leave the Icelandic grounds. 
Roy Hattersley, a Minister of State in the Foreign Office, flew 
to Iceland for crisis talks but failed to impress the Icelanders 
who found him arrogant, stubborn and undiplomatic.'" 
Icelandic officials told Ambassador Lydvo that Hattersley had 
come with the preconceived idea of negotiations where two 
sides would state their case and gradually move towards a 
compromise. He had been advised right away, however, that 
the Icelanders would not move and were a "compromise" to 
be found, it would have to involve an almost unconditional 
British acceptance of the Icelandic agenda. Unsurprisingly, 
Lydvo concluded that however faulty Hattersley may have 
been in his conduct, he was not to blame for the failure of the 
talks. 324 
For the next few days, harassment and cuttings continued 
on the fishing grounds. Britain would have to surrender - or 
take to arms. On November 25, the latter option was chosen. 
For the third time in less than 20 years, Royal Navy frigates 
sailed northwards to protect British trawlers off Iceland. At 
'" VD, 31.1l/60IXXIII, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, October 9 and November 7,1975. 
m GRFL, National Security Adviser. NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean 
Affairs Staff: Files. Box 11. Iceland, 1975 (2), D. Clift to Brent Scowcroft, 
November 26,1975. On Hattersley's attitudes, see also Daily Express, 
November 17, 1975, and Ray Hatters!ey, \'(1ho Goes Home? Scenes from a 
Political LIfe (London, 1995), 141-46. 
m VD, 31.!1/60IXXIII, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, November 19, 1975. 
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the same time, Britain reconfirmed its willingness to enter 
negotiations with Iceland and Norway now got immediately 
involved. On the one hand, the memories of the second Cod 
War in 1972-73 were still fresh. In talks with the British side, 
Norwegian officials could easily mention that conflict and 
argue that the presence of British warships excluded all hopes 
for a solution.'" Moreover, Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlllnd 
was perfectly willing to get involved. Since taking office in 
1973 he had gained a reputation as a solid "bridge-builder" 
and he possessed, in the words of Olav Riste, "a profound 
understanding of the complexities of international relations, 
and an open, analytical mind. ,,'" Behind the scenes, 
Frydenlund repeatedly urged Britain to show restraint and he 
also raised the seriousness of the dispute with Henry 
Kissinger, the D.S. Secretary of State.m Furthermore, the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister offered the Icelanders to act as 
an official go-between. At this early stage in the dispute, 
however, they were not prepared to accept Norwegian 
mediation.m This was probably because it could be taken as a 
sign of weakness but also, as Foreign Minister Agustsson 
remarked, in spite of the Cod War the British and the 
Icelanders were still amicable enough to speak to each other 
face to face.'" Furthermore, the rulers in Reykjavik were 
buoyed by the fact that on November 28, West Germany and 
Iceland signed a two-year agreement on fishing in Icelandic 
\vaters.3J[) 
JH UD, 31. 11160/XXIJI, Foreign Ministry to Norwegian Embassy (Paris), 
November 27,1975. 
J1h Olav Riste, Norway's Foreign Relation, 263. 
n7 UD, 31.11/60IXXIV, Foreign Ministry 1vlinure, January 13, 1976. 
50. UD, 31.11/60IXXIII, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to Foreign 
Ministry, December 3,1975, and Foreign Ministry to Norwegian Embassy 
(London), December 4,1975. 
12-9 UD, 31.11/60IXXIV, Foreign Ministry l\1inure, December 18, 1975. 
HIl The agreement gave 40 West German trawlers the right to fish 60,000 
tons of fish per year (mostly saithe and ocean perch and only 5,000 tons of 
cod). From 1972 to the making of [he agreement, Icelandic coast guard 
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Britain, however, was in nO mood to accept Iceland's 
proposals, or what really amounted to diktat, on the amount 
of British catches. On December 11, a serious incident 
occurred as the Th6r spotted three British tugboats (which 
were also used to protect the trawlers) inside Iceland's three-
mile territorial waters, not just the 200-mile fishing limit. The 
British vessels were transferring water supplies under the lee of 
the land and did not comply with orders to leave Icelandic 
waters immediately. The Th6r proceeded to fire live shots at 
them and numerous collisions occurred before the tugboats 
sailed away. The Th6r retreated into harbour with 
considerable damage and the Icelanders were enraged. For the 
first and so far the only time in its history, Iceland brought a 
case to the notice the UN Security Council, protesting the 
British use of force inside Iceland's territorial waters. At a 
meeting of Nordic ambassadors in New York, Ambassador 
Ingvi Ingvarsson circulated a proposed resolution whereby the 
Security Council: 
deeply deplores the exercise of force by British public vessels 
against the Icelandic coast guard within the territorial waters 
of Iceland [and] 
calls upon the government of the UK to refrain from acts of 
force in Icelandic waters. 
Both at this and similar occasions, Nordic representatives 
expressed deep sympathy and understanding for the Icelandic 
cause. They politely pointed out, however, that many nations 
might not view the tugboats incident as seriously as Iceland 
did, especially in comparison with deadly conflicts in the 
many war torn regions of the world. U.S. officials also asked 
Norway to have a quiet word with the Icelanders and explain 
that the episode could not be said to constitute "a threat to 
international peace and security," as was the custom with 
vessels had cut at least 35 trawls from West German trawlers. See 
Heidbrink, "Continue trawling and continue negotiations," 305. 
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resolutions of this kind. JJ ' The soothing influence from the 
Nordic region contributed to the Icelandic conclusion that it 
would be unwise to try to force a debate on the proposed 
resolution. The whole idea demonstrated the extreme 
emotions and even irrationalism which often influenced 
Icelandic thinking during the Cod War. 
Iceland also brought up the incident with the Th6r and the 
tugboats in the North Atlantic Council in Brussels where 
Agustsson warned that the British use of naval forces might be 
causing irreparable damage to the prestige of NATO and 
respect for Western defence cooperation in Iceland.J .12 The 
festive season then passed relatively quietly but in the first 
week of 1976, tension increased on the fishing grounds. On 
January 10, fishermen and other inhabitants near the Keflavik 
base blocked roads to a U .5. radar station close by and 
threatened to prevent access to the base itself. The day after, 
Petur Thorsteinsson, permanent secretary in the Icelandic 
Foreign Ministry, met with Knut Frydenlund and Defence 
Minister Fostervoll in Oslo and warned that unless the Royal 
Navy was withdrawn in the near future, Iceland would break 
diplomatic relations with Britain. Frydenlund confirmed that, 
as had been planned in 1973, Norway would then be willing 
to take care of Iceland's interests in Britain. He also 
underlined, however, that the Norwegians were prepared to 
facilitate a compromise and wondered whether a withdrawal 
of the warships might be met by a secret pledge by the 
Icelandic side to cease harassment during the period of 
negotiations. This idea had been mooted in 1973 and 
Thorsteinsson was sceptical; feelings were running so high in 
Iceland that he doubted whether negotiations could begin 
even if the Royal Navy left the disputed waters. The situation 
mUD, 3Lll/60IXXIV, Norwegian Delegation to United Nations to 
Foreign ministry, December 16, 1975, and Kjeld Vibe Minute, December 
16,1975. See also ]6nsson, Friends hI Conflict, 165-67. 
_m UD, 31.11/60/XXIV, Foreign Ministry Minute, December 18, 1975. 
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was very gloomy, Thorsteinsson concluded, and Iceland's 
future in NATO looked more precarious than ever before. 
Unsurprisingly, the Norwegians were disturbed. Fostervoll 
could not but mention that while Iceland should of course 
determine its defence and foreign policy without outside 
interference, the Icelanders must keep in mind that the other 
Nordic states depended on the maintenance of the so-called 
"Nordic balance." Drastic changes in Iceland would upset the 
necessary stability in the Nordic region and the Norwegian 
military authorities must emphasise the need for Western 
solidarity. Iceland should keep this in mind.333 
Notwithstanding Frydenlund's qualities and aptitude as a 
mediator, self-interest remained an important aspect of 
Norway's Iceland policy. 
Thorsteinsson's analysis, as well as similar remarks by other 
Icelandic statesmen and officials, convinced the Norwegians 
that Britain would simply have to back down off Iceland and, 
in a sense, surrender fish for security. At a session of the 
North Atlantic Council on January 12, 1976, Norway again 
made such a request and other delegates more or less agreed 
with the assessment that, in spite of Britain's rights in the 
dispute, the warships would have to leave.'" In the following 
week, Secretary General Luns was engaged in frantic 
emergency diplomacy, hoping to at least postpone the 
Icelandic decision to break off diplomatic relations with 
Britain. On January 14-15, Luns held talks with Icelandic 
ministers in Reykjavik and found no cause for optimism, as he 
told Ambassador Lydvo afterwards. The Icelanders were as 
firm as ever, especially 6lafur J6hannesson, now Minister of 
Justice, who seemed capable of overruling Prime Minister 
Hallgrimsson's more conciliatory attitude. Still, Luns' 
mUD, 31.11160IXXIV, Foreign Ministry !\.1inute,january 13, 1976. 
114 UD, 31.11160/XXN, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign 
Ministry, January 12, 1976. See also GRFL, National Security Adviser. 
NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs Staff: Files. Box 11. Iceland, 1976, 
Clift Memoranda, January 12 and January 15, 1976. 
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intervention secured a short respite and on January 19, he met 
with the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, in 
Brussels. J35 While Callaghan was conscious of the strategic 
risks involved, he found Iceland's conduct infuriating.3." Most 
reluctantly, he agreed to withdraw the British naval forces 
from the fishing grounds in return for high-level negotiations 
in London and Luns' "personal belief" that the Icelandic coast 
guard would not cut trawls for the duration of the talks."7 
On January 20, the Royal Navy frigates received orders to 
leave the Iceland area. If events took the same turn now as 
they had done in late 1973, subsequent negotiations would 
lead to a provisional settlement. Yet, this progress was almost 
wrecked by an Icelandic ultimatum - delivered before the 
British decision to withdraw the frigates had been published -
to the effect that unless they had left Icelandic waters before 
January 24, Iceland would cut diplomatic relations with 
Britain. Further last-ditch talks were needed to maintain the 
weak momentum and although the Norwegian authorities had 
not been directly involved in Luns' efforts, Ambassador Lydvo 
was now asked to use his contacts in Reykjavik."" During a 
meeting of NATO's Foreign Ministers in Brussels on January 
23, Knut Frydenlund also obtained an interview with 
Callaghan and impressed on him the need to show 
conciliation, not least because of the alliance interests 
involved. Throughout the talk, however, Callaghan 
demonstrated not only his irritation over the Icelandic stand, 
but also a definite displeasure about Norway's support for 
Iceland. "There is a limit to how often one can turn the other 
cheek," he told Frydenlund, according to Norwegian notes of 
U5 UD, 31.11/60/XXIV, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign 
Ministry, January 19, 1976. 
,1-)6 See James Callaghan, Time and Cballce (London, 1987),377-78. 
mUD, 31.11/60IXXIV, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign 
Ministry, January 20,1976. 
mUD, 31. 11/60IXXIV, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, January 20, 1976. 
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the meeting: "truly enough, the Bible said that one should 
turn the other cheek but there was nothing about the need to 
do it 17 times. There was a limit to the number of insults 
which the British cabinet could accept." Moreover, Callaghan 
emphasised that for Britain, considerable economic interests 
were at stake. He therefore asked - no doubt rhetorically - if 
the Norwegians were prepared to compensate Britain for lost 
income, laid off trawlers and unemployment in the fishing 
ports?339 Frydenlund could only ask Callaghan again to show 
restraint and think of the wider strategic picture. The United 
States did so as well behind the stage and the gentle pressure 
undoubtedly had an effect."o A few days later, the British 
Ambassador in Oslo, Peter Scott, implied that Britain could 
not view Norway as a neutral in the confIict."1 During this 
stage of Cod War Ill, Norway was definitely a useful, if self-
interested, ally of Iceland. 
On January 23, Prime Minister Hallgrimsson flew to 
London and had talks with Foreign Secretary Callaghan and 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The wide gap between the two 
sides was confirmed. Most importantly, Iceland was only 
willing to offer Britain a quota of 65,000 tons of fish for the 
year, a figure which was well below British expectations. 
Disagreement on the number of trawlers in Icelandic waters 
and closed conservation zones also seemed almost 
insurmountable when news from the fishing grounds made 
certain that no deal would be reached in this round at least: as 
the ministers were conferring, the Tyr, the new flagship of the 
Icelandic a coast guard fleet, cut the warps of a British 
trawler. Upon hearing this, Wilson went pale but Callaghan 
"became as red as a redfish," as the Icelandic delegation 
'" UD, 31.1!/60/XXIV, Kjeld Vibe Minute, January 27,1976. 
HO GRFL, National Security Adviser. Presidential Country Files for Europe 
and Canada. Box 15. United Kingdom (6), Clift to Brent Scowcroft1 January 
22,1976. 
HO UD, 31.11/60/XXV, Kjeld Vi be Minute, February 4,1976. 
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noted. The talks ended in failure."2 Geir Hallgrimsson and his 
followers always suspected Olafur J6hannesson (head of the 
coast guard in his capacity as Minister of Justice) of having 
allowed action against the trawlers at this sensitive moment in 
order to scuttle the London talks, either because he feared that 
the Prime Minister would be too placatory or that he would 
be able to enjoy the spoils of a successful Cod War peace.''' 
Whether that was true or not, domestic politics continued to 
shape Iceland's policy in the dispute. To call for calm and 
conciliation was tantamount to treason and political suicide. 
In the first days of February, with the frigates still at a safe 
distance, the Icelanders made two other successful warp-
cuttings. On February 6, the Royal Navy returued to its 
protection duties. That very day, one of the frigates collided 
twice with the TYr. For the next few days, ill feeling reigned 
on the fishing grounds. The Icelandic media and public were 
livid and an e>.1:remely worried Geir Hallgrimsson told U.S. 
Ambassador Irving of his fears that within days, the 
Progressive Party would demand the rupture of diplomatic 
relations with Britain and possibly the resignation from 
NATO as well. There were even influential members within 
the Independence Party - including the Minister of Fisheries, 
Matthias Bjarnason - who felt that Iceland should threaten to 
leave NATO unless the Royal Navy left Icelandic waters at 
once. Hence, Hallgrimsson foresaw that his coalition could 
collapse and the British might have to face a much sterner 
regime to deal with in Reykjavik.'H In other words, the 
H1 URN, 1996 B/70-1, "Sk),trsla um vidr~dur fors~dsddherra islands og 
Bretlands dagana 24.-27. januar 1976 vegna fiskveidideilu Breta og 
islendinga," [Report on talks between the Prime Ministers of Iceland and 
Britain over the Anglo-Icelandic fishing dispute, January 24-27, 1976]. See 
also Gudmundsson, "Thorskar f k61du stridi," 74-75. 
HJ See for instance Davfd Oddsson, "Geir Hallgrimsson," Alldllari [Icelandic 
journal], Vo!. 119, 1994, 59-6L 
144 GRFL, National Security Adviser. Presidential Country Files for Europe 
and Canada. Box 7. Iceland-State Department Telegrams. To SECST ATE-
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Progressives and some Independents were definitely ready to 
wield the "NATO-weapon" and Prime Minister Hallgrimsson 
was at least pointing to its existence by relaying his fears to 
Irving. In response, Secretary General Luns vacillated between 
the worry of losing Iceland, the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" 
in the North Atlantic, and the hope that the Icelanders had to 
be bluffing.'" From Reykjavik, meanwhile, Ambassador 
Lydvo reported that anti-British sentiments were now stronger 
than ever before during his tenure in Iceland:'46 
Nonetheless, cooler minds in the country continued to 
search for a solution. Hans G. Andersen and Foreign Minister 
Agustsson worked on an interim arrangement which would 
permit a limited number of British trawlers to catch up to 
5,000 tons a month in certain areas. The aim of this scheme 
was, as V.S. Ambassador Irving described it, "to avoid [the] 
politically explosive fish catch limit. ,,347 Governmental backing 
of this scheme was not secure, however, and other options 
had to be discussed as well. At the Foreign Ministry in Oslo, 
the possibility of a mediation offer was discussed once more 
but as Kjeld Vibe pointed out, Britain might feel that Norway 
had come too biased in the dispute."8 Still, Knut Frydenlund 
met James CaIIaghan in Brussels on February 12 and urged 
him once more to withdraw the Royal Navy. The British 
EXDIS, Frederick lrving, U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), to Secretary of State, 
February 10, 1976. See also Oddsson, "Geir Hallgrirnsson," 60. 
m GRFL, National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-
77. Box 17, Memorandum of conversation between U.S. President Geralcl 
Ford and NATO Secretary General josepb Luns, February 9, 1976, and 
National Security Adviser. NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs Staff: 
Files. Box 11. Ic~land, 1976, State Department Briefing Item, February 17, 
1976. 
w, VD, 31,l1160/XX\!, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, February 11, 1976 . 
.w GRFL, National Security Adviser. Presidential Country Files for Europe 
and Canada. Box 7. Iceland-Srare Departmenr Telegrams. To SECSTATE-
EXDIS, Frederick Irving, U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), to Secretary of State, 
Februarv 10, 1976. 
w UD, 31.11160fXXV, H.W. Freibow Minute, February 11, 1976. 
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Foreign Secretary was not moved, however, and countered 
that the presence of the warships on the high seas was 
"entirely lawful and justifiable. ",,, Kjeld Vibe, who was 
present at the meeting, later recalled - smilingly - that he had 
never been as close to being thrown out of a meeting!'·" The 
deadlock seemed insoluble. 
In Oslo, the conclusion was reached that desperate 
circumstances called for desperate measures. At a meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council on February 18, the Norwegian 
Permanent Delegate, Rolf Busch, suggested that while the 
NATO states should urge Britain to withdraw its warships 
and fishing vessels during a new round of negotiations with 
Iceland, they should also offer to compensate the trawling 
industry for the time lost on the fishing grounds. The 
suggestion was certainly unusual but nobody wanted to reject 
it out of hand.m So, was a solution at last in sight? At first, 
alas, it seemed as if the novel scheme had appeared too late. 
The following day, the feared, and unparalleled, step was 
taken: Iceland declared that it had broken off diplomatic 
relations with Britain . 
.Hq VD, 31.11160IXXV, H.\Xl. Freibow Minute, February 20,1976. 
Wl Author's interview with Kjeld Vibe, December 4, 2001. 
mUD, 31.11160/XXV, H.W. Freibow Minute, February 20,1976, Kjeld 
Vibe .M.inute, February 21,1976, and Norwegian Delegation to NATO to 
Foreign l\.1inisrry, February 24,1976. 
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Chapter 9 
"Frydenlund solved it" 
The End of the Cod Wars, 1976 
The rupture of diplomatic relations made the search for a 
solution even more difficult. Before the event, the Icelandic 
Ambassador in London, Niels Sigurdsson, had been 
transferred to Bonn so he did not have to be recalled but the 
arrival of his replacement, Sigurdur Bjarnason, was put on 
hold. In Iceland, however, the British Ambassador, Kenneth 
East, faced the awkward fact that for a few days an airline 
strike prevented all departures from the country. He solved 
the problem by lying low until the strike had come to an 
end.m In Iceland, France took over the care of British interests 
and in Britain, Norway assumed that role for Iceland. The 
Icelandic Embassy in London became, as had been arranged in 
1973, "Royal Norwegian Embassy. Icelandic Interests 
Section. " 
Norway now took on a much more active role in the 
conflict. In talks with the British charge d'affaires in Oslo, 
R.G. Britten, Frydenlund reiterated the compensation offer 
and he also told Joseph Luns that Norway was prepared "to 
take npon itself more than a fair share.,,)53 Norway was not 
willing to go it alone, however, and hesitant reactions in other 
H! Author's interview with Kenncrh East, January 28, 2000. 
'" UD, 31.11/60/XXV, H.W. Freibow Minute, February 20,1976, and 
Foreign Ministry Minute, February 25, 1976. 
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NATO capitals killed off the idea. The Washington 
administration would not join in, for fear that Congress 
would dislike this allotment of the taxpayers' money and 
because participation might give rise to complaints in 
Reykjavik that the United States was ready to aid Britain but 
not Iceland. That, in turn, might jeopardise the future of the 
Keflavik base.'54 France and Turkey also registered their 
refusal to participate, mostly because of the precedent it might 
set.'" Others undoubtedly agreed and in Oslo, the Canadian 
Ambassador, Kenneth McIlwraith, delivered a message on 
those lines from the government in Ottawa. In reply, Kjeld 
Vi be explained how disappointed the Norwegian authorities 
were that the NATO states did not view the simmering 
conflict between Britain and Iceland seriously enough. After 
the breaking of diplomatic relations, there had been renewed 
demonstrations at roads to U.S. installations and the Th6r had 
collided twice with a British frigate. Vibe emphasised, 
therefore, that if the conflict continued, it might have "serious 
strategic and political consequences for Norway and other 
countries in the region, and for NATO as a whole. ,,356 It may 
be recalled that in the late 1950s, the question of Norwegian 
participation in a NATO-loan to Iceland had been described 
as "defence expenditure." The thinking behind the 
compensation scheme was very similar; the only difference 
being that Britain would now be on the receiving end. 
Leaving aside the negative response inside NATO, it is 
doubtful whether Britain might have accepted the 
compensation scheme or that it would have sufficed to get the 
Icelanders to the negotiating table. When he was still stuck in 
Iceland, the expelled Ambassador East warned that NATO 
'" UD, 31.1l/601XXV, u.s. Aide-Memoire, February 23,1976, and 
Norwegian Embassy (Washington), to Foreign Ministry, February 24, 1976. 
mUD, 31.11/60/XXV, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign 
Ministry, February 27,1976, and UD, 31.11/60IXXVI, Norwegian 
Embassy (Paris) to Foreign Ministry, March 3, 1976. 
mUD, 31. 11/60/XXV, Foreign !vfinistry Minute, February 26,1976. 
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would just be "buying itself a new setback" and tempers were 
still so high in the country that Prime Minister Hallgrimsson 
would hardly dare to negotiate unless an acceptable outcome 
- that is, a total Icelandic victory with extremely limited 
British fishing - would be secured beforehand."" By this stage, 
the British policymakers had probably come to accept that in 
the end they would have to realize what the Icelanders were 
willing to give. But they still needed, as Frydenlund put it in 
discussions with Luns, "a face-saving formula. ,,15' Britain 
could not be expected simply to give in. 
Thus, the search for a way out of the impasse continued. 
Within NATO, the Secretary General continued his constant 
efforts but he also put his hopes on Norway, for as he stated 
at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on February 27, 
"Norway was the only country which had put forward fresh 
ideas and the only country which had made clear its readiness 
to assist in the efforts to find a solution.""" That same day, 
moreover, a new and mysterious twist in the tale began to 
develop, with Norwegian involvement. In Reykjavik, 
Ambassador Lydvo had a secret lunch with an MP from the 
Progressive Party. Lydvo would not even mention his name in 
his despatch to Oslo and described him only as a "salmon-
fishing colleague." The MP obviously belonged to the right-
wing of the party because he voiced his concern that the Cod 
War might have the most unfortunate consequences for the 
O.S. presence in Iceland and the country's membership in 
NATO."" In fact, this was T6mas Arnason, an influential 
w VD, 31.11/60/XXV, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik) to Foreign 
Ministry, February 23, 1976. 
HIi UD, 31.11160/XXV, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign 
Ministry, February 27, 1976. 
_H" VD, 31.11/60/XXV, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign 
!vlinistry, February 27,1976. 
,M> VD, 31.1l/60/XXV, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik) to 
Foreign !vlinistry, February 27, 1976. 
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member of the Progressive Party who had also been on good 
terms with Lydvo during the 50-mile dispute in 1972-73.361 
Arnason suggested that instead of a total catch quota, 
Iceland and Britain should simply agree on the number of 
British trawlers permitted simultaneously inside the 200-mile 
limit. He felt that Iceland could offer the figure of 15 and 
indicated that it might even be slightly higher. Some 
conservation zones would have to be closed to all trawling but 
if the agreement were to last for six months or until the end of 
the year, Britain would probably be able to catch 50-60,000 
tons. In essence, the proposal was similar to the design which 
Hans G. Andersen and Einar Agustsson had begun to work on 
earlier in the year. Interestingly, however, Arnason had told 
Olafur J 6hannesson, the party chairman and Minister of 
Justice, of his wish to talk with Lydvo bnt he had not 
described his proposal to him nor had he notified Agustsson, 
his other party colleague. Prime Minister Geir Hallgrimsson 
was also uninformed. Yet, Arnason was certain that they 
would be willing to "go along" and that a majority for this 
solution could be achieved in the Althil1g. Despite the 
ambiguity, Lydvo felt that the suggestion should be taken 
seriously. Here, perhaps, was the necessary "face saving 
device;" a means to '·canlouflage" a British retreat. 362 
At the Foreign Ministry in Oslo, the Ambassador's 
evaluation was accepted. Knut Frydenlund immediately asked 
Ambassador SCOtt to report the initiative to London.'" Of 
course, he did not mention where the idea had come from. In 
both Britain and Iceland, the chances of a positive evaluation 
would decrease if the powers-that-be thought that a suggested 
cease-fire had come from the "enemy camp." Similarly, at a 
Nordic ministerial meeting ill Copenhagen on February 29, 
;1,1 Author's interview with T6rnas Arnason, January 4, 200!. 
'" UD, 31.111601XXV, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik) to 
Foreign Ministry, February 27, 1976. 
"" UD, 31.11160/XXV, Per Tresselt Minute. February 27,1976. 
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Frydenlund tentatively suggested the trawler-formula to Prime 
Minister Hallgrimsson, again without describing its origins. 
Hallgrfmsson agreed that it was worth trying to see how 
Britain would react to this solution. Frydenlund spoke of 15 
to 20 trawlers; the Icelandic Prime Minister felt that 15 should 
be the starting point. A short while later, Frydenlund also 
informed Foreign Minister Agustsson about this possible way 
3t14 
out. 
The ball had started to roll. At the NATO headquarters in 
Brussels on March 2, Ambassador Busch conveyed the 
message from Frydenlund that he was working on a new 
peace proposal but felt it untimely to describe it in detail. 
Joseph Luns replied that the NATO states were thankful to 
the Norwegians and had full faith in their efforts.M Luns 
would gladly have taken on Frydenlund's role but since many 
Icelanders were apt to include the NATO leadership when 
they described their fury over Britain's conduct, Norway 
could only be a more suitable intermediary. In Reykjavik the 
following day, Lydvo told Arnason that Britain was 
considering his ideas but would probably require a more solid 
offer from Iceland. He agreed to inform Olafur J6hannesson 
about this and then get in touch again. He also emphasised, as 
Lydvo wrote to Oslo, that the chain of exchanges must be like 
this: "Olafur J6hannesson - the MP - Lydvo - Frydenlund-
the British." Neither the Icelandic Prime Minister nor the 
Foreign Minister should be involved at this stage. J6hannesson 
was said to be the "key man" and if he endorsed the proposed 
solution, Prime Minister Hallgrimsson could not but agree as 
well, although one would have to consider his "prestige".'" 
164 UD, 31.11160/XXVI, Knur Frydenlund to Olav Lydvo, Norwegian 
Embassy (Reykjavik), March 6, 1976. 
MUD, 31.11160/xxV, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign 
1vlinistry, March 2, 1976. 
"" UD, 31.11/60/XXV, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign !-.1inistry, March 3, 1976. 
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While Frydenlund must have been pleased about the 
unexpected turn of events in Iceland, he was clearly worried 
that domestic politics were involved as well."7 It appeared as if 
61afur J6hannesson and the Progressives wanted to be able to 
claim credit for having solved this Cod War, as they did with 
regard to the earlier conflict in the 1970s. Frydenlund 
therefore asked Lydvo to tell Arnason that the Norwegians 
felt that Prime Minister Hallgrimsson must be notified about 
these dealings between the two of them.36 ' This was done and 
at around the same time, Frydenlund learned from Foreign 
Secretary Callaghan that Britain would be ready to enter into 
negotiations with Iceland about a short-term fishery 
agreement, based on the principle that 30 British trawlers 
were permitted to work off Iceland at the same time (the 
Foreign Office in London reported that this number could be 
lowered to the absolute minimum of 25) .. '69 
Somehow, the gap between 15-20 and 25-30 would have 
to be bridged. The plan would also have to be brought into 
the open. Britain needed at least a semblance of official 
negotiations as part of the "face-saving device." On March 8, 
Lydvo informed Prime Minister Hallgrimsson and Foreign 
Minister Agustsson of the British reaction. Agustsson was 
non-committal and Hallgrimsson as well, although he seemed 
a bit more positive, especially with regard to further mediation 
by Norway.'70 In turn, Frydenlund claimed to be 
"considerably more optimistic" than he had been before.37 ] 
'" UD, 31.11/60/XXVl, Knut Frydenlund to Olav Lydvo, Norwegian 
Embassy (Reykjavik), March 4, 1976. 
"'. UD, 31.111601XXVl, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Knut Frydenlund, March 5,1976. 
)1,9 UD, 31.11/60IXXVI, Knut Frydenlund to Olav Lydvo, Nonvegian 
Embassy (Reykjavik), March 6, 1976. 
1'" UD, 31. 11160IXXVI, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Knut Frydenlund, March 8, 1976 . 
. Ft GRFL, National Security Adviser. NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean 
Affairs Staff: Files. Box 11. Iceland, 1976, State Department Briefing Item, 
March 9, 1976. 
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Nonetheless, Icelandic toughness and friction within the 
coalition in Reykjavik still looked likely to wreck this latest 
chance of an end to the Cod War. Since the start of the 
conflict, 61afur J6hannesson had regularly complained over 
the American unwillingness to lease or sell suitable vessels to 
Iceland.m On March 5, he publicly declared that he wanted to 
obtain ships from the United States, in line with the U.S.-
Icelandic agreement from 1974 which had ended the three-
year long discussions on the future of the American presence 
in Iceland. That agreement had contained a clause on 
increased cooperation between the U.S. forces and the 
Icelandic coast guard. And if the United States would not 
comply with Icelandic wishes, J6hannesson suggested that 
Iceland might enquire about the availability of small frigates 
in the Soviet Union.m Although he hardly believed that the 
Soviets would lend their warships to a NATO state, the 
Progressive leader had once more shown his readiness to use 
the "NATO-weapon." Furthermore, J6hannesson suggested 
that Norway might own coast guard boats which could be 
used in the conflict with Britain. Consequently, a spokesman 
for the Foreign Ministry in Oslo had to state Norway's 
reluctance to give material support to one party in the Cod 
War, and that stance was not well received by the Icelandic 
bl ' 374 pu lC. 
m See for instance GRFL, National Security Adviser. NSC Europe, Canada 
and Ocean Affairs Staff: Files. Box 11. Iceland, 1976, State Department 
Briefing Item, January 8, 1976, and National Security Adviser. Presidential 
Country Files for Europe and Canada. Box 7. Iceland-State Depanrnent 
Telegrams. To SECSTATE-EXDIS, Frederick Irving, U.S. Embassy 
(Reykjavik), to Secretary of State, February 2, 1976. 
J:1J See lvlorgtmbladid, March 6, 1976, and Gudrnundsson, <'Thorskar f 
k61du strfcii," 75-76. The clause, which J6hannesson referred to, stared that: 
"The two governments will study ways to further the cooperation between 
the Iceland Defence Force and the lcclandic coast guard, civil defence and 
civil aviation authorities." 
174 Sce for instance Dagbladid [Icelandic daily], March 10, 1976. 
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Hallgrimsson was extremely nnhappy with J6hannesson's 
utterances abont the leasing of foreign vessels.m They had 
been made withont his knowledge, let alone approval, and 
they con Id only npset the new avenne for tentative talks. On a 
smaller scale, John Prescott, a Labour MP from Humberside, 
also complicated things by flying to Iceland and offering his 
own proposals for a solntion to the conflict. This initiative 
was withont the blessing of the British authorities and they let 
it be known that they preferred to stick to "the Norwegian 
channel.,,"6 Moreover, in a four-day period from March 10 to 
March 13, the Tyr, the Th6r and a newly acquired coast 
guard vessel, the converted trawler Baldur, clashed eight times 
with Royal Navy frigates, causing considerable damage on 
both sides and yet more anger against British "aggression" in 
Iceland. The only positive development, at least in the minds 
of the rulers in Reykjavik and Oslo, was the exchange of notes 
on March 10 on continued line-fishing by Norwegian vessels 
inside the 200-mile limit. This agreement was insignificant, 
however, and had little or no bearing on the main conflict.377 
Despite all the irritants, by March 19 Hallgrimsson could 
tell Frydenlund that his government was considering a 
proposal whereby "[aJn average of 20 British trawlers a day 
will be permitted to fish within 200 miles of Iceland, subject 
to a maximum of 25 trawlers on the fishing gronnds at any 
one time." In this way, the divide between 20 and 25 trawlers 
a day would be bridged. Some areas would be closed and the 
agreement was only to last for 3-6 months. Hallgrimsson was 
now pntting so mnch faith in Frydenlund's mediation that he 
J7,\ See for instance UD, 31.11160/XXVI, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), 
ro Foreign Ministry, March 11, 1976. 
Ft, UD, 31.11/60IXXVI, Foreign 1vlinistry to Norwegian Embassy 
(Reykjavik), March 18,1976, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy 
(Reykjavik), to Knut Frydenlund, March 19, 1976, and Norwegian Embassy 
(london) [0 Foreign Ministry, 1vlarch 30, 1976. See also Colin Brown, 
Fightillg Talk. The Biography of Johll Prescott (London, 1997), 121-23. 
1"'7 See J611s50n, Priends ill Conflict, 178-79. 
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left it to him to choose whether to mention the proposal to the 
British side or to wait until the Icelandic government was 
committed to a solution of this kind. And when Frydenlund 
decided to inform the rulers in London right away they replied 
by asking him to obtain from Reykjavik "a single overall 
informal preview of the Icelandic offer. "m 
This, however, proved a tough task indeed. The Progressive 
Party appeared at best lukewarm to the emerging solution and 
Geir Hallgrfmsson would be in serious political trouble if he 
put his name to a proposal which the Progressives would then 
criticise. For the next three weeks or so, no progress was made 
behind the scenes. At the frontline, conversely, collisions 
between the coast guard vessels and the British frigates 
continued. It only seemed a matter of time until a fatal 
incident would happen in the disputed waters. Yet, by mid-
April a consensus had apparently been reached in Reykjavik 
that more would be gained by a short-term compromise than 
an escalation at sea. The Icelandic government would accept 
an average of 22 British trawlers in Icelandic waters and in 
private, Geir Hallgrimsson indicated that he would be 
prepared to defend "some flexibility" in this regard if a 
satisfactory outcome could be reached on conservation areas 
and other aspects of the agreement. Frydenlund then 
incorporated the figure of 22 trawlers into a provisional 
"Memorandum of Understanding" which he put for the 
British side.'" They were not overjoyed. On April 20, Roy 
Hattersley visited Oslo and argued - after lengthy references 
to Icelandic obstinacy, unfairness and unreliability - that the 
figure of 25 trawlers was an absolute minimum. Overall, 
Hattersley also gave the impression that Frydenlund's 
mUD, 31.11/60IXXVI, Foreign Ministry to Norwegian Embassy 
(Reykjavik), March 21,1976. See also Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy 
(Reykjavik), to Knut Frydenlund, March 19, 1976 . 
. i7'I UD, 31.1l/60/XXYI, Foreign Ministry Minute, April 19, 1976. 
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suggestions were not sufficiently "neutral" .380 In Reykjavik, 
meanwhile, Olafur J6hannesson declared that the Progressive 
Party could not make fundamental decisions before a meeting 
of its central committee in early May.'"' 
The delay was annoying and worse than that, on the 
evening of May 6 (before the committee meeting), the most 
serious clashes in the Cod Wars took place. In a few hours of 
frenzied activity, the Baldur, the Odillll and the Tyr collided 
eight times with three British frigates. Two of them retired 
with serious damage, as did the TYr. Throughout the Cod 
Wars of the 1970s, both Iceland and Britain constantly 
blamed each other for the collisions at sea. In two of the 
episodes which involved the Tyr this evening, the British 
frigate deliberately and indisputably rammed the Icelandic 
vessel at high speed. It was truly miraculous that nobody died 
on board, or even that the ship stayed afloat.'" A watershed 
had occurred. Shortly after midnight, Eric Young, First 
Secretary at the French Embassy's "British Interests Section" 
in Reykjavik, telephoned Ambassador Lydvo and warned that 
there was "all hell loose on the fishing grounds." The 
following day, the Icelandic media roundly condemned the 
British "aggression" and Fisheries Minister Bjarnason insisted 
that the chances of a solution to the Cod War were smaller 
than ever before.383 
In fact, however, the shocking events served as a sobering 
eye-opener in both of the warring camps. Somewhat 
surprisingly, in London this development was helped by 
," UD, 31. 11/60/XXVJ, Bjam Skogmo Minute, April 20, 1976, and Kjeld 
Vibe Minute, April 26, 1976. 
'" UD, 31.11/60/XXVI, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, April 26, 1976. 
3SZ For a detailed description, see 6ttar Sveinsson, Utkall. T)', er ad sokkva 
[Emergency. The Tyr is sinking], (Reykjavik, 2004). 
1>, UD, 31.11/60/xXVI, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, May 7, 1976. 
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changes at the highest levels.,"4 On March 16, Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson had resigned and was succeeded by ] ames 
Callaghan. Anthony Crosland took over at the Foreign Office 
and Callaghan left the fishing dispute to him, preoccnpied as 
he nOw was with even greater problems facing Britain. Less 
than half-a-year before - as was mentioned above - Crosland 
the Grimsby MP had called on his government to defend 
forcefully Britain's undisputable rights to fish on the "high 
seas." In 1971, moreover, he had described Iceland's claim to 
50 miles as "monstrous", so what would he think about the 
200 mile limit?3H5 Once in power, however, Crosland knew 
well enough what could and could not be achieved off 
Iceland. Kenneth East, based at the Foreign Office after his 
expulsion from Iceland, later recalled that when the officials 
of the fishery department in Whitehall warned against a "sell-
out" to Iceland, Crosland replied that "we had to bite the 
bullet." '"' When other Cabinet ministers heard that attitude 
from an MP from Grimsby, they must have worried less about 
the risks of condemnation there and at the other fishing ports 
of Britain. 
From Reykjavik, Olav Lydvo also reported after the serious 
events on the fishing grounds that a member of the Progressive 
Party had notified Eric Young that the Progressive Party was 
prepared to settle the dispute through the "Norwegian 
channel.,,3", As with Tomas Arnason a few weeks before, the 
contact was unnamed but this was in fact Heimir Hannesson, 
a lawyer who waS in regular touch with 61afur ]ohannesson 
and a leading member in the Atlantic Treaty Association, a 
civilian organisation with formal ties to NATO which had 
been active in the quest for Cod War peace in both this 
m See Petcr Kellner and Christopher Hitchens, Callaghan. The Road to 
Number Ten (London, 1976), 144. 
m See The Times, June 15, 1971. 
J% Author's interview with Kenneth East, January 28, 2000. 
'"' UD, 31.11160/XXVI, Olav LydvQ, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign l\!finisrcy, May 11, 1976. 
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dispute and the earlier one in the 1970s.'88 On May 11, 
Foreign Minister Agustsson also summoned Lydvo to the 
Foreign Ministry and confirmed that the Icelandic government 
was willing to accept, in principle, "the Norwegian proposal." 
The average number of trawlers could be set at "22-23" in 
return for a satisfactory outcome in other areas, in particular 
closed zones and the immediate enforcement of the reductions 
on duties on fish imports to the EEC (such reductions, it may 
be recalled, had been agreed on but "frozen" ever since the 
outbreak of the second Cod War in 1972). Agustsson added 
that he had spoken informally with the Socialist Ludvik 
J6sepsson who was to have stated that the conflict could not 
go on, although he would certainly protest all concessions to 
Britain within the 200-mile limit. Agustsson also remarked 
that 6lafur J6hannesson was going to make sure that the 
coast guard vessels wonld be held at bay in the near fnture. ", 
Nonetheless, further incidents occnrred. On May 12, the 
JEgir, a sister ship of the Tyr, tried to arrest a British trawler. 
The vessel managed to escape but the JEgir followed and fired 
solid shots at her. The coast guard vessel only broke off the 
pnrsnit after a British Nimrod surveillance aircraft warned 
that if the gunfire continned, it would reply in kind. It goes 
without saying that the authorities in London were unhappy 
with this episode. Yet, they still expressed their desire to seek 
"a fair and early settlement" to the dispute.'" After the events 
of May 6, the desire to risk fatal incidents and put an end to 
m Author's interview with Heimir Hannesson, September 12, 2002. See also 
GRFL, National Security Adviser. Presidential Name File, 1974-77. Box 3. 
Rostow, Eugene V., Eugene V. Rostow to Henry Kissinger, November 17, 
1975, White House Central Files [WHCFJ. Subject File. Box 12. FO 3-
l/Fisheries (2), Eugene V. Rostow to Sir Frank Roberts, December 12, 1975, 
and Heimir Hannesson to Eugene V. Rostow, June 26, 1976. 
'"' UD, 31. 11/60IX:>O-'VI, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, May 11, 1976. 
,," UD, 31.11160IXXVII, Foreign Office Memorandum for the North 
Atlantic Council, May 18, 1976. 
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the conflict at almost any cost had come to determine British 
policy. 
Conversely, the public in Iceland condemned the trawler's 
escape on May 12 as yet another case of British disdain for 
Icelandic laws and regulations. Members of the coast guard, 
particularly angry and upset after the severe clashes earlier in 
the month, were convinced as well that constant harassment 
was the best means to force Britain to back down.'" Ever since 
the outbreak of the Cod War, Prime Minister Hallgrimsson 
had indeed complained over some of the coast guard captains 
who, in his opinion, wanted to be "national heroes" and did 
not obey instructions to refrain from action at sensitive 
moments in the dispute.'" After the attempted arrest by the 
JEgir on May 12, Hans G. Andersen similarly suspected that 
its commander had either acted on his own initiative or that 
6lafur J6hannesson had given an order to show aggression, 
just when a negotiated settlement seemed to be in sight. If so, 
Andersen felt that such behaviour was just typical, especially 
in light of the fateful warp-cutting in January 1976, when 
Geir Hallgrimsson was meeting with James Callaghan and 
Harold Wilson in London."3 Andersen may have been too 
cynical and he held long-standing sympathies for 
m See the memoirs of four coast guard captains: Sveinn Sremundsson, 
Gudmulldllr skipberra Kjamlested I-II [!\1emoir of Gudmundur Kjxrnested, 
commander of the Tyr], (Reykjavik, 1984-85), Sigurd6r Sigurd6rsson, 
Spattgsami spor(lIgliml [The witty sparrow. Memoirs of Thr6stur 
Sigtryggsson, commander of the 6diml], (Reykjavik, 1987), Adi 
Magnusson, f kr6ppu111 5;6 [In troubled waters. Memoirs of Hclgi 
Hallvardsson, commander of the Th6r}, (Reykjavik, 1992), and Hoskuldur 
Skarpheciinsson, Suiptillgar a sjiiudrsl6d [Conflicts at sea. l\1emoirs of 
Hoskuldur Skarphedinsson, commander of the Ba/durl, (Reykjavik, 1999). 
mUD, 31.11/60/XXIV, OIav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, December 12, 1975, and GRFL, National Security 
Adviser. Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada. Box 7. Iceland-
State Department Telegrams. To SECSTATE-EXDIS, Frederick Irving, V.S. 
Embassy (Reykjavik), CO Secretary of State, February 10, 1976. 
'" UD, 31.11/601XXVII, OIav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, May 11, 1976. 
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Hallgrimsson's Independence Party. Nonetheless, the distrnst 
demonstrated the enduring conflicts, disagreements and self-
interested agendas in the Icelandic decision-making body. 
In short, despite the British determination to accept a 
settlement almost completely on Icelandic terms, as laid ont 
for instance by Einar Agustsson on May 11, it could be hard 
to get the anthorities in Reykjavik to the negotiating table. 
Three days later, Hans G. Andersen mentioned to 
Ambassador Lydvo, almost in passing, that nnfortnnately 
Agustsson had "forgotten" to mention that in any agreement 
with Britain, Iceland would have to insist on a formal 
recognition of the 200-mile limit.'" Unsurprisingly, British 
officials and ministers were disappointed with this addition to 
the list of Icelandic prerequisites. They were not that 
surprised, however. In Oslo in April, Roy Hattersley had 
complained that whenever Britain had agreed to an Icelandic 
wish list, the Icelanders had come back with a new set of 
demands:195 But the British had resolved to bite the bullet. 
While the authorities in London felt that it would be 
"inappropriate" to incorporate a formal recognition into an 
interim fishery agreement, they informed Norwegian officials 
that they "remain most eager for a negotiated settlement and 
d b fl 'bl ,,396 are prepare to e eXI e. 
Despite this newest concession, the Icelandic government 
still hesitated to commit itself to talks with the British side. On 
May 20-21, a NATO ministerial meeting was to be held in 
Oslo. Both there and in Brussels, it was felt that Agustsson 
could use the occasion to hold talks with Foreign Secretary 
Crosland. Knut Frydenlund snggested that they meet at his 
residence bnt the Icelandic Foreign Minister was still so 
worried about the possible stigma at home of talks with the 
'" UD, 31.11/60IXXVII, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign !vlinistry, May 14, 1976. 
mUD, 31.11/601X:\''VI, Bjorn Skogmo Minute, April 20, 1976. See also 
HatterlseYl \Vlha Goes Home? 143. 
,% UD, 31.11/60IXXVII, Kjeld Vibe Minute, May 18, 1976. 
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adversary that he insisted on speaking with Crosland at the 
venue for the NATO meeting. Then, as Hans G. Andersen 
explained to Ambassador Lydvo, Agustsson could simply 
deny claims by the Icelandic media that he had spoken 
specifically with Crosland about the Cod War.'" Still, the two 
would meet and once Crosland had arrived in Oslo, his 
absolute determination to end the dispute became clear. On 
May 19, he first spoke with Frydenlund and described how he 
wanted it "out of this world as soon as possible." The 
Icelandic demand for a recognition of the 200-mile limit could 
be met and if he could get from Agustsson a definite set of 
conditions for an agreement he would take that back to 
Britain and defend it both in London and Grimsby."" 
Frydenlund decided not to wait for the NATO meeting but 
to encourage Agustsson to speak with Crosland that very 
evening. The Icelandic Foreign Minister apparently felt that 
the press would not be able to hear of the encounter, as the 
two met with their entourage at his hotel. Again, the British 
Foreign Secretary indicated that Britain was ready to settle on 
Icelandic terms and the Icelanders finally seemed ready to take 
the plunge: Prime Minister Hallgrimsson was notified and 
flew to Oslo from another ministerial meeting in Finland. On 
May 21, the two Icelanders secretly met Crosland and all but 
agreed that the time had come to put an end to the Cod 
War. J99 Within the next few days, Iceland and Britain would 
declare that official negotiations were to be held. In reality, 
there would be nothing to "negotiate" but the semblance of 
give and take would give Crosland and Britain the necessary 
"face saving device." The British warships and tugboats 
would leave Icelandic waters and the trawlers would be 
advised to haul when instructed to do so by the coast guard 
mUD, 31.11160/XXVII, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ivlinistry, Ivlay 14, 1976. 
3% UD, 31.11/60IXXVII, Foreign l\.1inisrry Minute, !viay 19, 1976. See also 
.Jonsson, "Tfunda rhorskastrfdid" [The tenth Cod War), 94-95. 
_l'!~ See Geir Hallgdmsson's account in Morgunbladid, Ocrober 15 1 1985. 
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vessels. Since the "negotiations" wonld only last a day or two, 
the British side was finally prepared to break the principle of 
withdrawing the protection force withont a no-harassment 
pledge by the Icelanders.'"o 
Right after the talks in Oslo, Crosland also accepted an 
increase in closed areas within the 200-mile limit but instead 
he got the average number of British trawlers up to 24 per 
day.'" Crosland foresaw that the official talks would then 
begin on May 26 and that day representatives of the trawling 
industry were told - in strictest confidence - that the British 
government had decided to withdraw all of its protection 
forces in Icelandic waters.,"2 Once more, however, the 
Icelanders managed to bring up yet another demand.'" Within 
the government, Olafur J6hannesson insisted that Iceland 
must have a guarantee against the possibility of renewed 
demands for fishing inside the 200-mile limit after the expiry 
of the agreement. While the concern was in itself logical, Hans 
G. Andersen was certain that J6hannesson was only 
concerned with possible gains in domestic politics."" 
Presumably, Andersen suspected that J6hannesson and the 
Progressives wanted to be able to pose as the firm defenders of 
Icelandic interests who had managed to improve on a 
somewhat faulty settlement which Geir Hallgrimsson had 
already sanctioned. 
"" UD, 31.11/60/xXVII, Sir Perer Seott, British Embassy (Oslo), to Kjeld 
Vibe, May 24, 1976. 
4(H UD, 3i.11/60/XXVII, Sir Peter Sea tt, British Embassy (Oslo), to Knut 
Frydenlund, May 25, 1976. 
~O!'1vlodern Reco~ds Centre, University of\Varwick, l'vlSS.126IGE/313, File of 
correspondence, 1960-76, from the Grimsby Steam and Diesel Fishing 
Vessels' Engineers' and Firemens' Union regarding the dispute with Iceland. 
D.K. Cairns, National Fishing Liaison Officer l\1emorandum, .May 26, 
1976. 
41l; GRFL, National Security Adviser. NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean 
Ailairs Sraff: Files. Box 11. Iceland, 1976, D. Clift Briefing Item, May 28, 
1976. 
'~UD, 31.11160/XXVII, Olav Lydvo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign !vlinistry, !vlay 27,1976. 
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But would the Icelanders never commit themselves to an 
agreement, then? To outside observers, it almost seemed as if 
they were determined to force through an unconditional 
surrender by Britain. On May 28, officials in Washington had 
formed the impression that although the political leaders in 
Iceland wanted a settlement, "the emotions they themselves 
have raised among the public and their own lack of firmness 
make it difficult to be particularly optimistic at this stage. ,,4().\ 
In London, however, the retreat continued. That same day, 
the British government confirmed that when the proposed 
interim arrangement had expired, British vessels would only 
fish in the waters off Iceland according to further agreements 
with the Icelandic authorities. Finally, the Icelanders were 
satisfied. In London and Reykjavik, it was announced that on 
May 31 Icelandic and British Ministers would meet in Oslo to 
negotiate a final settlement. Behind the scenes, both sides 
agreed that this summit would merely be a formality."6 The 
previous evening, the British protection vessels sailed out of 
Icelandic waters. The talks in Oslo then proceeded without a 
hitch, as expected, and on June 1, 1976, Britain and Iceland 
signed an agreement which ended the bitter conflict between 
the countries. For the following six months, an average of 24 
British trawlers could work inside the Icelandic 200-mile limit 
(and never more than 29 at the same time). Some conservation 
areas were closed and Icelandic specialists estimated that the 
trawlers could fish what amounted to a total annual catch of 
around 50,000 tons. Also, the tariff reductions which Iceland 
had negotiated with the EEC in 1971, subject to a consensus 
on Iceland's fishing limits, were to take almost immediate 
effect, and after the expiry of the agreement on December 1, 
405 GRFL, National Security Adviser. NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean 
Affairs Staff: Files. Box I!. Iceland, 1976, D. Clift Briefing Item, May 28, 
1976. 
'0, UD, 31.1!l60/XXVII, Sir Peter Scott, British Embassy (Oslo), to Kjeld 
Vibc, May 28, 1976, and Ola\' Lycivo, Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign Ministry, 11ay 28, 1976. 
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British vessels would only fish inside the 200 miles if Iceland 
• -107 gave Its consent. 
The Cod War was over. At a press conference in Oslo, 
Anthony Crosland stated that the agreement was not 
surrender by either side but rather "a victory for common 
sense" in both Reykjavik and London. While admitting that 
the British trawling industry was deeply unhappy with the 
final outcome, Crosland could point to the fact that the 
Socialists in Iceland attacked the government for weakness 
when full triumph was at hand. Furthermore, it was in itself a 
small victory for Britain - a "face saving device" - to end the 
conflict by an agreement instead of a unilateral withdrawal of 
warships and trawlers. Then again, the protests in Iceland 
against the agreement were feeble and the Icelanders clearly 
had much more to celebrate than the British side. Naturally, 
the Norwegians were jubilant as well. Crosland openly 
thanked them, and Knut Frydenlund in particular, for the 
conciliatory efforts which had contributed to the agreement. 40" 
In the North Atlantic Council, Joseph Luns also praised 
Frydenlund for the "very discreet and very effective 
contribution to this happy result." In Washington, likewise, 
Norwegian diplomats described how everyone was praising 
Norway for its decisive contribution, adding that it was 
"especially good to be Norwegian in Washington right 
now.,,-I09 
Frydenlund's efforts had all taken place behind the scenes 
and when the media in Iceland suspected an uncanny 
Norwegian interest in the dispute, Prime Minister 
Hallgrimsson and others were quick to deny any involvement 
~1J7 See J6nsson, FrieNds;l1 Conflict, 180-181, and ]onsson, "Tiundn 
thorskastrfdid" [The tenth Cod WarJ, 98-104. 
40\ UD, 31.11/60/XXVIJ, Press Conference Transcript, June 1, 1976. 
4D3 VD, 31.11160/XXVII, Norwegian Delegation to NATO to Foreign 
Ministry, June 1, 1976, and Norwegian Embassy (Washington), to Foreign 
Ministry, June 3, 1976. 
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by the authorities in Oslo.'1O Frydenlund himself also had to 
reject such claims although he did not like the need to mislead 
people. "The truth was," as he later put it, "that Norway, 
along with ]oseph Luns, played a great role in the solution of 
the conflict.,,'ll Obviously, the Cod War would somehow 
have come to an end without Knut Frydenlund's keen 
involvement. In that case it is quite possible that Luns, who 
always played a significant part behind the scenes, would have 
been even more active. It is also possible that Britain would 
have been forced to accept unconditional surrender off Iceland 
and leave the fishing grounds unceremoniously. Last but not 
least, it is not inconceivable that the conflict conld have 
dragged on and deepened, maybe even with the use of arms 
and loss of life. Feelings against Britain, NATO and the V.S. 
presence in Iceland would then have reached new heights in 
the country. A resolution on the withdrawal from NATO and 
the expulsion of V.S. forces could then have been passed in 
the Althing, on the basis that Iceland could not accept an 
alliance or defence forces which were of no use in a deadly 
fight against Iceland's main enemy. 
In the long run, the Icelanders would almost certainly not 
have benefited from escalation or a total vicrory. In May 
1976, at the height of the conflict with no clear solution in 
sight, the V.S. administration had obviously grown tired of 
the constant threat that unless they and other NATO states 
acceded to Icelandic demands on fishing limits, the American 
forces might have to leave the island. Notwithstanding 
Iceland's clear strategic value, President Gerald R. Ford 
therefore agreed that a study should be undertaken of "the 
political, military, and intelligence importance of Iceland to 
the V.S. and NATO." In this connection, the options and 
410 See for instance Morguubladid, March 25, 1976, and 
UD/31. 11/60IXXVI, Olav LydvJ), Norwegian Embassy (Reykjavik), to 
Foreign !vIinistry, }.1arch 25, 1976. 
HI Morgll11bladid, December 5,1979. 
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costs of relocation were also to be considered.'" And that 
would of course involve Norway. As before, Norwegian 
interest in Iceland's fishing conflicts can only be understood in 
the strategic context. It is true that Foreign Minister 
Frydenlund was partly driven by the unselfish will to do the 
good thing and help allies who found themselves in an 
apparently insoluble conflict where outside assistance was 
needed. Partly, however, he was also driven by the self-
interested concern for Norway's defence interests. Within the 
Foreign Ministry, Kjeld Vibe summarised that factor in mid-
May 1976: 
The background to Norway's engagement has primarily been 
the risk that a continuation of the conflict might make the 
Icelandic government question again both Iceland's 
membership in NATO and the continued operation of the 
U.S. base at Keflavik. From the Norwegian point of view, 
Iceland's membership in NATO and Iceland's contribution to 
the Atlantic alliance are an important part of the strategic and 
military balance in the Northern region.m 
To conclude, Ambassador Kenneth East was later to assert 
that "Knut Frydenlund saved everybody's bacon. Frydenlund 
deserves to have a statue in Reykjavik and in Whitehall.,,414 
The praise is fair, but should statues be raised to honour his 
conduct in the Cod War, there probably should also be one in 
Oslo. 
m GRFL, National Security Adviser, NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean 
Aff<lirs Staff, Files, box 11, Iceland, 1976 NSC, Scowcroft memorandum, 
undated, but from middle or late May 1976. See also Gudni J6hannesson, 
"To the Edge of Nowhere", 115-37. 
'" UD, 31.11/60IXXVII, Kjeld Vibe Minute, May 18, 1976. 
m Author's interview \vith Kenneth East, January 28, 2000. 
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Chapter 10 
Condusion 
Norwegian policy during the Anglo-Icelandic fishing dispntes 
after the Second World War was gnided by the determination 
to advance and protect Norway's national interest. This study 
has shown, however, how difficult that was since the various 
aspects of the national interest could conflict or contradict 
each other. Moreover, it has been established how the defence 
of purely Norwegian interests inflnenced decision-making in 
Oslo more than sympathy for Iceland or the desire to follow 
an "ethical foreign policy". During the disputes, Norway 
primarily offered its good offices and tried in various ways to 
find a solution because of the egocentric concern that a 
prolongation of the conflicts could harm the defence interests 
of Norway, or make it difficnlt for the authorities in Oslo to 
follow their chosen course of action in matters of the law of 
the sea and territorial waters. Thus, Norway's policy could be 
unfavourable to Icelandic interests. But even if it was selfish 
rather than enlightened, the Icelanders sometimes had every 
reason to be thankful for Norwegian interest and intervention 
in the disputes. Furthermore, Britain and Iceland, the two 
warring sides, were of course only fighting for their own 
particular interests, so why should Norway not do so as well? 
In 1948-52, the first phase of the extension of Iceland's 
fishing limits, the Norwegians and the Icelanders appeared to 
be in the same boat. Both nations wanted to enforce a four-
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mile limit and both could base their claims on even wider 
fishing limits from the time when they were together under 
Danish rule. Both nations faced opposition from Britain and 
although Iceland began to get rid of the treaty with Britain 
from 1901 on three-mile territorial waters around the island, 
it was Norway which took the lead in this period. From the 
autumn of 1948, Norway fully enforced its Royal Decree from 
1935 on a four-mile limit off North Norway, measured from 
baselines between headlands and the outermost islands and 
skerries. In late 1951, when the International Court of Justice 
endorsed this method of delimitation, there was great 
jubilation in Iceland. A fellow Nordic nation had had its way 
against Britain and the Icelanders could now follow. 
By then, Iceland had already extended the fishing limits off 
its north coast to four miles, thus closing some traditional 
grounds to Norwegian herring fishermen. The response in 
Norway to this action had not been positive, even if it was 
based on the Norwegian precedent, and Norwegian attitudes 
did not improve when the Icelanders went all the way in 
1952, declaring a baseline-measured four-mile limit around 
the whole island. The authorities in Oslo wanted to protect 
the "herring" aspect of the national interest, i.e. the right to 
maintain long-established fishing rights off Iceland. They 
realised perfectly well, however, that if they issued formal 
protests they could be accused of hypocrisy and selfishness. 
The clear desire do raise objections still demonstrated that the 
Norwegian policymakers did not think that they shared a 
common cause with Iceland. The Icelanders, meanwhile, felt 
that Norway was duty bound to support them and were 
indignant when they found out that the Norwegians would at 
best be neutral in the looming struggle between Iceland and 
Britain. Hence, tension was inevitable: on the one hand, the 
newly independent nation could be self-centred and naive 
about the willingness of other nations to support its point of 
view. On the other hand, the Norwegian authorities showed 
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no interest to follow an "ethical foreign policy" in their 
dealings with the Icelanders. 
Icelandic displeasure over Norwegian attitudes continned in 
1952-56. In this period, British trawler owners (with tacit 
blessing in London) imposed a ban on the landings of iced fish 
from Icelandic trawlers. Where was Norwegian sympathy and 
Nordic unity when it was needed? The Icelanders were 
enraged that Britain, an ally in NATO, would resort to 
economic coercion and they were also disappointed with the 
lack of pressure on Britain from Norway. Here the Icelanders 
continued to expect too much moral support from Oslo and 
the whole Nordic region, especially with regard to the 
apolitical Nordic Council. The authorities in Oslo also had to 
keep the herring interests in mind and, in general, the 
conflicting interests of Norway's inshore fishermen and the 
distant-water fishermen and hunters (of whale and seal) made 
it difficult to formulate a clear policy on fishing limits and 
territorial waters. Shipping interests intervened in this regard 
as well. But when the OEEC decided to work towards the 
lifting of the landing ban the Norwegian delegate, Arne 
Skaug, played an important part. Other Western nations 
clearly felt that the Norwegians were most likely to be able to 
reason with the Icelanders. 
Norwegian interest in the termination of the landing ban 
intensified in 1956 when a left-wing government came to 
power in Reykjavik, seemingly determined to expel the U.S. 
troops from the island who had been stationed there since 
1951. Within NATO, it was agreed that the Icelanders had to 
be convinced of the benefits of Western cooperation and it 
was easy to conclude that the British coercion would then 
have to end. As before, policymakers in the West were also of 
the opinion that when it came to persuading the Icelanders, 
their close friends the Norwegians were the obvious choice. 
However, during the crisis in Iceland in 1956 when the United 
States appeared ready to treat the new leftist regime as an 
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outcast, Norwegian representatives did well by counselling 
moderation in Washington rather than in Reykjavik. In doing 
so, they based their advice on their knowledge of Iceland's 
domestic politics where there was in fact a majority in favour 
of the continuation of the U.S. presence. Furthermore, they 
knew that undue external pressure would not have the desired 
effect on the "obstinate" Icelanders. Norway's soothing voice, 
in particular that of Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, 
contributed to the easing of tension between Iceland and its 
Western allies. For that, the pro-Western Icelanders could be 
grateful, but it must be noted that Norwegian efforts were 
primarily based on the worry that in the unlikely event of 
Iceland actually ordering the removal of U.S. forces, NATO 
defences in the North Atlantic would be weakened and 
pressure on the Norwegians to accept foreign troops on their 
soil would greatly increase. Norwegian interests were at stake, 
hence the involvement. This self-centred approach was also 
evident when Norwegian officials and politicians expressed 
concern about economic assistance to Iceland and possible 
means to decrease its trade with the Soviet Union, established 
because of the infamous landing ban. Would such efforts not 
harm the Norwegian fishing industry? Norway had been put 
in a "no-win situation," it was argued in Oslo in 1956-57. 
Ultimately, the Norwegian government was willing to offer 
Iceland a modest financial loan but was then spared the 
nuisance of supporting the Icelanders, a keen competitor on 
some of the world's fish markets, by their own refusal to 
accept a string of small loans from the NATO countries (for 
fear that Iceland might be considered a beggar in Western 
circles). 
By 1957, one crisis had been solved but another lay ahead. 
Ever since the end of the Second World War, the law of the 
sea had developed in favour of coastal states. Although a 
United Nations conference in early 1958 failed to secure an 
agreement on the width of fishing limits and territorial waters, 
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it was clear that the status quo could not be maintained. In 
September that year, Iceland went ahead and declared a 12-
mile fishing limit. The Norwegian authorities had hoped that 
the Icelanders would not act unilaterally in such a manner, 
both since it would lead to increased calls for similar action in 
North Norway, and since they rightly feared that Britain 
would not accept the extended limit. Indeed, the rulers in 
London had asked the Norwegians to get that message across 
in Reykjavik. As with the United States and the base crisis in 
1956, Halvard Lange and the other Norwegian 
representatives concluded that not only would they be unable 
to persuade the Icelanders to back down but that they should 
also recommend the British side to show restraint. That did 
not happen, however. The Royal Navy sailed to the waters off 
Iceland and protected British trawlers from harassment by 
Icelandic coast guard vessels. 
The first Cod War had begun. Norway obviously wanted 
Britain to withdraw their warships and acknowledge defeat in 
the dispute because of the damaging effect its continuation 
could have on Icelandic attitudes towards NATO and the U.S. 
base. Still, the Norwegians understood the British point of 
view and were accepted as mediators by both sides in the 
conflict. In early 1960, after a stand-off in the disputed waters 
for more than year, Foreign Minister Lange and NATO 
Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak secretly sought a solution. 
Although they were not successful, their ideas for an end to 
the conflict were heavily in favour of Iceland and contributed 
to the feeling in London that it would ultimately be necessary 
to withdraw the warships and accept Iceland's 12-mile limit. 
Indeed, the Royal Navy left the waters off Iceland before 
the second United Nations conference on the law of the sea, 
held later in 1960. This time, the international community 
was only one vote from accepting the principle of 12-mile 
fishing limits (with a ten year phase-out period for traditional 
distant-water fishing). After the conference, the Norwegian 
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government announced that it would impose a 12-mile limit 
but that it would of course negotiate phase-out rights with 
interested countries. Norway was never a "unilateralist" on 
the oceans. Then again, the Icelanders grumbled that the 
Norwegians had simply let them do all the hard work in the 
fight against Britain and then they wanted to follow and reap 
the benefits. While there was some truth in that, it was of 
course not Norway's fault that Iceland had acted unilaterally 
and precipitated the Cod War. In late 1960, Britain and 
Norway reached agreement on the 12-mile extension, with a 
ten-year transitory period. Then, in early 1961, the Cod War 
came to an end as Britain accepted the 12-mile limit off 
Iceland, in return for three-year fishing rights inside the new 
line and a commitment by the Icelandic government to refer 
possible disputes in the future to the International Court of 
Justice. The Norwegians obviously wanted to achieve the 
same phase-out rights in Icelandic waters which Britain (and 
West Germany) had achieved but reluctantly refrained from 
making formal requests because of Icelandic warnings that 
such selfishness was not expected from "friends" and 
"cousins" . 
In 1971, a new left-wing coalition came to power in 
Iceland. It was intent on extending the fishing limit to 50 miles 
and decided to ignore the treaty obligations from a decade 
before, on the referral of disputes to the International Court. 
The Norwegian government did not like this hard-line stand, 
not only because of the obvious risk of renewed conflict with 
Britain but because the opponents of Norwegian membership 
of the EEC used the Icelandic example to support the 
contention that Norway should extend its national 
jurisdiction instead of opening its waters to European 
fishermen. In this sense, the Icelandic policy undoubtedly 
contributed to the Norwegian rejection of entry into the EEC 
in September 1972. At the beginning of that month, the 50-
mile extension had taken effect off Iceland. The Icelandic 
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coast guard vessels had developed a new "secret weapon" in 
the shape of "cutters" which severed the trawl-wires of the 
British trawlers. The trawlermen demanded naval protection 
but initially the authorities in London refrained from that 
action, mindful of the experience in the first Cod War when 
the Royal Navy presence had been costly, risky and ultimately 
unsuccessful. 
Furthermore, in its manifesto the Icelandic regime had 
promised to order all U .5. troops out of Iceland within the 
next four years. That, of course, was bad news for Norway. 
The Soviet naval build-up, which had begun in earnest in the 
1960s, meant that Western defence and surveillance 
installations in Iceland were deemed even more important 
than before. Even the neutral Swedes, no friends of the United 
States in this period, emphasised that Scandinavian security 
was dependent on the U.S. presence in Iceland. The Icelandic 
Prime Minister, leader of the centrist Progressive Party, 
acknowledged Norwegian concerns and apparently gave the 
secret pledge that Iceland would take no final action on the 
U.S. presence before consultations with the government in 
Oslo. Within his coalition, only the most left-wing party was 
genuinely behind the pledge to expel the Americans. The 
Norwegian authorities were somewhat reassured by that but 
they realised quite well that an escalation of the conflict on the 
fishing grounds could evoke strong feelings among the 
nationalistic Icelanders against NATO and the U.S. base. 
The feared escalation began in May 1973, when the Royal 
Navy reappeared in the waters off Iceland and began to 
protect British trawlers from the coast guard vessels and their 
hated "cutters". Tempers ran high and the Norwegians 
immediately offered to mediate in the dispute. The rather far-
fetched idea of offering to send unarmed Norwegian vessels to 
keep peace in the disputed wasters was even mooted in Oslo. 
The Icelandic authorities were not willing to accept 
Norwegian arbitration or mediation and they clearly felt that 
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the Norwegians were only interested in the dispute because of 
its strategic connotations for themselves. By the fall of 1973 it 
looked as if Norway's involvement in the Cod War would 
take the form of looking after Iceland's interests in Britain. 
The rupture of diplomatic relations between the two COuntries 
was imminent when, at the last moment, both sides backed 
down and reached a two-year compromise on British fishing 
within the 50-mile limit, rather in favour of Iceland. Norway's 
Cod War engagement in 1973 had never been decisive. The 
Norwegians did play a noticeable role, however, by constantly 
arguing in both London and Brussels that a solution was 
impossible unless the Royal Navy left the disputed waters. The 
offer to take care of Icelandic interests also demonstrated the 
close ties between Iceland and Norway. No other state was 
such an obvious candidate for this role (Denmark was ruled 
out because of the "colonial" link). 
In 1974, the leftist regime in Iceland collapsed and was 
replaced by a centre-right coalition which was quick to 
abandon all plans for the expulsion of D.S. troops from the 
country. The new government was determined to extend the 
fishing limits once more, this time to 200 miles. That 
extension took effect against Britain in November 1975. 
Trawls were immediately cut and this time Britain did not 
hesitate to send in the Royal Navy. Nasty clashes occurred at 
sea and in February 1976, Iceland broke off diplomatic 
relations with Britain. The irate Icelanders even seemed willing 
to leave, or threaten to leave, NATO and once again the 
future of the U.S. base was in jeopardy. After the rupture of 
diplomatic relations between the two NATO states (a unique 
event in the history of the alliance), negotiations between 
Iceland and Britain appeared impossible. As had been planned 
in 1973, Norway took over the protection of Icelandic 
interests in Britain and Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund 
increased his efforts to facilitate an end to the conflict. While 
the self-centred concern for Norwegian security interests lay 
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behind these endeavours, Frydenlund sincerely wanted to be 
of assistance in the conflict. That he managed to do, with help 
from the NATO Secretary General, Joseph Luns. Both sides 
needed a mediator who could convey tentative proposals and 
counter-proposals, make fresh suggestions and keep up the 
pressure for talks. Britain also needed a "face-saving" formula 
in the shape of talks in a third country, in order to avoid the 
impression of total defeat in the dispute. 
On June 1, an agreement to end the Cod War was signed in 
Oslo after brief "negotiations". In fact, they only confirmed a 
solution which both countries had previously accepted in 
secret talks, brokered by Norway and NATO. Five months 
later, the last British trawlers left Icelandic waters for good. 
While this last Cod War would probably have come to a 
similar end without Frydenlund's active involvement, it could 
also have escalated with the loss of life at sea and even 
Iceland's resignation from NATO. Thus, his efforts were 
certainly valuable for the majority of Icelanders, usually pro-
Western at heart. In that context it made no difference that 
the protection of Norwegian defence interests lay primarily 
behind the Norwegian involvement, as always. 
